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Master's Dissertation
DOI
https://doi.org/10.11606/D.12.2009.tde-18122009-090455
Document
Author
Full name
Eric Universo Rodrigues Brasil
E-mail
Institute/School/College
Knowledge Area
Date of Defense
Published
São Paulo, 2009
Supervisor
Committee
Postali, Fernando Antonio Slaibe (President)
Madeira, Gabriel de Abreu
Mattos, César Costa Alves de
Title in Portuguese
Renda de informação nos leilões de exploração de petróleo no Brasil: uma estimação não-paramétrica com assimetria entre os agentes
Keywords in Portuguese
Gás natural
Leilão
Organização industrial
Petróleo
Abstract in Portuguese
Esta dissertação tem como objetivo estimar a renda de informação apropriada pelos vencedores dos leilões para exploração e produção de petróleo e gás natural no Brasil. Assume-se um modelo estrutural de leilão de valor privado independente. Foram estimadas as distribuições dos lances e dos valores privados dos lançadores de forma não-paramétrica, assumindo assimetria entre os participantes (Petrobras+OGX versus outros). Para isso, explorou-se um banco de dados construído a partir de informações de todos os leilões realizados entre 1999 e 2008. Tal estudo é relevante por tentar avaliar o sucesso do governo brasileiro e das empresas licitantes nestes leilões, principalmente diante da discussão do novo marco regulatório do pré-sal. Os resultados sugerem que a Petrobras e a OGX obtiveram rendas de informação significativamente maiores que as demais concorrentes. Tais rendas variam entre 14% e 63%, dependendo do número de competidores e de seu tipo. De maneira geral, o governo tende a extrair maior parte do preço de reserva do vencedor do leilão quando este não é a Petrobras ou a OGX e quanto maior for o número de concorrentes.
Title in English
Information rent in the exploration auctions of oil in Brazil: a non-parametric estimation assuming asymmetry between the participants
Keywords in English
Auctions
Oil industry
Regulation
Abstract in English
This dissertation aims to estimate the information rent grabbed by the winners of auctions for exploration and production of oil and natural gas in Brazil. It assumes a structural model of independent private values for the auctions. We estimated non-parametrically both the distributions of bids and the distribution of private values from bidders, assuming asymmetry between the participants (Petrobras + OGX versus others). For this, we explored a database with information about all the auctions held between 1999 and 2008. This study is relevant since it tries to assess the success of the Brazilian government and bidders in these auctions, especially before the discussion on the new regulatory framework of pre-salt. Results suggest that Petrobras and OGX obtained information rents significantly higher than other competitors. These rents vary between 14% and 63%, depending on the number of competitors and on their types. In general, the government tends to capture most of the reserve price of the winning bidder when it is not Petrobras or OGX and the greater the number of competitors.
 
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Publishing Date
2009-12-21
 
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