

Universidade de São Paulo and King's College of London

Joint Degree Program:

Instituto de Relações Internacionais (USP) and King's Brazil Institute (KCL)

Brazilian Educational Diplomacy:

PEC-G and PEC-PG as Foreign Policy Tools

São Paulo

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PEC-G and PEC-PG as Foreign Policy Tools

Dissertation submitted to *Instituto de Relações Internacionais* at Universidade de São Paulo in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of *Doctor of International Relations*.

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To my beloved daughter, the reason of everything.

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Abstract

Can developing countries influence the transnational arena using science and education as foreign policy tools? Soft power is usually related to developed countries as consequence of military and economic power. However, taking in account its own constraints, major developing countries are designing strategies adapted to the new transnational arena modified by technological transformations. Those strategies include scientific and educational agreements towards an exchange of knowledge and shaping public opinion: science, education and innovation diplomacy. To shed light on the central question presented above, I will use as a case study the Brazilian international scholarship program, addressing other issues. Do Brazilian scholarships influence these students' perception towards the country's projection in the international arena? What are the determinants of their perception? Do these students become elites who can influence Brazilian international relations in the future? Thereby, I aim to analyse the role of the international scholarships funded by the Brazilian government to assess the factors that contribute to the success or not of the Brazilian Educational and Foreign Policy. Using a survey with different groups of international students and researchers, I will use statistical analysis to compare their perception of Brazil, indicating the effect of some determinants as field of study, country of residence and the Brazilian region where they pursued their degrees or realized their researches. Also, the survey allows enlighten soft power indicators according to the literature.

Key Words

Foreign Police. Power. Perception. Educational Diplomacy.

Resumo

Os países em desenvolvimento podem influenciar a arena transnacional usando a ciência e a educação como ferramentas de política externa? O poder brando está geralmente relacionado aos países desenvolvidos como consequência do poder militar e econômico. No entanto, levando em conta suas próprias limitações, os principais países em desenvolvimento estão desenvolvendo estratégias adaptadas à nova arena transnacional modificada pelas transformações tecnológicas. Estas estratégias incluem acordos científicos e educacionais para uma troca de conhecimento e moldar a opinião pública: diplomacia de ciência, educação e inovação. Para elucidar a questão central apresentada acima, utilizarei como estudo de caso o programa de bolsas de estudos internacionais brasileiro, abordando outras questões. As bolsas de estudo brasileiras influenciam a percepção desses estudantes em relação à projeção do país na arena internacional? Quais são os determinantes da sua percepção? Esses alunos se tornam elites que podem influenciar as relações internacionais brasileiras no futuro? Assim, pretendo analisar o papel das bolsas internacionais financiadas pelo governo brasileiro para avaliar os fatores que contribuem para o sucesso da Política Externa e Educacional do Brasil. Utilizando uma pesquisa com diferentes grupos de estudantes e pesquisadores internacionais, utilizarei a análise estatística para comparar sua percepção sobre o Brasil, indicando o efeito de alguns determinantes no campo de estudo, país de residência e região brasileira onde se realizaram ou realizaram seus estudos. pesquisas. Além disso, a pesquisa permite esclarecer indicadores de poder brando de acordo com a literatura.

Palavras-Chave

Política externa. Poder. Percepção. Diplomacia Educacional.

Introduction

This research aims to analyze how Brazilian international scholarships granted to foreign students through the Programs for Partner Undergraduate and Graduate Students (respectively, PEC-G and PEC-PG) impact the way these students perceive Brazil.

These scholarships could be thought of as soft power tools through public diplomacy, as well as a strategy to promote the development of countries of the Global South. To support this analysis, I will conduct an online survey with foreign students currently studying or that have previously studied in Brazil. This survey will compare the perception of students who received the PEC scholarships with the perception of those who did not receive them, in order to evaluate the impact of granting this benefit.

Higher education scholarships to international students are very common in developed countries, and their objectives can be divided into two broad categories: (a) development grants: for humanitarian purposes (usually funded by government departments that work with international assistance); and (b) public diplomacy/soft power scholarships: for political purposes, such as the creation of long-term bilateral relations and positive feelings towards donor countries (grants usually funded through foreign policy-related departments) (MAWER, 2014a, p. 2).

Despite this division, these goals are not mutually exclusive, and scholarships generally include both goals: development and public diplomacy. Thus, I expect many of the observations and conclusions relevant to one of the purposes to be relevant to the other. Another important aspect for the evaluation of international scholarship programs, especially those designed to be both a development and a power strategy tool, will be measuring the students' rate of return to their countries of origin and the factors involved in this trend, since the return is required for fulfilling both objectives of international scholarships.

In order to ascertain whether these international scholarships achieve these objectives, it is necessary to constantly evaluate them. Moreover, the program may be reformulated based on the information obtained from the study of these evaluations.

The *Commonwealth Scholarship Report* (2016) shows that, because of the need for investment, international scholarships are usually funded by high-income countries. However, middle-income countries such as Brazil have increasingly deployed the policy of granting scholarships. Unlike the grants awarded by high-income countries, though, there is a lack of evaluation data on scholarships in these countries.

With this research, I intend to help fill this gap by analyzing the impact of Brazilian scholarships on foreign students, mainly focusing on three points: professional development; perception about Brazil; and residence trends of researchers after graduation.

In order to achieve such goals, I have divided this study into three chapters. The first, for expository reasons, was developed in three parts. In the first part, I discuss the transformation of the contemporary global arena that allowed and increased the importance of soft forms of power. In the second, I address the concept of power through different typologies in the literature, as well as other related concepts that are essential for the discussion held in the empirical chapter. The third part deals with soft power (and its conceptual problems) and public diplomacy as a contemporary trend.

In the second chapter, I carry out a literature review focused on the evaluation of international scholarship programs for higher education. Divided in two parts, it initially discusses the substantive issues addressed by the literature, and then the methodological issues, analyzing both limitations and possibilities for the case under study.

In the third chapter, the empirical section of the research will be developed with the purpose of demonstrating the results obtained with the survey and indicating possible future developments of the work.

1. Power

There are different concepts of power in the literature related to Social Sciences. Weber (1978, p. 53) states that power “is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.” Also, “power is latent force”¹, as sustained by Biersted. In the same sense, Dahl's (1957, pp. 202–203) classic view of power in the field of International Relations defines it as a relation between people as follows: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.”²

Two important observations arise from these definitions: power presupposes a social relationship; and, according to Keohane (2013), following Baldwin's stance (1979), power is a *capacity*, not a resource. And this capacity relates to the existence and mobilization of specific *resources* to achieve certain results. Both this capacity and the resources available are constantly being developed, accompanying, among other factors, the technology available.

In the case of scholarships, resources are not only culture, values and educational institutions, but primarily financial resources. And, following the definitions above, power is the capacity to mobilize such resources for the creation of a foreign policy that uses those resources for certain purposes. According to the main hypothesis of this dissertation, besides cooperating with the development of foreign students and their countries, the goal of the policy of granting international scholarships would be to increase the influence of the donor country on the recipient country.

In this sense, I adopt an assumption that emphasizes the *state bureaucratic organization*, or the *government of a state*, as the creator, sponsor and guarantor of policies implemented by *educational institutions*. Nonetheless, I want to look at aspects of their outcome for *individuals*, who would, in the abstract, be more likely to establish a long-term relationship with the donor country and become elites in their countries of origin. Receiving

¹ In his text *Power, Authority and Influence*, Paul Mott (1970) makes a revision of the concept of power. Some of the definitions he mentions are: Goldhammer and Shils: a person has power ‘to the extent that he influences the behavior of others in accordance with his own intentions;’ Weber: ‘Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will, despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests;’ Biersted: ‘Power is latent force.’”

² According to Lukes (2004), Dahl in 1957 speaks of power as a capacity (potential power) and, in 1969, of power as a successful attempt (effective power). In this work, we will use the definition of power as a capacity. Polsby's definition (1963, pp. 3–4) goes in the same direction, by stating that power is “the capacity of one actor to do something affecting another actor, which changes the probable pattern of specified future events.”

formal education at undergraduate and graduate level would make them more likely to take positions as decision-makers and information disseminators in governments, institutions and civil society.

On the one hand, while recognizing the existence of new actors (RUGGIE, 2004), I believe that state governments are the main players in the global arena, since they are responsible for creating projects and the policies capable of mobilizing resources to accomplish them. On the other hand, however, I recognize that the State is formed by a set of relatively coherent institutions, which are constantly created, extinguished, and modified by human beings capable of doing so in line with Wendt (1999). This justifies, from the perspective of the exercise of power, investment in educational projects: more than a human right that constitutes dignity, it translates into a *certain* formation of qualified human capital through formal education and immersion in certain values and beliefs that will guide their actions in the future.

Thus, in order to analyze certain state government policies³ and their results, it is necessary to understand the relationship between mobilization capacity and resources available to a particular government and their impact on individual behavior, integrating the three dimensions mentioned above. Therefore, the importance of a given resource and the ability of a government to use it depend on a careful situational analysis that must consider the interaction between domestic and global factors and, as I assume in this research, the centrality of the human being in constructing several social structures.

I therefore use Realism-aligned assumptions about the State's major role in policy-making, but I include considerations from other theoretical frameworks in the analysis, whilst being careful not to fall into uncritical syncretism. This is because, herein, I recognize the human component and its growing importance in the contemporary world in view of technological evolution⁴.

With increasing speed since the 1970s, the change of technological possibilities⁵ available for information, transportation and production (especially the transnationalization

³ As opposed to corporate governments, which have transnational scope.

⁴ I also recognize the importance of educational institutions, through which the national bureaucratic organization acts to build its domestic cultural élan and, in international relations, to disseminate and legitimate its values and culture.

⁵ Regarding technological possibilities and their relationship with the construction of reality, Nye (2004, p. 30) states that "in such a diverse world, all three sources of power—military, economic, and soft—remain relevant, although in different degrees in different relationships. However, if the current economic and social trends of the information revolution continue, soft power will become more important in the mix."

of production and consumption of goods and services) have profoundly changed the characteristics of the contemporary global arena, and were therefore called “Third Scientific and Technological Revolution.”⁶

One of the main changes was the access to information by more and more individuals, whether or not they belonged to organizations. This included new actors in debates and activities that were once limited to strategic elites, who had access to bureaucratic structures linked to States—and not all States—and to large amounts of capital. This statement is aligned with Hurrell (2013) and implies two important consequences for my analysis:

(1) the global space was opened for a greater number of state (not only those considered to be developed) and non-state actors, while also enabling formal and informal processes of accountability that influence the distribution and cost of power;

(2) there was an increase in the cost of exercising coercive and co-opting power⁷, and, as a consequence thereof, processes of attraction—whose resources are culture, values, and knowledge—became more used by actors because they are more legitimate and less costly.

As a result, actors previously excluded from global decisions and debates because they do not have traditional power resources, which include governments (or States) considered as developing, have acquired the *capacity* to mobilize certain resources to participate in decision-making processes previously restricted to the holders of military and economic power. This has given them the possibility of acting in order to change their position in the transnational arena.

In this research, the *capacity* to mobilize resources means promoting policies that use educational and cultural resources, as well as financial resources, as a legitimate foreign policy tool: the provision of international scholarships by governments.

The use of scholarships as an instrument of foreign policy—and power—is already present in the literature on International Relations and Political Science, as will be discussed in Chapter 3. However, research on the topic usually focuses on developed state actors who, considering the higher cost of exercising co-opting and coercive power, have the ability to mobilize their financial and cultural resources to maintain their position and increase their influence. Nevertheless, as already pointed out, not only have changes in the global arena

⁶ According to Farah Júnior (2000, p. 49), for example, “this movement of great social, technical, economic and cultural transformations that became more pronounced in the 80s is a process, although not hegemonic, of profound change inside capitalist societies, characterized as the third technical scientific revolution, not only as regards factory routines, but in basically all socioeconomic activities.”

⁷ The word “coercion” means threat, whereas the word “co-option” means the concrete use of force, the materialization of the threat. In this work both concepts—often used interchangeably by authors such as Keohane (2013, p. 41)—are related to the hard forms of power.

favored the choice for more legitimate processes, such as attraction; they have also affected which actors have the ability to mobilize such resources.

Thus, before discussing the use of scholarships as an instrument of power increasingly used by countries with different income levels, it will be necessary to deepen the discussion about the transformation of the transnational arena that allowed this new form of power to come into existence.

1.1. Changes in the Contemporary Global Arena

Economic integration, a significant increase in physical mobility, as well as communication and information among the most distant regions of the globe are technological developments that allowed globalization processes to advance. The results of such processes include an expressive increase in exchanges between people of different cultures and legal realities (BARTON *et al.*, 2008; HART; PRAKASH, 2003), and changes in the logic of production and consumption, with new social organizations that carry out production in a global way.

The existence of this new, globalized arena was made possible by technological development, with the intensification of communication processes, and increased, on the one hand, interdependence (KEOHANE; NYE, 1998) between governments (or States), and, on the other hand, the responsibility and accountability of agents, both within institutions (formally: accountability) and in civil society (informally: public opinion, *name and shame*) through the spread of information and speeches.

Moreover, the establishment of regimes and international and multilateral organizations has created a global public domain: the system of States has been inserted in an institutionalized transnational arena of discourse, controversy and organized action, with multiple actors, which turned out to be deeper and more comprehensive than the previous one (RUGGIE, 2004). Composed by the interaction between non-state actors and States, it enables a more direct expression and the pursuit of several human interests, and not only those mediated (filtered, interpreted and promoted) by state bureaucratic structures.

This transnational arena is anchored in norms and expectations, as well as in institutional networks and shared circuits within, across and beyond States, which gain real-time dynamic density thanks to technology. The effect of the new global public domain is not—at least so far—that of replacing States, but rather incorporating governance systems into a global framework of social capacity that did not exist before (RUGGIE, 2004).

The aspects of power related to co-option and coercion as an ability to use resources as positive or negative stimuli remain fundamental to relationships and negotiations in the transnational arena. However, in this new context, the ability to affect the decision-making agenda and to modify what people want or believe through a process of attraction and persuasion also becomes central.

These skills or abilities related to attraction and persuasion are called *soft power* by Nye (2004) and others (FELS; KREMER; KRONENBERG, 2012; KURLANTZICK, 2007; MELISSEN, 2005; WATANABE; MCCONNELL, 2008). In view of their conceptual breadth, this research will deal with soft forms of power as one of the dimensions of power in the contemporary, technology-built reality, as opposed to coercion and co-option. I will, however, also employ more specific concepts, which will be presented in subsequent sections.

Likewise, Hurrel (2013) states that the nature and dynamics of power are changing to re-signify the concept of *having power*: the ability of attracting, related to soft forms of power, has become more used than those of repelling or threatening, related to the idea of co-optive and coercive power, in view of the cost they represent.

Naim (2013, pp. 1–2) also addresses these transformations that affect world politics by announcing the *decay of power*. For the author, material power was of great importance in the twentieth century; however, the trend of the twenty-first century would be the opposite⁸, as it values other aspects of power over those related to coercion and co-option. According to Naim, coercive power has given decreasing and short-term returns, which makes its maintenance very costly⁹.

One of the consequences of this new configuration of the transnational arena is the opening of opportunities for countries without military or economic power comparable to that of great powers to exploit institutional procedures and political debates grounded on civil society in order to influence the international agenda (HURRELL, 2006) and to modify the distribution of power, that is, to *emerge*.

⁸ Rostoks (2015) argues that, even if Naim is right, most countries would rather having material capabilities of power than not, indicating that, despite the trend, there are limitations of other forms of power as compared to hard power.

⁹ Naim (2013, pp. 1–2), however, also warns of possible harmful consequences of this new trend in which power is more diluted: “a world where players have enough power to block everyone else’s initiatives, but no one has the power to impose its preferred course of action, is a world where decisions are not taken, taken too late, or watered down to the point of ineffectiveness.”

This new configuration of the global arena—caused by communication, data storage and transportation new technologies—modifies both what is considered a power resource and the ways power can be exercised.

1.2. Soft Power: Concept and Criticism


The definition of power on which this research is grounded is given by Dahl (1957), as being A's ability to cause B to do something B would not otherwise do, plus Baldwin's emphasis (1979) on the fact that power is a *capacity* related to the existence and mobilization of specific *resources* to achieve certain results. As pointed out by Keohane (2013), the various controversies about the concept of power try to indicate which capacities are relevant and which are the causal mechanisms that connect capacities to the desired results.

Nye, in describing power, also opts for an objective, Dahl-aligned definition: power as the ability to influence the behavior of others to achieve desired results. The author's main contribution is shedding light on the binomial hard power/soft power: “the distinction between hard and soft power is one of degree, both in the nature of the behavior and in the tangibility of the resource” (NYE, 2004, p. 7)¹⁰. According to Nye, then, hard power and soft power have two interconnected degrees of distinction: (1) agent behavior; and (2) tangibility of the resource used. As recalled by Ramos and Zahran (2006), the concepts of *agent behavior* and *power resource* are analogous to those of strategy and resources. As discussed above, resources are the sources, the instruments available to the agent (power resources), while behavior/strategy is the course of action chosen, in view of resources, to achieve the desired goals (ways of exercising power): thus, the (un)availability of resources may affect the agent's possible behavior.

Nye (2004) also differentiates resource types and behavior types. The author puts *command*—the ability to change what others do, herein defined as a hard power behavior—and *co-option*—the ability to change what others want, herein defined as a soft power behavior—as two extreme behaviors, with a spectrum of intermediate behaviors such as inducement and agenda setting. As for tangibility of resources, Nye refers to the military; money; institutions; values; and culture. Soft power resources are intangible and tend to be associated with the end of the co-optive behavior spectrum, whereas hard power resources are tangible, and usually associated with command behaviors, as shown in Table 1.

¹⁰ Ramos and Zahran (2006) warn that this quote appears only in notes to the text in the works of 1990 and 2002—it is first incorporated into the text body in the 2004 edition. See Nye, 1990, p. 267, note 11; Nye, 2002, p. 176, note 31.

Table 1: Relationship between Resources and Power Behaviors



Source: Nye (2004, p. 8)

Thus, based on the resources and agent behaviors presented in Table 1, one could differentiate hard power from soft power. However, as already stated, this relationship is imperfect: command power can use intangible resources, in the same way that co-optive power can rely on tangible resources. And “it is even possible that command power creates soft power resources, or that co-optive power creates hard power resources” (RAMOS AND ZAHRAN, 2006, p. 140).

Ikenberry (2009) and Ramos and Zahran (2006, p. 140) exemplify the problems of this relationship by mentioning three rather common cases in history: (a) States that coerce others (a command behavior) through institutions (a soft power resource); (b) cases in which a robust economy (a hard power resource) is used to attract other States (a soft power behavior); (c) States that overcome major conflicts and use the power of command to build institutions, which in the future will be seen as legitimate (soft power resources).

Nye recognizes the limitations of his model, but claims that such cases are exceptions to the rule he proposes. By placing the complex relationship between power resources and strategy in the background, this simplified classification becomes inapplicable to the object of this research (RAMOS; ZAHRAN, 2006, p. 140). A case in point is mentioning scholarships as soft power strategies (NYE, 2004, p. 32; 109) when they use economic resources.

In his book *Soft Power: the means to success in world politics*, Nye (2004) presents yet a classification of three types of power, without discussing it: military power, economic power and soft power. This means that hard power as a category disappears, as shown in Table 2 below:

Table 2: Three Types of Power

	Behaviors	Primary Currencies	Government Policies
Military Power	coercion deterrence protection	threats force	coercive diplomacy war alliance
Economic Power	inducement coercion	payments sanctions	aid bribes sanctions
Soft Power	attraction agenda setting	values culture policies institutions	public diplomacy bilateral and multilateral diplomacy

Source: Nye (2004, p. 31)

The concept of soft power is widely used in the literature of International Relations to define soft forms of power, that is, those deploying attraction and persuasion rather than coercion and co-option. However, in this research I agree with Rostoks (2015) and Ramos and Zahran (2006), for whom the concept of soft power has become too broad to be used as an analytical tool.

In this sense, two points should be especially considered. First, as already stated, educational scholarships contain an economic ingredient that, according to Nye (2004), is outside the scope of soft power. Second, Keohane (2013), based on Grant (2006), divides social influence into four types: *persuasion*, which involves influencing the actions of one or more people without the use of force or the provision of incentives; *coercion*, which involves the use of force or threat of using force; *bargaining*, which involves the offer of rewards and the threat of punishment; and *emulation* in the sense of Nye¹¹. In fact, in Nye's literature, it is not clear whether the author refers only to imitation/attractiveness or also to persuasion, making it difficult to use the concept for analytical purposes.

¹¹ As Martha Finnemore states, “being persuasive means grounding claims in existing norms in ways that emphasize normative congruence and coherence.” Political persuasion is persuasion with respect to issues involving authoritative collective decision-making (FINNEMORE, 1996, p. 141).

Thus, it is important to delimit what forms and aspects of power this study examines. The concepts that will be presented correlate with that of soft power, for they exclude co-option, kickback, and coercion: the main point of these soft forms of exercising power is their *appearance* of legitimacy—a point that will be discussed in a specific section with the support of Ruth Grant's literature. Since Dahl, the conceptual discussion of power has gained depth in the literature of International Relations, as demonstrated by Rostoks (2015), who listed a wide range of conceptual tools with the purpose of elaborating a conceptual (re)definition of “soft power” projected by the European Union and Russia onto the common neighborhood.

In dialogue with the rationale used by Nye, I will bring into the discussion the contribution of authors such as Bachrach and Baratz (1962), who dealt with the second dimension of power; Lukes (2004), who incorporated it and went on to address the third dimension of power; and Barnett and Duvall (2005) who, in dialogue with Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes, created a taxonomy that includes four facets of power based on the interaction between the types and specificity of social relations through which power works. Additionally, two other concepts essential to understanding and discussing power for the purposes of this thesis are: persuasion, addressed by Keohane (2013); and legitimacy, treated by Grant (2006) and Lake (2013). At the end of this section, these concepts will be recovered to discuss the concept of soft power while addressing its limitations.

1.2.1. Three Dimensions of Power

The different forms of exercising power are classified by Lukes (2004) and retaken by Keohane (2013), who divides them into three dimensions.

Lukes analyzes what he considers the first dimension of power, related to concrete and observable behavior in decision-making on important matters in a conflict—also observable—about interests.

Next, Lukes analyzes the contribution of Bachrach and Baratz (1962), who consider not only the decisions made, but also those not taken due to the “rules of the game by the mobilization of bias,” which are the hidden forces that constrain the political decision-making agenda. The forces that constrain decision-making possibilities, that is, that get a certain actor not to make certain decisions, are also forms of power. After analyzing the contributions made by the authors, Lukes makes his proposition by adding the third dimension of power, that of an ideological nature. In this sense, the author states:

Is it not the supreme and most insidious use of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial? (LUKES, 2004, p. 28)¹²

Summarizing these dimensions, Keohane (2013) states that the first one involves the ability to use material resources, such as military and economic resources, as positive or negative stimuli. The second relates to the ability to affect the decision-making agenda, usually linked to institutional processes. And the third, now referred to in the literature as the constructivist theory, concerns the ability to modify what people want or believe through processes of attraction and persuasion that would directly interfere in the dynamics of social construction of reality.

Still according to Keohane (2013, pp. 28–29), the debate on power is organized around these three key aspects: (1) the contrast between the role of material resources and non-material resources as a means of influence; (2) the impact of institutions on the processes of transmission of power; and (3) the role of ideas in the development of agendas, either facilitating or preventing persuasion. It is important to note that the three faces of power are not alternatives, but rather complementary, and that the tensions between them can help understand social norms and the role of persuasion in world politics.

1.2.2. Four Forms of Power

In dialogue with the aforementioned authors, Barnett and Duval (2005) presented their own taxonomy by using the interaction between two dimensions: the main types of social relations through which power works (interaction of specific actors and social relations of constitution) and the specificity of social relations through which effects of power are produced (either directly and diffusely).

¹² According to Daniel Béland (2006), this quote clearly emphasizes the relationship between the third dimension of power and what Marxists call “alienation” and “false consciousness.” Although Lukes' original essay is not Marxist in the strict sense of the term, it presents a Marxist-inspired problematization of the opposition between “real interests” of people and the ideological blindness that prevents many from perceiving and thus responding to these interests.

Table 3: Barnett and Duvall's Model (2005)

Barnett and Duvall's Model		Relational specificity	
		Direct	Diffuse
Power works through	Interactions of specific actors	Compulsory	Institutional
	Social relations of constitution	Structural	Productive

Source: Barnett and Duvall (2005, p. 48)

Compulsory power can be defined as a series of relationships between actors that make it possible to *directly* shape the circumstances or actions of others also in a direct manner. Rostoks (2015) identifies it as the first face of power presented in Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes.

Another way of exercising power is *indirectly*, that is, through institutional arrangements that limit the framework of possible decisions, creating a bias for decisions toward certain outcomes. But they are not a direct way for A to control B because an actor cannot “own” an institution—in that case, when an actor “owns” an institution, exercising control over it to reach another actor, it can be classified as compulsory power, even if mediated by an institution. Rostoks (2015) identifies institutional power with the second face of power presented by Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes.

The great innovation of Barnett and Duvall is in the structural and productive concepts of power. They overlap in many respects, and three fundamental similarities can be listed. First, both relate to the social processes of constitution that are not controlled by specific actors, but rather performed through significant practices of actors. Secondly, both relate to how the social *capacities* of actors are socially produced, and how these processes shape the self-understanding of actors and their interests. Finally, none of them depend on the express existence of a conflict.

There is, however, a fundamental difference between them: while structural power works through direct structural relations, productive power implies more widespread and diffuse social processes. Specifically, structural power is the structural constitution, that is, the production and reproduction of dominance positions that the actors occupy, whereas productive power is the constitution of all social affairs, that is, systems of knowledge and discursive practices in the social sphere, broadly and generally. Productive power is concerned with historically constructed worldviews, norms, and social identities; that is, with

the types of subjects that are socially produced. As a result, productive power looks beyond (or is post-) structures related to domination (BARNETT; DUVALL, 2005, pp. 55–56).

1.2.3. Persuasion

Keohane (2013, p. 41) devotes a section to the concept of persuasion in *Stephen Krasner: subversive realist* and classifies it as the use of argument/discourse by one or more people to influence the *action* of one or more other people without using or threatening force, or providing incentives. Political persuasion would then be the change of belief (or perception) about something that has a direct or indirect impact on the decision-making of a political group or a political unit, such as a State.

As discussed above, Keohane distinguishes *persuasion* from three other forms of social influence for analytical purposes: *coercion*¹³, involving the use or threat of force; *bargaining*, involving offers of rewards and threats of punishment; and *emulation*, which would be the soft power as defined by Nye.

Still according to Keohane, there are two types of persuasion: direct and indirect. The first involves the change of belief by an actor as a result of discursive action of another actor: a cognitive change takes place in one actor, the persuadee, through the direct discursive action of another, the persuader, who provides information with the objective of reducing the uncertainty of the persuadee in relation to a situation: call for rational choice by providing information that facilitates decision-making. In direct persuasion, what changes is the information available to the persuadee: (a) about identity, interests and principles themselves; (b) about the consistency of persuadee's behavior with their identity, interests and principles; (c) on facts hitherto ignored by the persuadee, or, alternatively, known facts are put under a new light.

In indirect persuasion, on the other hand, the persuader tries to influence an agent (persuadee) through the public, the audience. The strategic actor aims to influence the attitudes of the public through emotional appeal so that the public may affect the elite who make the policy. According to Keohane, it is important to note that, even if elites and mass are rational actors, depending on the place of their action and the role they play at the moment, they act differently: on the one hand, elites tend to act rationally, in the sense of

¹³ Here, Keohane employs the word “coercion” as use or threat of using force, without the distinction between coercion and co-option made earlier in note 7.

strategically coherent behavior, because the impact of their actions can be scrutinized; on the other hand, the mass tends to act emotionally¹⁴, pressing the elite for a particular decision-making.

In any case, persuasion acts to change the information available to the persuaded actor. According to Keohane, the analysis of persuasion must go beyond the rationalist conception in order to encompass concepts such as knowledge, identities, and beliefs, usually dealt with by constructivist theories. In order to explore the knowledge and beliefs that intervene in the actors' decision-making processes, the concept of perception, widely discussed by Robert Jervis (2015), will be used in this work. The analysis of perception, for the author, is the analysis of the cognitive dimension of decision-making, which approaches this concept of persuasion to Keohane's.

1.2.4. Perception

Perception is an important concept in the analysis of decision-making and, consequently, of power in international relations. In this sense, Robert Jervis, in *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (2015), analyzes the perception of decision-makers about themselves, about other actors, and about the environment, and how these perceptions can influence how decisions are made in international politics.

The author describes four levels of analysis applicable to theories of international politics: the individual; that of the government bureaucracy; that of the nation-state; and that of the international environment. Jervis emphasizes the importance of the individual level of analysis since other approaches propose that the environment *determines* how actors behave, ignoring the role of individual factors—such as beliefs and experiences—as vectors acting on decision-making. Thus, for the author, it would be impossible to explain crucial political decisions without referencing the decision-maker's beliefs about the world and their images about others (JERVIS, 2015, p. 28).

¹⁴ According to Keohane, actors act differently in different situations: "focusing on indirect persuasion alerts us to a distinction between two different types of actors: those who can be expected to behave strategically, since their actions have discernable impacts on others; and those (such as members of mass publics) who should not be expected to behave strategically. Even if they are both rational, actors of these two types will behave in profoundly different ways. Elites will seek a great deal of information and will typically have a stake in ensuring that their beliefs conform with reality. Members of mass publics – who may be the same people playing different roles on different issues– may be 'rationally ignorant,' as theories of mass voting suggest." (KEOHANE, 2013, pp. 43–44)

I argue in this thesis that the granting of international scholarships is a governmental strategy of power that seeks to increase the influence of one country over another through key individuals, who are or will become elites, opinion-makers and decision-makers: higher education students. In this sense, considering the importance of the perception of key individuals in political decision-making, it is important to analyze the perceptions of these foreign students about the position of Brazil in the transnational arena. For this thesis, it is especially important to verify the existence of a correlation between the granting of scholarships and the positive perception about the country.

1.2.5. Legitimacy and power

The question of legitimacy is central in any discussion about power, but especially in the contemporary transnational order. Technological development, with the intensification of information and communication processes, increased interdependence between actors (KEOHANE and NYE, 1998), as well as the channels that enforce the responsibility and accountability of agents, both within institutions and in civil society—strategies called *name and shame* and accountability processes.

The coercive power has increasingly presented decreasing and short-term returns, greatly elevating the cost of its maintenance: even in scenarios where coercive power is used, the actors exercising it have to make an effort to justify it before the public opinion and within institutions¹⁵.

The concept of legitimacy used in this work is that given by Suchman (1995, pp. 573–574): “legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.” From this definition, two observations arise: (a) being a perception, it is enough that it is seen as legitimate, denoting a subjective construction of who perceives it—and an objective construction of who has it; (b) being socially constructed, it is related to a social group—not to individual actors—and to shared values, norms and beliefs between those who perceive it and those who have it.

¹⁵ An example is U.S. military actions in the Middle East being constantly justified as part of a “war on terror”.

For the purposes of this research, legitimacy is related to two power problems from a political perspective: legitimacy within authority, as defined by Lake (2013) and retaken by Rostoks (2015); and the legitimacy of incentives, according to Grant (2006).

Lake draws a distinction between co-option and coercion of authority insofar as co-option and coercion are based on threat or use of violence, and authority is based on the *right of command* of one actor over another, grounded on the notion of legitimacy. For Lake, the international order, albeit founded on the concept of sovereignty, is sufficiently hierarchically constituted; and political authority is rooted in a “social contract” in which the weakest gives the strongest the right to have power in view of their ability to provide and sustain a particular political order.

The problem of legitimacy for Grant (2006, p. 29) relates to incentives as a form of power alongside coercion and persuasion. The author develops evaluation criteria to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate incentives. According to Grant, an economic approach is centered on voluntarism as the sole criterion of judgment, whilst her political approach has three standards: purpose, willingness, and effect on the character of the parties involved¹⁶.

Grant asserts that the legitimacy of incentives depends on the meaning and context in which they are offered: incentives work best if they are within a framework of respect and support. The recipient of the incentive should feel free and autonomous: if they feel they are controlled like a puppet, with their freedom of action threatened, the incentive tends to have the opposite result to that intended by the donor.

Taking meaning and context as parameters, in her book *Strings Attached: Untangling the Ethics of Incentives* (2014), Grant briefly treats scholarships as an incentive, differentiating them from cash payments in the strict sense:

The college scholarship is a little bit like the bookworm. It is a sign of achievement that reinforces the idea that education is what is truly valuable. College scholarships are monetary incentives, but they are far preferable to cash payments for just this reason. The benefit the student receives is not so much the money as it is further education. (Grant, 2014, p. 120)

¹⁶ Grant opens the article by stating: “understood within an economic framework as a form of trade, incentives appear inherently ethical; understood as a form of power, incentives seem ethically suspect. Incentives, along with coercion and persuasion, are among the ways in which some people get others to do what they want them to do. This paper analyzes incentives as a form of power in order to develop criteria for distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate uses of them. Whereas an economic approach focuses on voluntariness as the sole criterion in judging incentives, this political approach yields three standards: purpose, voluntariness, and effect on the character of the parties involved” (GRANT, 2006, p. 29).

Although many authors put money incentives and scholarships in the same category, Grant differentiates them to emphasize the legitimacy of scholarships—which she does not see in cash payments—in view of their ultimate goal of enabling and/or encouraging the recipient's education and development, rather than giving money in the strict sense.

It is then possible to understand the granting of scholarships as an instrument of influence clothed in legitimacy, since it grants a benefit that, because of its content (education), is not a merely individual advantage. In the case of PEC-G and PEC-PG, the scholarships allow individuals to receive education for themselves, an individual benefit, but also to be a change agent in their country of origin through the education received. Hence, the objective of cooperation is integrated with that of influence, or soft power, demonstrating that they are not mutually exclusive.

1.3. Brain Drain

According to the literature, *brain drain* is the movement of attraction—either deliberate or not—of qualified professionals from one country to another, increasing the capital stock of the latter; in this case, human capital.

Economic studies directed to the formulation of socioeconomic policies point to education as a factor positively associated with the development of a country, which can be accumulated (MANKIW; ROMER; WEIL, 1990) and produces comparative advantages in the international scenario.

In this sense, researchers point to education's role in increasing a country's capacity for innovation and in transmitting the knowledge necessary for new technologies to be assimilated and used (AGHION *et al.*, 1998; BENHABIB; SPIEGEL, 2005; NELSON; PHELPS, 1966). The literature also emphasizes the impact of human capital qualification on the different growth rates in countries/regions (BARRO, 2001; HANUSHEK; WOESSMANN, 2012; MANKIW; ROMER; WEIL, 1990; VANDENBUSSCHE; AGHION; MEGHIR, 2006).

Considering that human beings with higher education can be classified as skilled labor/human capital, an increase in the number of such professionals can be analyzed in economic terms.

In our perspective, the “acquisition” of qualified human capital by a donor country is a result theoretically not desired by the policy of granting international scholarships. This is

because the continuing connection between the individual who received the scholarship and their country of origin is one of the conditions for the donor country to exert its influence.

Thus, it is necessary to analyze whether the recipient of the scholarship returned to their country of origin and thus maintained the bond that would make it possible to exert the type of influence that, as we believe, is expected from a scholarship. This possible externality of policy needs to be detected if it is to be corrected, or even better used by the donor country in another policy.

2. International Higher Education Scholarships as Soft Power

International scholarship programs for higher education allow thousands of people around the world to study outside their country of origin every year. These initiatives are supported by governments, supranational organizations and charities as part of both public diplomacy and development assistance commitments (MAWER, 2014a).

Scholarship providers/donors increasingly invest in evaluating the results of these systems by analyzing the trajectories of students and alumni during and after the scholarship, as a means to assess their progress toward the objectives of the scholarship program policy. According to the *Commonwealth Scholarship Commission* report (MAWER, 2014a), despite the high importance of evaluation practices both to understand the results and to ensure renewal of funding, few analyses have been conducted on the evaluation practices employed in scholarship programs.

As discussed earlier, international scholarships for higher education are very common in developed countries, and their objectives can be divided into *development grants* for humanitarian purposes—usually funded through State departments acting to assist the development of other countries; and *public diplomacy/soft power grants* with political objectives, such as creating long-standing relations between the donor and the recipient country and fostering positive feelings towards the former—normally funded through State and foreign affairs departments (MAWER, 2014a, p. 2).

Although these objectives are not mutually exclusive, for scholarships usually involve both development and public diplomacy goals, I have restrained my analysis to the latter, as this research evaluates the use of PEC-G and PEC-PG international scholarships as a tool of public diplomacy/soft power.

2.1. Public Diplomacy and Soft Power

According to Jan Melissen (2005, p.4), public diplomacy is one of the most important instruments to Soft Power.

Cull (2008), following a traditional school, defines public diplomacy as the attempt of an international actor to conduct its foreign policy by engaging with foreign publics, therefore, a government-to-people action. However, scholars as Gregory (2011) have recently pointed to the new configuration of the transnational arena as a more horizontal structure that gives space to emerging nongovernmental actors in public diplomacy because of new technologies available as discussed in Chapter 1.

In order to understand public diplomacy, it is necessary to appropriate some conceptual distinctions made by Nye (2008) between public diplomacy and soft power—herein, the *soft forms of power*. Understanding power as the ability to obtain a certain conduct from others in order to achieve desired results, I will mainly deal with soft forms of power—or simply *soft power*, as per the nomenclature introduced by Nye.

Soft power would then be the ability to shape the preferences of others, causing them to perform certain actions without the use (or threat of use) of economic or military force to coerce them. This means using attraction instead of coercion and payment¹⁷. According to Nye (2008, pp. 95–96), not only is soft power the power to persuade; it is also the power to attract and seduce: it is the power of attraction in behavioral terms. Moreover, it is also important to note that, according to Nye, soft power, that is, a country's capacity to attract others, has three main sources/resources—when it is legitimate: the attractiveness of its culture and its knowledge; its political values; and of its foreign policy (in terms of practices and policies). Still according to Nye (2008, p.95), public diplomacy, on the other hand, is an *instrument* that governments use to mobilize power resources, including soft power, in order to attract audiences from other countries—and not specifically governments.

At this point, the specification made in the first chapter as to soft power being a capacity and the difference between resource and result become essential for the analysis: if the contents of power resources (in the case of soft power, culture, values and policies) are not attractive, then public diplomacy does not produce soft power—and perhaps produces the opposite effect¹⁸.

Thus, Nye (2008), and Leonard, Stead and Smewing (2002) divide public diplomacy into three complementary dimensions: the first and most immediate one relates to daily communication about government decisions in both domestic and foreign policy; the second is dedicated to strategic communication on specific themes, as in political campaigns; the third dimension—which is the main focus of this research—is the one that creates and fosters long-term relationships with key individuals through, for example, scholarships, exchange programs, seminars and conferences.

¹⁷ “Payment”, here, refers to the payment of pecuniary advantage against specific advantages. The problem of legitimacy of monetary incentive will be dealt with on the basis of Grant (2006; 2011). According to Grant, incentives have varying degrees of legitimacy, since “I can also give you something that you want in exchange for your compliance with what I want. Coercion, persuasion, and bargaining are alternative forms of power. Each is sometimes legitimate and sometimes not” (GRANT, 2006, p. 30).

¹⁸ In epidemiology, the term “iatrogenesis” describes a healing activity that produces undesired effects.

Another important point about public diplomacy important for the central argument of this text is that it is not just about attracting the public from other countries by promoting the image of a particular country in a positive way—through the production of information and the generic projection of a positive image. Public diplomacy, especially in its third dimension, is also founded on building long-term relationships, especially with key individuals¹⁹, who can create a positive environment for government policies.

Consequently, public diplomacy can be conceptualized as a way for a government to exercise power by attracting the audience from another country, making them want the same projects as the country's nationals. The *effectiveness* of public diplomacy, therefore, rests on the attraction for the creation of shared values between the issuer and the recipient, which guarantees the *legitimacy* of these policies²⁰.

Given that soft forms of power linked to co-option require shared values, they are considered a two-way street (NYE, 2008, p. 103): the effectiveness of public diplomacy increases when, besides issuing information, a country is also able to hear its interlocutor. This allows the issuer to access the way information is being received and understood, and thus to fine-tune their relationship with the audience.

For these reasons, and refining what has been discussed so far, the focus of this research leans on the third dimension of public diplomacy as defined by Nye, considering that international scholarships are a tool for building long-term relationships with key individuals. Some of the most used forms of public diplomacy are those related to education, science and technology through scholarships, exchange programs, research projects, seminars and conferences²¹. Consequently, the third dimension of public diplomacy relates to the concept of education and scientific diplomacy.

2.2. Education, Science and Technology

Domingues (2018) affirms policies linked to education, science and technology activities have historically stimulated integration among nations and reinforced long-lasting

¹⁹ In this research, key individuals are not strictly those who occupy strategic positions in governments of other countries, but also those capable of spreading information or worldviews in a legitimate and persuasive way, such as teachers, decision-makers of companies and institutions, etc.

²⁰ Shared values are an assumption of legitimacy that will be addressed later as the foundation of authority and incentives.

²¹ One of the results of these strategies is the emergence of scientific diplomacy, defined as a strategy used by political actors to stimulate scientific interaction among nations, reinforcing partnerships, proposing solutions to common problems and building knowledge (FEDOROFF, 2009; ROYAL SOCIETY [GREAT BRITAIN], 2010).

partnership ties, in line with the third dimension of public diplomacy and the concept of scientific diplomacy.

Turekian and Lord (2009) define scientific diplomacy as the “scientific cooperation and engagement with the explicit intent of building positive relationships with foreign governments and societies.” Some examples of the use of science as a diplomatic tool are: (a) the interactions between the Weizmann Institute of Israel and the Max Planck Society of Germany in the 1950s helped establish diplomatic relations between the two countries, paving the way for a historic agreement in 1964 between the countries, which facilitated the transfer of funds from Germany to Israel; (b) in the years following the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—through its Scientific Committee—initiated talks to create a new educational institution for the training of scientists and engineers from Eastern European countries. Although the institution was never created, this spirit of integration would have contributed to the formation of the European Union²² (SKOLNIKOFF, 2001).

In light of the concepts of scientific diplomacy and public diplomacy, Fialho and Wallin (2013, p. 7), as well as several scientific journals and national webpages²³, consider scientific diplomacy as a subtype of public diplomacy. Moreover, they claim that science is a universal language and, therefore, is an important instrument for bringing nations together.

[B]ecause science is a universal language, science diplomacy is one way to make a positive impact and foster dialogue while leaving politics aside, particularly between countries with strained relationships. (FIALHO; WALLIN, 2013, p. 7)

For the same reasons, exchange programs and scholarships are common tools for bringing countries together: not only science in the strict sense—with projects and professional researcher, but also science as education, training future scientists, politicians and workers, is a universal language.

In this sense, scholarship programs that enable the exchange of students—considered in this research as future political elites, scientists and decision-makers in the private sector—are one of the main contemporary instruments of public/scientific diplomacy. Nye (2008),

²² Although the institution recognized science and technology as a tool for social development, its true goal was to increase European integration, connecting the countries of the East with those of the West in order to increase the power of the capitalist bloc.

²³ Examples can be found at: <http://dfat.gov.au/people-to-people/public-diplomacy/Pages/science-diplomacy.aspx> and <http://uscpolicydiplomacy.org/blog/science-diplomacy-age-globalization>, <http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/author-info>, <http://www.aaas.org/page/science-diplomacy-2016-session-proposals>, <https://aaas.confex.com/aaas/2013/webprogram/Session5920.html>. Last visited on July 25, 2016.

for instance, stresses the importance of exchange programs in the formation of leaders such as Helmut Schmidt and Margaret Thatcher, who have participated in US programs. Similarly, the report by *The Association of Commonwealth Universities* points out students such as Álvaro Uribe Vélez (president of Colombia), Reid Hoffman (founder and CEO of LinkedIn) and Wang Lili (executive director of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China), who received scholarships from the United Kingdom.

According to Nye's concept, the main focus of public diplomacy is reaching the public of other countries. However, when it comes to establishing long-term relationships, the use of policies related to education, science and technology are the most common. Next, I discuss four factors that may explain this option.

The first, political factor relates to the very history of modern education: the constitution of the modern State. According to Hamilton (2012, p. 69), the idea that school training was an instrument of great value to the Church and the State comes from de Hoole (1660), in *A New Discovery of the Old Art of Teaching Schoole*. Schools would give political support to the State and the Church, causing their members to perform their "correct" function, according to the assumptions of these institutions.

The second factor concerns the logic of knowledge and technology development itself. Education, science and technology are eminently collective activities, which depend on prior knowledge to be developed as either continuity or rupture.

The third, economic factor is linked to the pattern of international trade, both in production and consumption, and has undergone profound transformations: companies began to distribute their operations around the world, from the purchase of supplies and product design to the manufacture of parts, assembly and marketing. Truly international production chains have been created, which also require a standardization of knowledge/education that allows for an efficient synchronization of the so-called global/regional value chains.

Finally, the fourth factor: these policies focus on higher education (undergraduate and graduate) and science and technology activities, which form teachers and decision-makers who will occupy strategic positions in schools, universities, companies, institutions and governments. These individuals are key to the dissemination of ideas to groups of people in their countries, and therefore can be considered vectors of public diplomacy/soft power.

2.3. Contribution: the Brazilian Case

A recent study by the *Commonwealth Scholarship Commission* (MAWER, 2014a, p. 31) concluded that there is a notable lack of published evaluation data on scholarship programs funded by emerging and non-OECD donors, such as China and India. According to this report, a recent study by the British Council and DAAD (ENGBERG *et al.*, 2014) has shown that scholarship systems are being financed not only with development assistance and foreign affairs funds from high-income countries; rather, this type of scholarship has increasingly been granted by middle-income countries such as Brazil (MAWER, 2014a).

The PEC-G and PEC-PG programs, funded by Brazil, are examples of this trend. Both grant scholarships to students from developing countries who have a cultural and/or educational cooperation agreement with Brazil, and focus respectively on scholarships for undergraduate and graduate courses at Brazilian institutions²⁴.

The Program for Partner Undergraduate Students (PEC-G) was officially established by Decree No. 55613 (1965), and is currently governed by Decree No. 7948 (2013), which was designed to provide further legal force to PEC-G's regulation.

PEC-G is administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), through the Division of Educational Themes, and by the Ministry of Education (MEC), in partnership with higher education institutions throughout the country. According to official web pages, the idea of creating a government program to support students from other countries followed the increasing number of foreigners in Brazil in the 1960s. The objective was to regulate the status of these students in Brazil, by unifying the conditions of student exchange and ensuring that universities would give similar treatment to students.

Meanwhile, the Program for Partner Graduate Students (PEC-PG) was officially established in 1981, with its first protocol, and updated in 2006. The program is administered by three agencies: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Ministério das Relações Exteriores—MRE*), through the Division of Educational Themes (*Divisão de Temas Educacionais—DCE*); Ministry of Education (*Ministério da Educação e Cultura—MEC*), through the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (*Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior—CAPES*); and the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (*Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia, Inovações e Comunicações—MCTIC*),

²⁴ Further information can be found at: <http://www.dce.mre.gov.br/PEC/PG/historico.html> and <http://www.dce.mre.gov.br/PEC/PECG.php> Last visited on June 20, 2016.

through the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (*Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico—CNPq*).

The programs' protocols indicate that their main objective is to cooperate in the training of human resources in developing countries. However, the National Graduation Plan 2011-2020 (PNPG, 2010) and official statements from Itamaraty authorize the understanding of PEC-G and PEC-PG as scholarship programs that do not only have development/assistance goals, but also political goals, for they intend to build long-term bilateral relations and positive perceptions regarding Brazil. In other words, they are expected to influence the transnational arena through individuals.

An entire chapter of the National Plan for Graduate Studies (PNPG) 2011-2020, an integral part of the National Education Plan (PNE), was dedicated to the internationalization of Brazilian graduate studies and international cooperation focused on the exchange of researchers: foreigners coming to Brazil, as well as Brazilians going abroad. The official objectives of the Plan are the development of researchers, the institutions they belong to, and their respective countries. Besides, the internationalization of higher education is expected to “increase Brazil's role in the international scenario” (CAPES, 2010, p. 303).

The page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil presents a discourse consistent with that of PNPG, as it depicts educational cooperation as a political instrument, whose objective of projecting Brazil internationally with a solidarity image is expressly stated:

Cooperation in educational matters is a political instrument to promote the rapprochement between States through their societies. Brazilian initiatives in this area in partnership with other developing countries contribute to project Brazil as a country whose international action is solidary. Additionally, coexisting with other cultures, learning foreign languages and exchanging experiences lead to the formation of an environment of integration and mutual knowledge, fostering greater understanding, respect for diversity and tolerance. (Itamaraty²⁵)

Historically, the Brazilian position towards other countries has been consistent as to the non-strengthening of military power—the most traditional source of material power according to the realists; the development of soft power (Soares de Lima and Hirst, 2006);

²⁵ Translated from Portuguese: *A cooperação em temas educacionais é um instrumento político para promover a aproximação entre os Estados por meio de suas sociedades. Iniciativas brasileiras nessa área em parceria com outros países em desenvolvimento contribuem para projetar o Brasil como país cuja atuação internacional é solidária. Ademais, a convivência com outras culturas, o aprendizado de idiomas estrangeiros e a troca de experiências levam à formação de um ambiente de integração e conhecimento mútuo, propiciando maior compreensão, respeito à diversidade e tolerância.* Further information can be found at: <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/politica-externa/cooperacao/3687-cooperacao-educacional> and <http://www.dce.mre.gov.br/PEB.php>. Last visited on June 20, 2016.

and the influence of the international agenda through *institutional* environments (MELLO, 2012, 2011). In this sense, Mello (2012), for example, affirms that the Brazilian aspiration to a permanent seat in the United Nations League in the 1920s was a historical antecedent in the country's diplomatic behavior, marked by its insertion in multilateral fora as a mediator between strong and weak actors.

This mediating role between the strong and the weak is consistent with its intermediate position in the hierarchical system of international power. This position also means that Brazil has to deal with different pressures, expectations and demands from different directions and from various international actors: on the one hand, it has a commitment to defend the rights of the smaller countries that it supposedly represents; on the other hand, it individually claims recognition equivalent to that of great powers.

In the 1990s, Brazilian foreign policy was marked by its willingness to accept the international agenda, integrating itself with the mainstream dynamics, and adhering to the multilateral regimes of the new global order (MELLO, 2012). Since 2000, however, Brazil has been oriented towards the construction of a legitimate identity, based on values created by developed countries: solidarity, struggle for domestic and international equality (FRAUNDORFER, 2015; HURRELL, 2013).

Brazil's desire to influence the international order and regimes must be understood mainly in terms of soft forms of power, based on strategies of attraction, especially avoiding the use of military power in its demands (Soares de Lima and Hirst, 2006). Thus, it is possible to affirm that Brazilian foreign policy favors processes of persuasion and attraction.

Since 2002, after the rise of the Workers' Party to the Brazilian government with the victory of President Lula, a change in political alignment—from North-South to South-South—was also characteristic of Brazilian foreign policy (DE OLIVEIRA, 2006; ONUKI; DE OLIVEIRA, 2012), since it has developed coordinated policies and intensified its relations with countries of the Global South. This set of policies of international relations between countries of the Global South integrates the so-called South-South Cooperation (DE OLIVEIRA; ONUKI, [s.d.]; IGLESIAS; COSTA, 2011; IGLESIAS PUENTE, 2010).

According to the official discourse, unlike the North-South relationship²⁶ that preceded it²⁷, South-South cooperation intends to treat political, economic and technical

²⁶ The assistentialist nature of North-South relations was object of severe critics by the world community, which claimed their subservience to economic and strategic interests of the donor countries through conditionalities that were a part of the assistance.

²⁷ It should not be forgotten that, during the period of military dictatorship, Brazilian foreign policy was aligned with the United States' agenda.

interests among developing countries with a more horizontal approach. An example of such cooperation was the growing importance of the Program for Partner Graduate Students—PEC-PG²⁸, which, according to official web pages and documents, is an educational cooperation activity with developing countries with which Brazil has an educational, cultural or science and technology cooperation agreement.

Its official objective is to improve the qualification of university professors, researchers, professionals and graduates of higher education, aiming to contribute to the development of their countries. However, the program seems to be the mirror of other international scholarship programs, such as Fulbright in the United States; Chevening in the United Kingdom; and Erasmus Mundus in the European Union. The donor countries of these programs, according to some authors, seek to culturally influence other countries as a power strategy (SHENG-KAI, 2015; TRILOKEKAR, 2010). Some researchers dedicated themselves to studying the development of the Brazilian strategy of using the educational agenda as a foreign policy instrument, with special attention to the PEC-PG program (CANDEAS, 2010; CORTÉS DIAZ; OTHERS, 2013; IGLESIAS PUENTE, 2010)²⁹.

In fact, this policy³⁰ of international cooperation in education accompanies a broader international cooperation movement, involving several political and financial sectors, and is preferentially oriented towards the countries of the Global South, according to PNPG's own guidelines (p. 36).

Finally, it is important to consider whether the program has as an externality the permanence of these students in Brazil after the end of the exchange program. It is a condition of PEC-G and PEC-PG programs for students to return to their countries of origin, and, as an incentive for such, the return ticket is included in the grant. However, according to interviews made for this thesis, this measure does not guarantee that these students will remain in their home countries after fulfilling their funding obligations.

²⁸ One of the officially established objectives of the Program for Partner Graduate Students (PEC-PG) is to contribute to the training of human resources, through the granting of master's degree and PhD scholarships for foreign students to carry out studies in Brazilian Higher Education Institutions (IES) that issue diplomas of national validity for *stricto sensu* graduate programs evaluated with a grade equal to or higher than three (03) in CAPES' classification.

²⁹ However, no empirical studies focusing on the opinion of foreign students, whose objective was to measure the success of these strategies, or even their determinants, were found.

³⁰ In this thesis, the internationalization of Brazilian graduate courses is treated as a public policy and, at the same time, as a foreign policy in the sense of Ratton, Elaini and Evorah (2006).

Evaluating the PECs is important to measure the impact of investments made by the government and to inform the program reformulation and improvement based on the information obtained.

3. Methodology

The report *A study of research methodology used in evaluations of international scholarship schemes for higher education* made by the *Commonwealth Scholarship Commission* (MAWER, 2014a) analyzed the most recurring methodological issues in the evaluation of international scholarships.

The first point raised by the report is that most evaluations are conducted *ex-post*. Initially, it should be considered that the randomized trial is considered the “gold standard” of impact assessment to indicate causality. However, as regards public policies, this model faces two major, interconnected difficulties: one is operational and the other ethical, since it is necessary to decide which students receive the treatment (public policy/scholarship), and the fact that this choice should be done randomly.

It is a fact that limitations of the *ex-post* model of analysis were faced by methodologists who created models for evaluating the impact of public policies that could reduce such problems, such as quasi-experimental strategies. These include the techniques of difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity. However, scholarship programs were usually designed and implemented without concurrent evaluation tables³¹.

The second issue to be addressed concerns the level of analysis: at the country level and at the scholarship scheme level. According to the *Commonwealth Scholarship Commission* report, empirical assessments on a geographic basis are less common, and are usually restrained to schemes specifically intended for a particular country, such as bilateral scholarship programs—for instance, the Marshall Scholarships.

Most studies, such as Nijathaworn *et al.* (2009), carry out scheme-level evaluations and use geographic subdivisions to analyze specific questions. Other examples are the evaluations of non-bilateral public diplomacy scholarship systems such as Chevening, since the objectives of these programs are seldom connected to the working capacity of recipient countries.

Thus, in view of the objectives of this evaluation and the possibilities presented by the study object, an *ex-post* analysis will be carried out at scheme-level, using geographical subdivisions to analyze specific issues. An example of such is the possible geographic influence³² of Brazil on neighboring countries, and the possible differences of perception

³¹ Some exceptions to this rule are, for example, the IFP (Ford Foundation) and the MasterCard Foundation Scholars Program.

³² Meaning that Brazil has a greater possibility of influencing (either positively or negatively) neighboring countries due to geographical proximity.

between students coming from Latin America and students from countries in other continents, which may suffer direct geographical influence from another country such as China.

Moreover, this research aims to analyze the counterfactual scenario: what would have happened had these scholarships not existed? This topic generates a lot of discussion among international scholarships evaluators, especially in *ex-post* frameworks, as is the case of this work. In view of the key points of this analysis, the question raised by the counterfactual analysis is: do students who receive these scholarships have different perceptions from those who receive other scholarships, or from those who do not have a scholarship?

3.1. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

As previously mentioned, this research began with the objective of analyzing the impact of an international scholarship program financed by Brazil for students from countries of the Global South. My main hypothesis, as grounded in the previous sections, is that the international scholarship programs addressed by this analysis—PEC-G and PEC-PG—are soft forms of power: ways of exercising power through the influence on perception, by employing an instrument that bears at least an *appearance of legitimacy* since it excludes co-option, payment of bribes and coercion.

Government programs for granting international scholarships are a complex movement, for they:

- a) involve the use of a *seemingly* legitimate financial incentive – scholarships;
- b) focus on undergraduate or graduate students who will become, in theory, elites in their countries;
- c) provide an immersion experience in the culture and values of the donor country that shape the students' perception of the country.

Initially, the problem of incentives evokes the question of legitimacy (GRANT, 2006) and, on the other hand, that of authority (LAKE, 2013) and structural power. The question of the legitimacy of incentives arises from the fact that, albeit having the official objective of *collaborating* with countries of the Global South, the PEC-G and PEC-PG programs must be analyzed in conjunction with the characteristics of the Brazilian foreign policy developed not only in the last leftist governments of the country, but since its genesis. They must also be understood in light of the official statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the sense

of using educational cooperation as a political instrument of Brazilian public diplomacy that contributes to the projection of Brazil in the international scenario as a country with solidary behavior.

Taking into account the rationale presented, scholarships can be analyzed through Grant's concept of legitimacy applied to incentives. The author states that the legitimacy of incentives depends both on the meaning and context in which they are offered. If offered in a situation of respect and support, they work in a positive way; however, the manipulation of the incentive recipient may have a result opposite to that intended by the donor. Brazil offers scholarships claiming a cooperative action: aiding students from developing countries. However, researchers have warned that, in addition to development goals, these grants are a power strategy—it is important to note that researchers have been using the concept of soft power to analyze the phenomenon (CANDEAS, 2010; CORTÉS DIAZ; OTHERS, 2013; IGLESIAS PUENTE, 2010).

At this point, problems concerning structural power and authority arise. Structural power is related to attempts to create unequal relationships between actors. While traditional examples thereof are focused on relationships such as capital and labor, Rostoks (2015) argues that donor and recipient relationships are also examples of structural power. Then, insofar as Brazil is a middle-income country, whose recent diplomacy was based on the creation of a zone of influence focused on Global South countries—in their vast majority with lower income than Brazil, and who often behaved like a representative of developing countries, my initial hypothesis is that PECs are instruments of power.

Nonetheless, this relation of power could be given the appearance of legitimacy: the authority, according to the definitions of Lake (2013). This research is based on the hypothesis that Brazil intends to create a relationship of legitimate power (that is, of authority) with the developing countries of the Global South by promoting a cooperative discourse. And one of the modalities of cooperation is technical-scientific collaboration, which includes international scholarships.

A second relevant factor is that PECs targets people who will become elites and occupy strategic positions in society: graduate students will potentially occupy bureaucratic, political, or academic elite³³ positions, which makes them potential decision-makers and

³³ In this line, Sheng-Kai (2015, p.3) states: "many of the international students on scholarships are potential leaders who eventually return to their home countries to take up senior positions in the public and private sectors where they contextualise and diffuse the knowledge learnt through their university education. The Fulbright Program, Chevening Awards and Colombo Plan Scholarships are some of the examples through which governments utilised higher education as a mode of development assistance as

disseminators not only of knowledge, but also of values and culture (PUGLIESI, 2011)³⁴.

Here, the concept of persuasion becomes important for the analysis: persuasion understood as the use of discourse intended to change a belief that has direct or indirect impact on the decision-making of a political group or a political unit such as a State (KEOHANE, 2013).

In view of the immersion of this current or future elite in Brazilian universities, it is possible to affirm that these actors will be persuaded during the experience, both inside and outside the universities, to share part of the values and culture of the country.

As mentioned before, Keohane makes a distinction between direct and indirect persuasion. The first involves cognitive change of an actor as a result of direct discursive action of another actor, who changes the information available to the persuadee. This definition would encompass the recipients of the scholarship who are or will become the decision-making elite in government or business spheres, even if they are not in a concrete decision/conflict situation.

The second form of persuasion is indirect, in which the persuader seeks to influence an agent (the persuadee) by persuading their audience, who will then affect and pressure the policy-making elite; in this case, by forming teachers who will spread values and culture to their students—the audience of the policy-making elite.

A third factor is that the analysis of the immersion experience requires using concepts such as the third dimension of power (LUKES, 2004), and the productive power of Barnett and Duvall (2005). The objective of the scholarship granting policy is to influence what people (students, as strategic actors for decision-making and for the spread of information) want or believe through processes of attraction and persuasion, in consonance with the third dimension of power.

Similarly, productive power would be, for the authors, the constitution of all social affairs, that is, systems of knowledge and discursive practices in the social sphere, in a broad and general way. Both relate to the production of social categories in discourse that include/exclude actors. Barnett and Duvall mention categories as “civilized,” “European,” “Western;” however, other categories can also be produced, such as “successful countries”

well as diffusing their norms through educational exchange.”

³⁴ Pugliesi considers students as *qualified human capital* as defined by Barro (2001) and Benhabib and Spiegel (2005). The use of this expression, originated in the economic studies that consider individuals as a factor of production, intends to express an implicit assumption in the argument of the authors when analyzing soft power: they rely on the expectation/potential of strategic insertion of subjects in the labor market thanks to their qualification.

and “unsuccessful countries” (ROSTOKS, 2015), or even “country that represents the developing countries.”

3.2. Analysis Variables and Indicators

As the main objective of this research is to verify the impact of PEC-PG (independent variable) on the perception of foreign students, it is necessary to assess the existence or not, as well as the type, of scholarships for the students, since this may influence their perception: it is expected to be more positive in cases where Brazil granted the scholarship, and even more so in cases of students from the Global South that received specific scholarships.

In this sense, Bin *et al.* (2015) were concerned with the effects of scholarships, and had the objective of analyzing the effect of peer review on the scholarship assignment process. However, the authors found positive association only in some areas of knowledge. Research exploring the same theme was also carried out by Goldsmith *et al.* (2002) and by the Chilean National Council of Science and Technology (STATCOM ESTADÍSTICOS CONSULTORES, 2007).

A report on soft power and the influence of the United Kingdom requested by a House of Lords’ Select Committee to the Association of Commonwealth Universities states that there are two conditions for an international scholarship to be able to generate the benefits of soft forms of power (THE ASSOCIATION OF COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITIES, 2013, p. 3): first, scholarship recipients must have influence; second, they need to maintain connections with both their home country, where the donor wants to improve their reputation, and with the donor country.

In a similar direction, the CSC report (MAWER, 2014) states that evaluations of scholarships focused on public diplomacy objectives analyze the scholarship recipient's perception of either the host country's reputation or the scholarship program itself. In addition, they are concerned with the networks and connections between recipients of scholarships and the host country, verifying the return rates of students to their countries of origin, or the willingness of beneficiaries to return to the country that received them to work. Thus, among the specific variables listed in the report³⁵, those related to the objectives of

³⁵ The specific variables listed in the report are: social demography of the candidates; scholarship process and student satisfaction with it; students' return rate to their country of origin; change in the scholarship recipient personal skills; post-employment professional trajectory; scholarship recipient's contribution to the sector, to the community and to the country of origin in the post-scholarship period; and post-scholarship connections with the donor country.

public diplomacy are: the return rate to the student's country of origin; their post-scholarship professional trajectory; and their post-scholarship connections with the donor country.

Other studies have been concerned with the effect of co-authorship on doctoral publications thanks to the collaboration between different knowledge areas and between different countries. These factors were positively associated with the results in the surveys of Böhmer and von Ins (2009) and Jacob and Lefgren (2011). Hence, the student's field of study can influence their perception in view of the areas' development in the country (resources and investments).

Therefore, the following indicators were chosen according to the literature presented:

1 – Assumptions of influence/soft forms of power:

- a) connection between the scholarship recipient and Brazil;
- b) students as elites or in positions where they exert influence.

2 – Perception regarding:

- a) dominance/legitimate dominance relationship (structural power and authority);
- b) a positive view of Brazil in terms of culture (persuasion and productive power/ideology).

3 – If there is transference from perception constructed based on soft power to hard power-based perception (treated in the experiment), since, as mentioned above, “it is even possible that command power creates soft power resources, or that co-optive power creates hard power resources” (RAMOS AND ZAHAN, 2006, p. 140).

These indicators can be rearranged as follows:

Independent Variable/Indicators:

Scholarship	Existence or not of a Brazilian scholarship
	Brazilian scholarship type

Dependent Variable/Indicators:

Soft Power	Students professional data (Elites)
	Connections and networking with donor country's citizens and institutions
	Student perception about the country
	Rate/intention to return to the country of origin (+)

Brain drain	Rate/intention to return to the country of origin (-)
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Control Variables:

Control variables	Field of study
	Student country of origin
	Brazilian state where studies were completed

Accordingly, the survey was designed to measure each of the concepts and variables through the indicators presented. The survey (full version in Annex 2) was organized as described in Table 4, where the Dependent Variables are highlighted in bold, and the main Independent Variables are highlighted in italic.

Table 4 – Survey Structure

Question	Group 1- Did not study in Brazil	Group 2 – Current Students	Group 3 - Former Students
		Question Number	Question Number
Gender	1	1	1
Citizenship	2	2	2
Place of residence	3	3	3
Education	4	4	4
Father's profession	5	5	5
Mother's profession	6	6	6
Father's education	7	7	7
Mother's education	8	8	8
Current Image of Brazil	9	9	9
Is Brazil a leader?	10	10	10
Brazilian cooperation with your country	11	11	11
Soft to Hard Experiment: OECD; NATO; UN	12	12	12
Division between non-students and students	13	13	13
Division between PECs and non-PECs	End	14	14
Division between current and former students		15	15
Date of arrival in Brazil		16	36
Which program is an active student of?		17	
Departure from Brazil		18	37
IES		19	39
Area of knowledge		20	38
Why Brazil?		21	40
The importance of your experience in Brazil		22	41
Have you lived in Brazil before? Control		23	42
Did you live in another country? Control		24	43
Which country is the former Control		25	44
What was the image of Brazil before the experience in the country?		26	45
Degree of satisfaction with Brazilian institutions (embassies, MRE, IES, MEC)		27	46
Reviews 27		28	47
What are your difficulties in Brazil?		29	48
Name / E-mail		30	56
Date of birth		31	57
Want to be part of an <i>alumni</i> network?		32	58
Contact		33	59
Division (alumni/students): Did you finish your studies in Brazil?			34
Why did you not finish your studies in Brazil? Complements question 34			35
What did you do after being a Brazilian student?			49

Did you work after?			50
Where did you work?			51
What is your professional area?			52
Do you have activities in partnership with Brazilians?			53
Do you consider yourself a leader?			54
Has your experience in Brazil contributed to your professional position?			55

Elaborated by the author

3.3. Counterfactual scenario

This research aims to analyze the counterfactual scenario³⁶: what would have happened had these scholarships not existed? It is a topic that generates a lot of discussion among the international scholarship evaluators, especially in *ex-post* frameworks, as is the case in this work.

Considering the two fundamental topics of this analysis, do students who receive PEC-G and PEC-PG scholarships respond differently from those receiving other types of scholarships, or from those who do not have scholarships?

As the survey will be sent to all foreign students registered in the Lattes Platform, it will be possible to compare the results of the scholarship recipients with the results of other foreign students.

³⁶ The report prepared by the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission in the UK (2016) analyzes and formulates its assessment around four thematic areas: (a) individual capacity; (b) international relationship networks; (c) development impact; (d) counterfactual scenarios.

4. Empirical Analysis

The empirical research of this thesis combined complementary methods given the complexity of the subject. In order to carry out the evaluation, it was initially necessary to understand the objectives of the programs.

After comparing the documents and information available in the official web pages of the Brazilian government with the theoretical framework available on the subject, I had to reformulate the strategy of my thesis.

As the texts presented broad objectives, there was no way to measure whether the objectives of the programs were achieved. Moreover, they mostly focused on cooperation³⁷, and rarely indicated the political agenda of projecting or constructing Brazil's image to a certain group of individuals (elites), and therefore departed from the literature on soft power.

Consequently, before proceeding to the survey, I had to clarify the programs' objectives. Since the programs are rather old, I have followed three complementary steps:

Table 5 – Methodology rationale

Objective	Method specification	Hypotheses
Delimitation of the PECs' objectives	a) documentary research at the Itamaraty's historical archive to understand the objectives of the programs since their creation	The programs were created as soft power initiatives
	b) in-depth interviews with government elites about the programs and their objectives nowadays	The programs maintained their soft power objectives through history, as a Brazilian (rather than a government) policy
Evaluation of achievement of the delimited objectives	c) survey evaluating the students' perception about Brazil	Students that were part of PEC have a better evaluation of Brazil's image, and are more willing to maintain connections with Brazilian citizens and institutions

Elaborated by the author

The next item will establish measurable objectives to be evaluated in the survey at two moments: (a) at the creation of the Student Agreements, according to historical documents; and (b) nowadays, through in-depth interviews.

4.1. The Objectives of the Programs for Partner Students: PEC-G and PEC-PG

³⁷ CAPES, for example, states that the objective of the PEC-PG program is “to increase the qualification necessary for students to contribute to the development of their country.” Available at: <https://www.capes.gov.br/cooperacao-internacional/multinacional/pec-pg>. Last visited on January 23, 2019.

I will start with an overview of the main institutional features of the programs available at the official pages—my research starting point, followed by the documentary research about the creation of the programs and in-depth interviews with government elites about their landscape and objectives nowadays to understand if there was any change.

As previously stated, the use of education as a foreign policy tool is usually associated with developed countries. However, major developing countries have been increasingly designing strategies adapted to the new transnational arena, which is constantly modified by technological transformations. Those strategies include scientific and educational agreements that aim to exchange knowledge and shape the public opinion.

Moreover, in accordance with a study of research methodology presented by the *Commonwealth Scholarship Commission* in the UK, there's a lack of evaluation data on non-OECD countries. One of the most recognized—but scarcely evaluated—strategies is developed by Brazil, that offers educational opportunities to international students—preferably from developing countries—through two programs: the Program for Partner Undergraduate Students (*Programa de Estudantes-Convênio de Graduação—PEC-G*) and the Program for Partner Graduate Students (*Programa de Estudantes-Convênio de Pós-Graduação—PEC-PG*).

Under PEC-G, students can take their undergraduate studies in Brazil for free. And, in cases related to merit or economic needs, Brazil may provide funds for these students after the first year of study. In some cases, the Brazilian government also provides these students with the return tickets to their country of origin.

The PEC-PG program is slightly different: since it is focused on graduate students—and, therefore, on research and knowledge production, not only does it offer the course for free, but it also comprehends a grant in the same value received by Brazilian students, as well as the return tickets.

Currently, both programs are part of the Brazilian Cooperation for International Development (COBRADI). According to the last report released in 2013 by the Brazilian Agency for Cooperation (ABC) and the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) on COBRADI, this policy is classified as educational cooperation.

The official discourse stresses three main lines through which education is used as a foreign policy tool. As cooperation, it intends to help other Global South countries to develop by qualifying their human capital, what would then help attract foreign investment and technology. Culturally, it fosters the coexistence of people from different backgrounds, enhancing mutual understanding and tolerance. And, politically, it tries to *construct* Brazil's image as an important actor to these foreign citizens, projecting the country in the transnational arena, along with its ideas, values and discourse.

Those three perspectives make education an important asset for Brazilian foreign policy, aligned with the Brazilian diplomatic discourse in the transnational arena—until 2018, at least. But what matters the most to our hypothesis here is the political perspective of the policy—which is, nevertheless, intertwined with the other two, in agreement with the traditional Brazilian diplomatic narrative of solidarity among countries.

In this sense, the Brazilian National Graduate Plan (PNPG 2011-2020) released in 2010 stated that the internationalization of higher education is a strategy that intends to influence the transnational arena and, literally, “to increase Brazil's role on the international scene” through qualified human capital.

This statement allows us to conclude that Brazil has a mixed foreign policy that aims to foster development but, at the same time, benefit from it by having developing countries' elites connect with the country: a foreign policy towards soft power/influence. Such is also deductible from the organization of the programs, since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs occupies an important position in the administration of both. The management of the two programs is shared among ministries, reflecting the complexity of the programs and their goals.

As already mentioned, the Division of Educational Themes of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs shares responsibilities with the Ministry of Education in managing PEC-G; and with MEC, through the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel and the Ministry of Science, Technology and Communication through the National Council of Technological and Scientific Development in managing PEC-PG.

Both programs were created during the dictatorship in Brazil (1964–1985): the PEC-G program was created in 1965, soon after the military coup in 1964 by the first military president of the period, President Castelo Branco, while PEC-PG was created during the last military government of the period, President Figueiredo's, in 1981.

Since then, they have been continuously updated, the last amendments being held, respectively, in 2013 and 2006, during the left-wing governments of the Brazilian Labor

Party (PT). During these administrations, PEC-G and PEC-PG received special attention, in line with the cooperation policy heralded by them: the so-called South-South cooperation, which, as mentioned above, was thought of as being more horizontal than the preceding model, the North-South cooperation.

Therefore, based on the literature about influence and soft power, my first question concerns the objectives of the programs: by offering scholarships and opening its graduate programs to foreign citizens, does Brazil intend to affect perceptions about itself, as the country influences the culture and values of potential leaders elsewhere? My hypothesis here is: yes, although the public discourse claims cooperation objectives, the main target of these programs, since their creation, was to exercise soft power.

Before proceeding to the main objective of this thesis—that is, soft power analysis itself—I sought assertiveness to my initial hypothesis about the soft power objectives, which would then enable the survey.

Since the program was created in 1965, it was important to follow two steps: first, I will present the findings of the documentary research about the programs' objectives at their creation; next, I will discuss the result of the interviews with the managers of the programs in both ministries to enlighten their current objectives.

4.2. Documentary research: historical objectives

Was PEC created as a Brazilian soft power policy? That was the question guiding my initial documentary research. In my previous incursions on the data available at official websites, I started by analyzing the organization of the programs in the decrees that rule the PECs currently in force³⁸. Legislation states that the programs act as an umbrella for specific educational agreements. Similarly, the DCE's web page section on PEC-G stresses that it was created to “support students from other countries after the increase in the number of foreigners in Brazil in the 1960s and the consequences that this brought to the internal regulation of the status of these students in Brazil.”

Bearing that in mind, I went on to search these acts at the Concordia Platform—a digital collection of international acts signed by the Brazilian government. Interestingly enough, the first agreement I found had been signed in 1933 by Brazil and Lebanon. This made me reason that the mechanism itself could be much older than the first program, PEC-

³⁸[Decree No. 7948, dated March 12, 2013.](#)

G, which was created in 1965.

To request access to the documents regarding the creation of the programs, I had an appointment at the General Coordination of Diplomatic Documentation (CDO) at the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brasilia (*Coordenação-Geral de Documentação Diplomática do Ministério das Relações Exteriores*).

I spent one week searching the archives, focusing on the MRE's Intellectual Cooperation Division books³⁹, the department responsible for all activities that encompassed educational, scientific and technical international cooperation. Because PEC-G was created in 1965, my research at the Itamaraty's Central Archive started with documents from this year and went backwards.

It is important to stress three aspects of the documentary research at CDO: (a) not all books were available, and few were organized, which impacted the research effectiveness; (b) in Brasilia, there are only documents posterior to 1960, the year when the city was founded; (c) the agreements themselves were available only at the Concordia database, which means that, at CDO, to help me understand the programs' creation process, I only had access to communications between government departments.

The documents were rich in information about the agreements, stressing their objectives and the biggest difficulties related to them. I divided them in two main categories: (a) those regarding the agreements and the creation of the first program; and (b) documents that stressed situations related with the international students that came to Brazil under an educational or cultural agreement.

This division makes sense since the first group of documents stresses not only the objectives of this policy, but also that PEC was created as a response to the increasing number of international students that came to Brazil under an educational or cultural agreement—hereinafter, the “agreement students.” Meanwhile, the second group demonstrates that the educational foreign policy of bringing international students to Brazil was in place long before PEC, and that even the denomination “agreement students” was used—at least—since 1960, much before the creation of the program (Annex 2).

Most of the documents were communications between the Foreign Policy Secretary, the Chief of the Intellectual Cooperation Division, the Chief of the Cultural and Political Department, and the Chief of the Culture and Information Department. The Foreign Ministry had—and still has—a special division to take care of cultural and educational matters.

³⁹ Predecessor of the Education Division at MRE.

Since 1960, those documents consistently show that Brazil uses culture and education as a foreign policy tool aiming to spread the Brazilian culture, create bonds, and build a good image before other countries. Some of the most important expedients for such were Brazilian publications (e.g. Brazilian Foreign Policy, doc.8⁴⁰), Brazilian Centers (doc.18) and Cultural Agreements (e.g. doc.3, 4 and 5)—the main focus of this research. As a result of these agreements, the Foreign Ministry would normally grant scholarships to international students, and many of these documents show a considerable influx of students coming from various countries, especially from Latin America and Africa (e.g. doc.5 and 12).

It is worth mentioning that Brazil had four different presidents during the interregnum focused by my documentary research, that is, from 1960 to 1965: Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961); Jânio Quadros (1961); João Goulart (1961-1964); and Humberto Castelo Branco (1964-1967). Despite these changes, which included a military government, this policy was constant—and, to date, remains in place. In the beginning of this research, I found it very interesting that both programs started—as programs—during the military regime. However, the policy itself is quite old and survived all drastic changes in ideological orientation, indicating that the bureaucracy had an independent and steady line of action.

The policy of signing cultural agreements and bringing in international students appears consistently since 1960, with the concern of binding them to “the political and economic interests of the country” (Annex 2, doc.5). In 1964, the Educational Commission of Itamaraty stresses the political orientation of these cultural agreements and scholarships, since the Foreign Ministry is a “political organism that pays attention to education as a means for a foreign policy promotion and not as an end in itself” (Annex 2, doc.24).

The objective of promoting a positive image of Brazil abroad is also clear when the Chief of the Culture and Information Department reports to the Foreign Policy Secretary his concern about the difficulties Nigerian students under cultural agreements had when trying to enroll in Brazilian universities (Annex 2, doc.17). He claims that this “could cause the worst impression on Nigeria, turning the scholarships counter-productive.”

Another important indicator of the use of these scholarships as a foreign policy tool is the communication of Albino Peixoto⁴¹, part of the DCE staff, that highlights the need to prevent these students from practicing their career in Brazil, or else the “spirit of the

⁴⁰ The documents appear in Annex 1 in a Summary Table, and their pictures are annexed in the same order.

⁴¹ To more information on the cultural diplomacy during the Vargas government, see Nepomuceno (2016).

Agreement would be perverted (Annex 2, doc.20).” The same subject appears when the Cultural Division Chief asks for a new cultural agreement with Colombia because Colombian institutions were not recognizing Brazilian degrees (Annex 2, doc.2). Since soft power or influence scholarships intend to create a positive image of the donor country abroad using the students as vectors and connection points, the Foreign Policy Ministry aimed to create mechanisms to prevent these students from staying in Brazil, and to assure their degrees would be recognized in their country of origin.

The documents also emphasize the increasing number of students since 1960, and the departments demand the creation of committees to give assistance to the students and to sign cultural agreements in a standardized way. The difficulties of managing those students without legislation that could organize the crescent influx of international students coming under different agreements are listed in a communication to the Chief of the Intellectual Cooperation Division in 1964 (Annex 2, doc.25). In this document, Albino Peixoto affirms that Brazil brings 600 students per year from other Latin American countries under cultural agreements, according to the policy designed by the Culture and Information Department—if the students were to stay around 5 years, the number of agreement students in Brazil would totalize 3,000 people to be managed by the Department, revealing the necessity of systematization from the agreement signature to the end of the scholarship period.

Consequently, I was able to confirm my first hypothesis: the Program for Partner Students was created in 1965 as an answer to Brazil’s interest in using education as a foreign policy tool, which was embodied in cultural agreements since the 1930s. The program worked as a legal umbrella to bilateral cultural agreements and aimed not only to tackle management issues, but also to standardize and integrate the educational foreign policy with the political and economic interests of the country. Its soft power or influence features appear not only in the signing of individual agreements, but also in the creation of the program itself—and, as it will be shown in the next item, remain nowadays.

4.3. In-Depth Interviews with Elites: Current Objectives

Is PEC still a Brazilian soft power policy? Considering the extended timeframe and the broad cooperation objectives claimed by the official discourse, it was necessary to dig into the current spirit of the programs. Therefore, I interviewed bureaucrats responsible for PEC-G and PEC-PG in both ministries involved in their management: Foreign Affairs and Education. From the latter, I was able to interview Leandro Gomes Cardoso, head of the International Advisory Board of the Ministry of Education; Rafael Duarte, MEC-OEI (Organization of the Ibero-American States) consultant for Education, Science and Culture; Noraí Romeu Rocco, general coordinator of International Affairs of Higher Education. And, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I interviewed Gustavo Baptista Barbosa, head of Itamaraty's Educational Cooperation Department.

These interviews were made while I was gathering historical data; therefore, I had part of the answers I was looking for about the programs' objectives: the programs were created as a Brazilian soft power initiative. Moreover, since semi-structured interviews are used to “gather systematic information about a set of central topics, while also allowing some exploration when new issues or topics emerge,”⁴² this was the method chosen for this section.

Gustavo Barbosa, from the Educational Cooperation Department at MRE, affirmed that the programs have two concomitant dimensions: promoting the development of partner States; and soft power. Nevertheless, he stressed that he sees the policy as a “sophisticated version that goes beyond the mere convincement of hearts and minds,” for it means

the exposure of these students [to Brazil and its culture], who had the opportunity to share a special moment of their lives: an important educational moment that build complex perceptions, the maintenance of long-lasting friendships, active networks, and informed vision of the decision-making process.

It is important to analyze his perspective in light of the bureaucratic structure he is part of: such will reveal congruence between the documents and the interview's findings: according to Itamaraty's documents (previous item), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses “education as a means for foreign policy promotion and not as an end in itself.” Another convergence is his view about Brazil's historical commitment with education and science cooperation, what could denote a “State policy”, as opposed to a specific “government policy.” The documents consistently show that the PECs have survived to all governments

⁴² Chauncey Wilson, in [Interview Techniques for UX Practitioners](#), 2014.

from 1960 to our days, giving proof of a steady line of action by Brazil's foreign policy bureaucracy.

Along the same lines, Leandro Cardoso, from MEC's International Advisory Board, indicates the difference in perspective between Ministries, stressing that they are complementary. This shows not only consistence between the different sources of empirical data presented, but also alignment with the theoretical framework about the policy nature: PEC is both a cooperation *and* a soft power policy. According to Cardoso,

DCE has a more diplomatic function in the sense of educational diplomacy, let's say, to underscore or strengthen Brazilian soft power through education, while our objective is to improve the quality of education in Brazil or other partners through international cooperation. The focus is a little different, but [we] work very closely, and the objectives are convergent with one another. Very rarely do they divide or have a contrast between them, so I understand that the assignments are close, but seen from different and complementary perspectives.

This different perspective in each ministry is confirmed by the answers of other actors from the Ministry of Education, who stress the focus on educational cooperation, which also sustains the complementarity with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to Rafael Duarte, the PEC's main objective is “the higher education training of people who will be agents of change in their countries—*preferably* developing countries.” In the same sense, Noraí Rocco highlights that

It is not a exchange program; it is a program of educational cooperation of Brazil towards, in principle, developing countries, that is, it is a cooperation program for the countries of the South. Even though Asian countries were included in the PEC-G, including China—if I am not mistaken, it had already been included as of 2013 in the last decree. But it is an interesting program from the diplomatic point of view because it contributes not only to training and forming human resources in these countries, but also to strengthening the ties of friendship between Brazil and the signatories of these educational agreements.

In this sense, it is possible to recognize the blended objectives of the policy: cooperation and soft power. Based on the literature on legitimacy (Suchman, 1995), we can infer that the cooperation goals fit symbiotically with the soft power goals, giving effectiveness to the PECs. The programs can be classified as positive incentives to the students according to the definition given by Grant (2006): they are surrounded by this cooperation atmosphere, where students are supported and respected with the possibility of receiving higher education training, contributing not only to their country, but also to their

personal development.

Educational cooperation presents itself as a political instrument of Brazilian public diplomacy that contributes to the projection of Brazil in the international arena as a country of solidarity. Therefore, it works as a platform for Brazilian soft power by taking advantage of the legitimacy of the incentive, affecting the perception of a group of international students with higher education training, and cultivates long-term relationships based on the instrument's nature.

According to this definition, the PECs are pieces of public diplomacy in its third dimension. More specifically, they are an example of scientific diplomacy, a subtype of public diplomacy (Fialho and Wallin, 2013, p. 7), once they seek “engagement with the explicit intent of building positive relationships with foreign governments and societies” (Turekian and Lord, 2009).

Another important information regarding PECs' soft power agenda retrieved from the interviews is the lack of a more organized strategy behind the programs that would allow using their full capacity. The documents found at CDO are clear about the political orientation of the programs and point to the students' selection as a strategy to maintain it. In this regard, it is possible to picture coordination between different ministries pursuant to their uneven interest in countries Brazil has relationships with.

However, when asked about the strategic use of the programs in the selection of candidates, Leandro Cardoso, for instance, says that currently there is no specific approach behind the process, but that the government sees this possibility in the future. Regarding this, he says,

Your question was about articulation with other ministries, the answer is no. But, last year, we started discussing the possibility of making this kind of articulation the way you put it: if there is Brazilian investment in a given country, we form the workforce of that country here, in our university, to work in the economic sector of the country receiving investment. This articulation is difficult for organizational reasons: to meet, to get it right, to understand which investments should be prioritized, to change the decree, and also to start creating, let's say, *quotes*, I do not know if that is the word, but reserving part of the vacancies for a particular country, or sector, or career, this does not currently exist. We would also have to articulate this with the universities: many of the vacancies offered nowadays are offered by the universities that, with their scope and autonomy, decide which careers and vacancies will be offered. So it would require an articulation with the universities, companies and ministries. We could start with a pilot, that is, by choosing a sector, a country, a handful of universities.

It is true that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be the responsible for guiding the political orientation of the PECs. Nevertheless, the lack of personnel has been a reality since the beginning of the program (doc.29), and still seems to be so, since, according to Gustavo, out of the five people who work at DCE—already a small number, only one is dedicated to the PECs, all the procedures related to them, and all the students selected:

Today, our division has four employees of the Brazilian Foreign Service—five, in fact. We have one in licensing, so there are five active people, at the moment we are four. The Brazilian Foreign Service has three functional categories: chancellery assistants, chancellery officers, and diplomats. In the division, today, we have two diplomats and two chancellery officers, and an official, Patrícia, who is specially assigned to take care of our cooperation programs, the PEC-G and the PEC-PG—which in fact indicates the commitment of the division with these programs, especially the PEC-G, since in this small universe of employees we have designated an employee especially for this activity. We have a support group of trainees, receptionists and outsourced employees that basically care of the division's [administrative] routine.

In this scenario, combining Leandro's and Gustavo's answers, the coordination between different ministries and economic interests, as well as the setting of a political orientation, appear intangible for the moment, but have been proposed for the future.

In the regard of the PECs' future and the countries targeted, or the direction of the bilateral agreements – the vectors of the programs⁴³, there is an important issue to be highlighted. Most of the literature available and official documents indicate the cooperation objectives using the developing countries as an important focus of the narrative. During the documental research it was demonstrated that the bilateral agreements that gave origin to the PECs started in the decade of 1930. After the programs were created, they were updated a few times, and the last happened during the left wings governments of the Brazilian Labour Party (PT). Both programs received special attention in line with the cooperation policy held by them: the so-called South-South Cooperation that uses the Brazilian classification as middle power country.

This is an important information to understand the programs' mechanism since they are juridical umbrellas to bilateral agreements, behaving as political vectors. The PEC-PG protocol and the PEC-G decree use the words “preferentially” and “priority” on the countries target by the programs, giving space to the foreign policy agenda. All the interviewed confirm

⁴³ The list of countries participants of the PECs is available at http://www.dce.mre.gov.br/PEC/paises_participantes.php. The list of these countries is in Annex 3.

that the programs are focusing in developing countries, but they can focus on any country, depending on the current government decisions about the vacancies and the bilateral agreements.

As discussed above, what makes Brazilian scholarships interesting is the fact that most international scholarships available worldwide—the development-focused, the public diplomacy/soft power and the blended scholarships—are funded by developed countries. Not only because they require funds, but also because, according to many scholars, soft power aims to co-opt and seduce, and therefore the main goal of these policies would be to provoke emulation.

In its traditional concept, soft power is normally understood as a result of other power resources and, therefore, more likely to be deployed by developed countries. However, the concept of *influence* brought by Reich and Lebow differs from power as long as it implies persuading potential allies towards common goals, enabling international action with legitimacy, rather than interaction determined by material capabilities. In both, however, the focus is to influence the perception of the target public, considering education through the perspective of financial nature or not. The main point that remains unanswered is: can a country like Brazil thrive on these policies? I intend to address this question with my survey.

4.4. Survey: International Students' Perception about Brazil

In order to gather the answers of foreign researchers and students, I used an Internet platform called *SurveyMonkey*, sending an invitation through e-mail to a database of 65,493 contacts.

The database with the e-mails was created based on the Lattes Platform as of 2017, when they were available and public in the curricula. This platform has a filter for foreign researchers and students, what made the exploration easier, and the searching character used was a blank space. To facilitate the process, I changed the number of page exhibitions in the URL and downloaded the curricula with the e-mails.

Therefore, in June 2019 I sent 65,493 invitations in 7 days, respecting the day-limit of SurveyMonkey: 6 days sending 10,000 invitations per day, and 1 day to send the last 5,493. Until June 24, the survey had been opened by 4,984 people, or 7.6% of the total—which was above expected.

Nevertheless, out of these 4,984 students, only 65% completed the survey. Since I had an heterogeneous dataset containing all international students and researchers that had a curriculum at Lattes Platform, I divided the survey into three main groups. The first main


division was between those who never studied in Brazil (G1) and those who did or were presently having an educational experience in Brazil (G2). This second group (G2), the group of students, was subdivided between those who are still students (G2.1) and those who had this experience in the past (G2.2): the division makes sense since the verb tenses used in the questions had to be different for them.

All three groups answered the page concerning the perception about Brazil and provided socioeconomic details. But only those who are/were students in Brazil answered the extended version regarding this experience—and the factors that could have shaped their perception about it (see the *Methodology* item).

4.4.1. Descriptive analysis

The dependent variables relate to the perception international students and researchers have about Brazil. According to the survey, 58.57% of the 3,333 respondents have a current negative perception about Brazil.

Graph 1 - In general, how do you currently evaluate Brazil's image?



Elaborated by the author

Interestingly, among the 3333 answers, 90,74% of the 2339 respondents who had the experience as students in Brazil, had a good image before their experience in Brazil as shown in Table 5.

Table 5 – Comparison between previous and current perception of Brazil's image

Students of Brazilian educational institutions		In general, how do you currently evaluate Brazil's image?		
		Negative	Positive	Total
		Count	Count	Count
How did you evaluate the image of Brazil before living in the country as a student of a Brazilian institution of higher education?	Negative	150	65	215
	Positive	1277	847	2124

Elaborated by the author

This indicates that the experience in Brazil plays an important role in the perception of all respondents. However, this research is concerned with the effect PECs have on this perception. Aiming to test the influence of PECs in the respondents' perception, three independent variables were created based on the answers received regarding their participation – or no – on the main Brazilian programs on education and research. In the first one, we oppose the PECs (589) to all the remaining respondents (2769); the second opposes the PECs (589) to other Brazilian programs (1490).

The main issue considered to create them was the fact that many who participated on PECs, were also part of other Brazilian programs. To solve it, the PECs were a preponderant category, phagocytosing any other program. Finally, the third variable considers all Brazilian programs (2019) against to the rest of the respondents (1279). A description of the variables used in the Regressions follows in Table 6:

Table 6 – Variables description

Name	Description	Type	Obs
Brazilian Funding	Having participated in a Brazilian program on education and research: CAPES, CNPq, PEC-G, PEC-PG, FAPs (1) All other respondents (0)	Binary	3333
PECs1	Having participated in a PEC (1) All other respondents (0)	Binary	3333
PECs2	Having participated in a PEC (1) Having participated in any <i>other</i> Brazilian program (0)	Binary	2055
Latin America	Residents in Latin America (1) Other respondents (0)	Binary	3333
Gender	Female (1) Male (0)	Binary	3333
Humanities	Studied Social Sciences, Linguistic, Literature and Arts in Brazil (1) Studied in other areas (0)	Binary	2126
Duration	Time spent in Brazil (number of weeks)	Continuous	1913
Southeast	Studied in Southeast (1) Other regions (0)	Binary	1940
Age	Age (years)	Continuos	1845

Elaborated by the author

To elucidate this point, a new variable was created opposing the participants of PECs to those who took part in other Brazilian programs. A t-test was performed to compare the perceptions, and the results are presented in Table 7.

Table 7 – T-test on the difference of perception about Brazil

In general, how do you evaluate Brazil's image currently?		PECs2	
		Other Brazilian Programs	PECs
		Column N %	Column N %
Negative		62,9% _a	56,3% _b
Positive		37,1% _a	43,7% _b
Elaborated by the author			
Note: Values in the same row and subtable not sharing the same subscript are significantly different at $p < ,05$ in the two-sided test of equality for column proportions. Cells with no subscript are not included in the test. Tests assume equal variances. ¹			
1. Tests are adjusted for all pairwise comparisons within a row of each innermost subtable using the Bonferroni correction.			

Elaborated by the author


According to Table 7, the PECs evaluation of Brazil's image is a significantly more positive than the other group. This subject will be deeper explored on the statistical section, where logistic regressions will help to shed more light on the matter. Now, it is possible to elaborate some hypothesis on the results of Tables 5 and 7:

- a) The experience in Brazil contributes strongly to turn a positive perception of Brazil on a negative one, nevertheless the PECs influence positively this perception.
- b) The survey was taken in 2019, amongst Brazil's political moment of high polarization and international exposure of scandals. Therefore, since the main goal it is to compare answers of the students coming from different Brazilian programs, the results can present a bias, but a uniform one, affecting the answers globally. However, the PECs influence positively this perception.

The second question about the Brazilian image required respondents to classify Brazil, choosing from four categories: regional leader; world leader; mediator; and follower

of the great powers. Most answers reflected a division between perceiving Brazil as a follower of great powers or a regional leader (Graph 2).


Graph 2 - Among the following alternatives, which is the most appropriate to describe Brazil and its insertion in the world scenario?



Elaborated by the author

To explore the perception of international students on Brazilian cooperation, we divided the most important in six categories: technical, military, educational, scientific and commercial cooperation. The results appear in the Graph 3, showing that educational, scientific and commercial cooperation are the most important, what was expected since the respondents were recruited using the Lattes Platform; however, the answers regarding the scientific cooperation were the last among the three once science and education are strongly related. Seems important the realization of further research on this topic.

Graph 3 – Perception about the most important cooperation



Elaborated by the author

The question regarding Brazil's image is related to the Brazilian cooperation and its regional importance. The question divided it into technical, educational, scientific, commercial, military and public policy cooperation. The most important categories chosen were educational, scientific and commercial cooperation. Crossing the results with the geographical location of the respondents.

According to the Table 6, most of the residents in Africa perceive educational cooperation as the most important with 71,3% of the answers, followed by scientific (16,3%) and commercial cooperation (12,4%). In Latin America the results are more balanced: educational cooperation is also perceived as the most important, but only accounts for 42,3% of the respondents, followed by commercial and scientific cooperation with 31,5% and 26,2%, respectively -it is important to remember that the Mercosur is a commercial agreement between Brazil and some Latin American countries.

In Europe, the results are completely different: commercial and scientific cooperation received were on top of the answers with 39,2% and 37,8%. The educational cooperation only received 23% the answers – residents of continents answered similarly (Table 8).

Table 8 – Most important kind of Brazilian cooperation

International cooperation is an important source of prestige for the relationship between countries. What kind of cooperation generates greater prestige for Brazil in relation to your country?	Continente			
	Latin America	Africa	Europe	Other regions
	Column N %	Column N %	Column N %	Column N %
Cooperação educacional	42,3% _b	71,3% _c	23,0% _a	24,2% _a
Cooperação científica	26,2% _a	16,3% _b	37,8% _c	31,3% _{a,c}
Cooperação comercial	31,5% _b	12,4% _c	39,2% _a	44,4% _a

Elaborated by the author

These results in Table 6 seem a consequence of the Brazilian educational foreign policies among which the PECs are the most important. The PECs participants (variable PECs2), as expected, find the educational cooperation the most important with 62,7% (Table 5). Interestingly, among PECs participants, scientific cooperation received the smaller number of answers (19,8%). The answers of participants of other Brazilian programs are much more balanced, but the scientific cooperation still occupies the last spot (Table 9).

Table 9 – Brazilian cooperation and PECs students

International cooperation is an important source of prestige for the relationship between countries. What kind of cooperation generates greater prestige for Brazil in relation to your country?	PECs2	
	Other Brazilian Programs	PECs
	Column N %	Column N %
Educational cooperation	38,9%	62,7%
Scientific cooperation	28,1%	17,5%
Comercial cooperation	33,1%	19,8%

Elaborated by the author

Regarding difficulties faced during the experience in Brazil by former students, and the willing to establish long lasting relationships, essential component of soft power policies, some indicators will be presented in the next tables. Table 8 shows that 47,5% of the respondents do not report difficulties with building relationships and academic links with Brazilian partners.


Table 10 – Difficulties related to the Brazilian experience

Please indicate the main difficulties you faced during your experience as a student at a Brazilian educational institution (before, during and / or after the experience in Brazil)		
Answer Choices	Responses	
I had difficulty proving Portuguese proficiency before arriving in Brazil	7,35%	123
I did not have enough accompaniment and information when I was choosing the course / city	15,17%	254
I could not establish academic contacts during my stay in Brazil	4,78%	80
I could not establish friendly relations during my stay in Brazil	4,54%	76
I did not have support from the Brazilian government during my stay in Brazil	10,33%	173
I did not have support from the Institution of Higher Education during the stay in Brazil	5,38%	90
I can not establish academic contacts after finishing my studies	11,95%	200
I can not establish professional partnerships after finishing my studies	20,73%	347
I had no difficulties	47,55%	796
Other	16,97%	284
Total Answered		1674

Elaborated by the author

Also, almost 80% of the former and current students want to be part of a Brazilian alumni network, showing the willing to establish long-lasting relationships with Brazilian institutions (Graph 4). An alumni network is a great instrument of educational and science diplomacy, allowing the communication with elites from other countries.


Graph 4 – Willingness to participate in an Alumni network



Elaborated by the author

Elites, in this scenario, can be understood in a broad sense: as the selected group of population who have higher education; or strict: exercising a leadership position in their professional life. All respondents are automatically included in the first category and, according to the survey, almost 65% of the 1006 respondents describe themselves as having a leadership position in their work (Graph 5).

Graph 5 – Self perception as a professional leader




Elaborated by the author

Additionally, it is important to see the behavior of the control variables: the Brazilian region where the international students lived during their courses, the continents in which they are living nowadays, their main study area in Brazil and the gender distribution of the sample. Almost 50% of the international students who came to Brazil, studied in Southeast

region. This is an expected result, since the region is considered the most developed and holds the majority of the Higher Education institutions (Graph 6).


Graph 6 – Brazilian region where the students lived



Elaborated by the author

From those students, 60% are living in Latin America nowadays. This distribution is the main cause the binary variable regarding the continents in the regression was built opposing those who are living in Latin America to the others. It is noteworthy that almost 25% of this sample are still students and, as the Brain Drain item will show, many former international students stay in Brazil after finishing their studies.


Graph 7 – Residence country of the students



Elaborated by the author

Another important control variable is the study area during the student's experience. This information can affect the results because of the quality of the area in Brazil or even the world vision the areas can engrain on the students' perception. It is interesting how Brazil receives students in all fields of knowledge, and as it will be demonstrated during the statistical analysis, the area seems to be strongly correlated with the respondents' perception regarding the Brazilian image. Engineering accounts for almost 20% of the respondents. Humanities, Applied Social Sciences and Linguistics, Literature and Arts have, together, almost 40% of the answers – the main reason of the creation the binary variable which opposes Humanities to all other areas (Graph 8).


Graph 8 – Study fields in Brazil



Elaborated by the author

Also noteworthy in this survey is the gender gap, since 62,36% respondents were male. In a moment where the female participation on science is a transversal focus, this is an important information to draw attention to (Graph 9).

Graph 9 – Gender distribution



Elaborated by the author

This item presented the broad picture regarding the respondents and the main indicators of soft power and influence according to the theoretical background presented and

described in the Methodology. The next step is to assess the data using a regression modelling.

4.4.2. Inferential Analysis

The statistical analysis of this thesis—which does not aim to demonstrate causality, only correlation between the variables of interest—uses three different models for each independent variable, and a logistic regression. The logistic regression, also called a *logit model*, is used to model dichotomous outcome variables. In the logit model the log odds of the outcome are modeled as a linear combination of the predictor variables. Three tables were used to test three different independent variables using three models each, organized according to the number of observations for each variable, so as to keep a pattern in all tables.

The first independent variable tested is PECs2 (Table 11): PECs compared to other Brazilian programs. The goal is to verify how that is correlated to the image respondents who are/were international students have about Brazil. PECs2 is highly significant (99%) and positively correlated to the positive image of Brazil in the first and the second model. The odds of having a positive image of Brazil increase by 43% and 52%, respectively. Living in Latin America behaves similarly (highly significant and positively correlated), and the odds of having a positive image increase to 90% in Model 1 and 86% in Model 2. In both models, Gender is significant and negatively correlated. Studying Humanities, in Model 2, is highly significant and negatively correlated, and the OR of having a positive image of Brazil decreases by 65% if the respondent studied a course in Humanities.

In Model 3, there is a decrease in the significance of PECs2, but the variable remains positively correlated, and the OR, steady. In this model, Latin America also is positively correlated, but loses significance, and the OR also decreases. The variable “Humanities” like in Model 2, is highly significant and negatively correlated.

Table 11 – PECs and the perception of participants of other Brazilian programs

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	OR	β	OR	β	OR
PECs2	.358***	1.43	.423***	1.52	.369*	1.44
	(.102)		(.112)		(.145)	
Latin America	.646***	1.90	.621***	1.86	.383*	1.46
	(.117)		(.128)		(.167)	
Gender	-.273**	.760	-.175*	.841	-.221	.801
	(.093)		(.102)		(.137)	
Humanities		-		.345	-	.312
		1.06***			1.16***	
		(.115)			(.163)	
Duration					-.0008*	.999
					(.0003)	
Southeast					.194	1.26
					(.128)	
Age					.008	1.00
					(.007)	
Constant	-.959***		-		-	
	(.118)		.697***		.906***	
			(.132)		(.388)	
Obs	3.333		2.126		1.155	
LogLikelihood	-1350.25		-		-669.98	
		1165.58				
Pseudo R ²	0.01		0.05		0.05	

Elaborated by the author

While the Table 11 compares the PECs perception with the students of other Brazilian programs, the main focus of Table 12 is to test the correlation between PECs1—PECs participants against all respondents—and the positive image of Brazil. In the first model, only being resident in Latin America has a highly significant (99%) and positive correlation. Gender is significant (90%) and negatively correlated to the positive image of Brazil.

In Model 2, two variables appear highly significant and positively correlated: PECs1 and Humanities. The odds of having a positive image of Brazil increase by 42% if the respondent is/was part of the PECs, and 81% if they live in Latin America. The variable Humanities is highly significant, but negatively correlated, and the odds of having a positive image decline by almost 64% if the respondent studied any Humanities course. In the third model, only the Humanities variable continues highly significant, and accounts for 70% of the odds.

Table 12 – PECs and the perception of all respondents about Brazil

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	OR	β	OR	β	OR
PECs1	.119	1.12	.351***	1.42	.334	1.39
	(.093)		(.108)		(.142)	
Latin America	.428***	1.53	.595***	1.81	.370	1.44
	(.078)		(.118)		(.158)	
Gender	-.204*	.815	-.164	.848	-.200	.81
	(.073)		(.095)		(.132)	
Humanities		-		.360	-	.30
		1.01***			1.19***	
		(.103)			(.154)	
Duration					-.0006	.99
					(.0003)	
Southeast					.219	1.24
					(.129)	
Age					.008	1.00
					(.007)	
Constant	-.592***		-.622		-.845	
	(.072)		(.120)		(.321)	
Obs	3.333		2.126		1.155	
LogLikelihood	-2241.85		-		-721.60	
Likelihood ratio test			1344.31			
Pseudo R ²	0.0085		0.05		0.05	

Elaborated by the author

Table 13 analyzes the perception of students from *all* listed Brazilian educational and research programs (see Table 6). Brazilian Funding is highly significant (99%) and negatively correlated to the positive image of Brazil in the first model, meaning that the odds of having a positive image of Brazil are 32% smaller when receiving a Brazilian funding—differently from the previous independent variables. Also, in Model 1, being resident in Latin America is highly significant (99%) and positively correlated to a positive image, while being a woman is significant (95%) and negatively correlated.

In Model 2, one more variable was added: being a Humanities student in Brazil. The variable has high significance (99%) and is negatively correlated to the positive image, that is, the odds of having a positive image of Brazil are 32% smaller when the area of study is Humanities. Brazilian Funding and Gender (being a female) lose part of significance and strength but continue significant and negatively correlated. Being a Latin America resident sustains both, a positive effect and a high significance.

Table 13 – Educational and research programs and the perception about Brazil


	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	OR	β	OR	β	OR
Brazilian Funding	-.384*** (.075)	.680	-.286* (.139)	.750	-.233 (.235)	.791
Latin America	.531*** (.081)	1.70	.560*** (.118)	1.75	.325* (.158)	1.38
Gender	-.185** (.073)	.830	-.160 (.094)	.851	-.202 (.131)	.817
Humanities			- 1.05*** (.105)	.349	- 1.18*** (.155)	.304
Duration					-.0006* (.0003)	.999
Southeast					.194 (.128)	1.21
Age					.006 (.007)	1.00
Constant	-.474*** (.073)		-.250 (.167)		-.419 (.388)	
Obs	3.333		2.126		1.155	
LogLikelihood	-2229.63		- 1347.49		-723.88	
Likelihood ratio test						
Pseudo R ²	0.01		0.05		0.05	

Elaborated by the author

The third model adds 3 more variables: Duration, Southeast, and Age. In this model, significance and strength decline for all variables. Latin America is significant (90%) and positively correlated, while Humanities is highly significant and negatively correlated. According to this model, the odds of having a positive image of Brazil increases by 38% if the respondent lives in Latin America, and decline by almost 70% if the respondent took any course in the Humanities area.

The variable Duration is also significant with a negative correlation effect. To visualize the effect of Humanities over time, a *marginsplot* was created. Time course diminishes the difference of the Humanities effect on the positive image. After 18 years, the area of study loses its effect on the Image of Brazil.

Graph 3 – The effect of studying Humanities on a time course



The construction of the independent variable is, obviously, crucial to its correlation to the perception about Brazil. When the perception of PECs participants is compared to a restricted universe (PECs2), that is, international students who were part of Brazilian programs other than the PECs, there is a significant positive correlation with the positive image of Brazil. However, the results are weaker when the perception of PECs participants is compared to the perception of all respondents (PECs1). In order to test another cluster against all respondents, the third independent variable created was the sum of all international students who participated in Brazilian programs. In this case, the correlation is inverted and becomes negative. This seems to point to the importance of the PECs specifically considered as an educational program, and its special impact on international students.

4.4.3. Brain Drain

As previously discussed, Brain Drain is considered a possible negative externality of

education programs with soft power and cooperation objectives. The rationale behind these programs is to create long-lasting relationships between international students and Brazilian citizens and institutions.

Consequently, if PEC students remain in Brazil, where they receive higher education training and create important professional connections, they will not take them back to their country of origin.

Among the survey respondents, 418 are ex-students of PECs. From those, 63% live in the same country of their citizenship; 24% live in Brazil; and 13% live in a third country. In other words, 66% of those who live in a country other than their country of origin stay in Brazil.

As already stated, it is important to shed light on these numbers in order to evaluate if the PECs are reaching their proposed objectives, and Brain Drain appears both in the literature and in the Itamaraty's documents as an undesired externality to programs like PEC.

Conclusion: What's next?

In what regards the analysis proposed in this research, it is possible to affirm—according to interviews made and documents analyzed—that PEC-G and PEC-PG are scholarship programs with both cooperation and soft power objectives since their genesis. The survey, on the other hand, showed that the majority of respondents have a negative image of Brazil. Since the country is going through an intricate political context, the bias affects the whole sample. However, what matters to this research is not the image itself, but the effect of the PECs on this image.

To find the correlation between the programs and the perception about Brazil, logistic regressions were used to compare the perception of PEC participants with that of other groups. Correlation was found between being a PEC student and having a positive image of the country when compared with international students of other programs, and when compared to all other respondents. Many factors can contribute to one's perception of the country, and the perception is one of the dimensions to be analyzed when using soft power/influence as a conceptual tool.

Power in the contemporary world is complex, and its exercise involves the interplay of behaviors and resources available to each actor, depending on the evaluation of each situation through cost-benefit estimation. The literature explains patterns by creating concepts of power; one of them is *soft power*, herein defined as a modality of power that does not use coercion or co-option, but rather attractiveness and persuasion.

This definition seems to fit perfectly the main activity of diplomacy, especially as regards *public diplomacy*—so developed nowadays thanks to the possibilities brought forth by technological development. There is also a deeper interplay between public diplomacy and technological development, since the main engine to a country's development—in welfare, economy, and so on—is its knowledge and technology.

This seems to be one of the reasons why the literature is increasingly paying attention to education, science and technology as foreign policy/diplomatic tools. Cooperation programs are used as assets to create connections in different levels. This literature is consistent with Brazilian diplomatic practices found in the Itamaraty's documents and in the interviews regarding PECs, an educational cooperation program.

The biggest novelty is that these kinds of programs are normally implemented by developed countries, while Brazil has a complex position in the transnational arena as a developing country. Even if it is not considered developed, Brazil's position as a “middle

power” places it below the most developed countries, but still as an important player in the world, especially influent in the region. Therefore, these Brazilian educational cooperation programs—PEC-G and PEC-PG—are consistent with the literature on soft power and public diplomacy, particularly because it works as a legal umbrella for bilateral agreements that can be modeled and analyzed as vectors: an amount with magnitude and direction.

This work has demonstrated that the policy currently present in the PECs started in the decade of 1930 with the signature by Brazil of bilateral agreements for cultural and educational cooperation. Given the massive number of international students in Brazil as a result of these agreements, the Program was created to standardize procedures and allow for an effective management of such cooperation.

In this perspective, during the last left-wing administrations, not only has Brazil continued to invest in this educational foreign policy; it has also strengthened and inserted it into a broader government program that is aligned with the solidarity discourse and focused on Global South countries.

However, since the impeachment of the previous elected president Dilma Rousseff (2011–2014; 2015–2016), the future direction of Brazilian foreign policy is uncertain. While it is true that the granting of international scholarships is a consolidated policy of the country, we could expect new courses to be taken in light of the many adjustments it underwent since its creation.

An important feature of this policy, on the other hand, is the lack of institutional evaluation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although some academic work has been done on the subject, especially because of the focus on South-South cooperation adopted by the last governments, there is no evaluation being carried out concomitantly with the policy itself to evaluate its desired complex outcomes and to assess the factors that contribute to either the success or failure of this educational policy.

A structured evaluation of the selection processes, for instance, could provide important information according to up-to-date methodological designs. In this sense, the government could greatly benefit from the establishment of partnerships with universities’ research institutes. Such data would permit not only to improve the policy pursuant to its complex goals, but also to provide accountability tools to the actors involved and to Brazilian citizens. Implementing a systematic evaluation process for both programs seems to be the next main challenge to policy-makers.

Moreover, accountability processes are now much easier than they were twenty years ago thanks to the improvement of data storage and transmission available to many citizens.

In a world so profoundly transformed by technological development, legitimate policies that seek to build common ground, allowing values to be shared, are becoming increasingly important.

The survey presented in this work is a frame and sheds light on part of the issues related to the PECs. The consistent repetition of the survey, creating a longitudinal analysis, would be a more effective design to a deeper public policy analysis. Another design—that could be used in combination with the one just mentioned—is the application of a survey to all PEC candidates before their selection, and again after the results, reapplying the survey periodically to both groups in order to measure the difference between them over time. Those are indications for further analysis.

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Annex 1: The questionnaire in its original language

Caros Colegas,

Alunas, Alunos e Pesquisadores,

Este convite é para que participe da pesquisa "Programa Estudante-Convênio: uma proposta de avaliação", desenvolvida no âmbito da Universidade de São Paulo (USP) como uma pesquisa de doutorado no Instituto de Relações Internacionais.

Gostaria muito de poder contar com a sua participação.

A sua participação nesta pesquisa se deve a você ser, ou ter sido, estudante estrangeiro ou parte dos Programas Estudante- Convênio. É importante ressaltar que a participação é voluntária e os resultados são sigilosos. As respostas não serão expostas vinculadas ao nome do respondente.

Os resultados desta pesquisa permitirão avaliar os Programas Estudante-Convênio (PEC-G e PEC-PG), e indicar possíveis melhorias.

Muito obrigada por sua participação Gabriela Ferreira
CV Lattes: <http://lattes.cnpq.br/2202196656362958>

(OK)

1. Gênero

Feminino

Masculino

2. Qual seu país de nacionalidade?

(Lista)

3. Em que país você reside/trabalha atualmente?

(Lista)

4. Qual a maior qualificação educacional completa você possui atualmente?

Pós-Doutorado/Doutorado/Mestrado/Graduação completa/Graduação incompleta

5. Qual é a profissão do seu pai?

6. Qual é a profissão da sua mãe?

7. Qual o nível educacional de seu pai?

Pós-Doutorado/Doutorado/Mestrado/Graduação completa/Graduação incompleta

8. Qual o nível educacional de sua mãe?

Pós-Doutorado/Doutorado/Mestrado/Graduação completa/Graduação incompleta

9. Em geral, como você avalia a imagem do Brasil atualmente?

Positiva/Negativa

10. Dentre as seguintes alternativas, qual a mais adequada para descrever o Brasil e sua inserção no cenário mundial?

Liderança regional/Liderança mundial/Mediador internacional/Seguidor das grandes potências/Outro (especifique)

11. A cooperação internacional é uma fonte importante de prestígio da relação entre os países. Que tipo de cooperação gera maior prestígio ao Brasil na relação com o seu país?

Cooperação técnica/Cooperação militar/Cooperação educacional /Cooperação em políticas públicas/Cooperação científica/Cooperação comercial

12. (Experiment – not part of this thesis)

13. Você já estudou ou ainda estuda no Brasil?

Sim Não

14. De quais programas brasileiros você participa ou participou? Marquem todos que se aplicam ao seu caso:

CAPES /CNPq /PEC-G /PEC-PG /Fundações Estaduais de Apoio à Pesquisa (Ex: FAPESP)/ Não participo nem nunca participei de nenhum financiamento ou programa estudante-convênio brasileiro

Outro (especifique)

15. Você ainda é aluno ativo em alguma Instituição de Ensino Brasileira?

Sim/Não

16. Qual foi a data de chegada no Brasil?

Data aproximada

17. De qual desses programas você é aluno ativo?

PEC-PG/PEC-G/CAPES (outra modalidade que não seja do programa PEC-PG)/CNPq/Fundações Estaduais de Apoio à Pesquisa (ex: FAPESP, FAPEMIG etc)/Sou estrangeiro aluno de uma instituição brasileira, mas não participo de nenhum dos programas brasileiros acima.

Caso participe de algum programa estrangeiro, por favor, indique.

18. Qual é a data prevista de partida do Brasil?

Data aproximada

19. Em qual Instituição de Ensino Superior você está realizando o seu curso?

20. Em que área ou curso você é aluno de uma instituição brasileira de ensino superior?

21. Qual foi a razão principal para escolher o Brasil para realizar seus estudos/pesquisas? (você pode escolher mais de uma opção)

Qualidade do ensino no Brasil
Estudo de um tema específico na universidade
Experiência cultural no Brasil
Proximidade cultural com o Brasil
Gratuidade do ensino superior
Aprendizado do português
Familiares residentes no Brasil
Amigos residentes no Brasil
Outro (especifique)

22. Em que medida você acha que a sua experiência em uma instituição de ensino brasileira está sendo importante para seu desenvolvimento profissional e/ou acadêmico?

Sem importância/Não muito importante/Muito importante/Extremamente importante

23. Você já tinha estudado e/ou residido no Brasil antes desta experiência enquanto estudante brasileiro?

Sim Não

24. Você já tinha estudado e/ou residido em país estrangeiro, exceto no Brasil?

Sim Não

25. Em qual país você estudou e/ou residiu antes de se estudante de uma instituição brasileira de ensino superior?

26. Como você avaliava a imagem do Brasil antes de morar no país como estudante de uma instituição brasileira de ensino superior.

Negativa Positiva

27. Gostaríamos de saber qual o seu grau de satisfação com as instituições brasileiras abaixo listadas em relação ao suporte (auxílio e informações) para participar desta experiência enquanto estudante brasileiro:

Embaixada Brasileira em meu país
Ministério de Relações Exteriores (MRE)
Ministério da Educação (MEC) e da CAPES
Instituição de Ensino Superior

Não recebi nenhum tipo de assistência
Muito insatisfeito
Insatisfeito
Satisfietao
Muito satisfietao

28. Utilize o espaço abaixo, caso queira, para fazer comentários acerca do suporte brasileiro:

29. Por favor, indique quais foram as principais dificuldades enfrentadas em relação a sua experiência como estudante de uma instituição brasileira:

Tive dificuldade em comprovar a proficiência em Português antes da chegada no Brasil
Não tive suficiente acompanhamento e informação quando estava escolhendo o curso/cidade
Não consigo estabelecer contatos acadêmicos durante a estada no Brasil
Não consigo estabelecer relações de amizade durante a estada no Brasil
Não tive suporte do governo brasileiro durante a estada no Brasil
Não tive suporte da Instituição de Ensino Superior durante a estada no Brasil
Não tive dificuldades
Outro (especifique)

30. Caso se sinta confortável em compartilhar seu nome completo e e-mail, por favor, preencha os campos abaixo:

Nome completo
E-mail

31. Qual a sua data de nascimento?

Data

32. Você gostaria de fazer parte de uma rede de Alumni (ex-alunos) dos programas educacionais brasileiros?

Sim Não

33. Poderíamos contactá-lo para saber mais sobre a sua experiência no Brasil?

Sim Não

34. Você concluiu os seus estudos por alguma Instituição de Ensino Superior brasileira?

Sim Não

35. Por que motivo você não terminou seus estudos na instituição brasileira de ensino superior? (Você pode escolher mais de uma alternativa)

Falta de capacidade financeira
Má qualidade da instituição de ensino superior
Dificuldade de integração com os colegas da instituição de ensino superior
Dificuldades no exame de proficiência da língua brasileira
Outro (especifique)

36. Qual foi a data de chegada no Brasil?

Data aproximada

37. Qual foi a data de partida do Brasil?

Data aproximada

38. Em que área ou curso você realizou seus estudos na instituição brasileira de ensino superior?

39. Em qual Instituição de Ensino Superior você realizou o seu curso?

40. Qual foi a razão principal para escolher o Brasil para realizar seus estudos? (você pode escolher mais de uma opção)

Qualidade do ensino no Brasil

Estudo de um tema específico na universidade Experiência cultural no Brasil

Proximidade cultural com o Brasil

Gratuidade do ensino superior oferecida pelo PEC-G Aprendizado do português

Familiares residentes no Brasil Amigos residentes no Brasil

Outro (especifique)

41. Em que medida você acha que a sua experiência como estudante de uma instituição de ensino superior brasileira foi importante para seu desenvolvimento profissional e/ou acadêmico?

Sem importância Não muito importante Muito importante Extremamente importante

42. Você já tinha estudado e/ou residido no Brasil antes desta experiência enquanto estudante brasileiro?

Sim Não

43. Você já tinha estudado e/ou residido em país estrangeiro, exceto no Brasil?

Sim Não

44. Em qual país você estudou e/ou residiu antes de estudar em uma instituição de ensino brasileira?

(lista)

45. Como você avaliava a imagem do Brasil antes de morar no país como estudante de uma instituição brasileira de ensino superior.

Negativa Positiva

46. Gostaríamos de saber qual o seu grau de satisfação com as instituições brasileiras abaixo listadas em relação ao suporte (auxílio e informações) para participar desta experiência enquanto estudante brasileiro:

Embaixada Brasileira em meu país

Ministério de Relações Exteriores (MRE)

Ministério da Educação (MEC) e da CAPES

Instituição de Ensino Superior

Não recebi nenhum tipo de assistência

Muito insatisfeito

Insatisfeito

Satisfierto

Muito satisfierto

47. Utilize o espaço abaixo, caso queira, para fazer comentários acerca do suporte brasileiro:

48. Por favor, indique quais foram as principais dificuldades que você enfrentou durante sua experiência como estudante de uma instituição de ensino brasileira (antes, durante e/ou depois da experiência no Brasil)

- Tive dificuldade em comprovar a proficiência em Português antes da chegada no Brasil
- Não tive suficiente acompanhamento e informação quando estava escolhendo o curso/cidade
- Não consigo estabelecer contatos acadêmicos durante a estada no Brasil
- Não consigo estabelecer relações de amizade durante a estada no Brasil
- Não tive suporte do governo brasileiro durante a estada no Brasil
- Não tive suporte da Instituição de Ensino Superior durante a estada no Brasil
- Não consigo estabelecer contatos acadêmicos após o término de meus estudos
- Não consigo estabelecer parcerias profissionais após o término de meus estudos
- Não tive dificuldades
- Outro (especifique)

49. Após sua experiência como estudante em uma instituição de ensino brasileira, você:

- Continuou seus estudos no Brasil participando de algum programa de benefícios (bolsas de estudos ou programa de vagas) brasileiro
- Continuou seus estudos no Brasil, mas fora de um programa de benefícios brasileiro
- Continuou seus estudos em seu país de origem Outro (especifique)
- Continuou seus estudos em outro país (que não seu país de origem ou o Brasil)
- Entrou para o mercado de trabalho

50. Você ocupou alguma posição profissional após seus estudos na instituição brasileira de ensino superior?

Sim Não

51. Por favor, indique detalhes sobre seu emprego/trabalho atual/mais recente (escreva "autônomo" em 'Empresa/Órgão', caso trabalhe por conta própria)

Título da sua posição
Empresa
País

52. Qual a área primária de sua atual/mais recente ocupação?

Governo e Diplomacia (exemplos: Político, Membro do Legislativo, Funcionário Público)
Saúde (exemplos: Médico, Veterinário, Farmacêutico, Psicólogo, Dentista)
Educação (exemplos: Professor - Universitário, de Ensino Fundamental e Médio, Diretor de Escola)
Serviços profissionais e financeiros (exemplos: Contador, Arquiteto, Engenheiro, Economista)
Legal e Judicial (exemplo: Advogado, Juiz, Delegado)
Administrativo (exemplos: Bibliotecário, Secretário Executivo de Empresa)
Serviços Gerais (exemplo: Encanador, Eletricista, Jardineiro) Agricultura, Agropecuária (exemplo: Agrônomo, Veterinário)
Indústria (exemplo: Trabalhador de Fábrica, Gerente de Produção)

Lazer e Hotelaria (exemplo: Gerente de Hotel, Chef, Agente de Turismo)

Mídia e Arte (exemplo: Jornalista, Ator, Dançarino, Diretor de TV)

Outro (especifique)

53. Como resultado da sua participação como estudante de uma instituição de ensino superior brasileira, você esteve envolvido em alguma das atividades a seguir?

Não Sim

Publicações em conjunto com parceiros brasileiros.

Colaboração em projetos de pesquisa conjuntos com parceiros brasileiros.

Contribuição para o financiamento de projetos, pesquisas, ou outras iniciativas em meu país de origem ou de residência.

Ensino de crianças e adolescentes em meu país de origem ou de residência.

Ensino em nível de graduação ou pós- graduação em meu país de origem ou de residência.

Ensino do idioma português em meu país de origem ou de residência.

Criação ou avaliação de políticas públicas em meu país de origem ou de residência.

Parcerias empresariais com meu país de origem ou de residência.

Outro (especifique)

54. Você ocupa um cargo de liderança no seu emprego/trabalho atual?(Cargo de liderança: posições em que se coordena e influencia um grupo de pessoas. Exemplos: diretor, chefe, supervisor, gerente, professor, jornalista).

Sim Não

55. A experiência como estudante de uma instituição brasileira de ensino superior contribuiu de alguma forma para a sua colocação profissional atual/mais recente?

Sim Não

56. Caso se sinta confortável em compartilhar seu nome completo e e-mail, por favor, preencha os campos abaixo:

Nome completo

E-mail

57. Qual a sua data de nascimento?

Data

58. Você gostaria de fazer parte de uma rede de Alumni (ex-alunos) dos programas educacionais brasileiros?

Sim Não

59. Poderíamos contactá-lo para saber mais sobre a sua experiência como estudante brasileiro?

Sim Não

Annex 2: Table with the main excerpts of the documental research of the Itamaraty

Documental research: Chapter 4			
Date	To	From	Content (in original language)
janeiro-60	Divisão de Educação Extra-Escolar do MEC	Chefe da Divisao Cultural	Prosseguimento do "planejamento de Comitê de recebimento destinado a acolher e orientar os estudantes estrangeiros que vem aperfeiçar os seus conhecimentos em nosso país"
janeiro-60	Chefe do Departamento Político e Cultural	Chefe da Divisao Cultural	"a despeito do Convênio de Intercâmbio Cultural entre Brasil e Colômbia , assinado em 14 de outubro de 1941 e ratificado em 1 de agosto de 1945, vem-se recusando, sistematicamente, a reconhecer e revalidar os diplomas concedidas por faculdades brasileiras a estudantes colombianos " (...) "a celebração de um novo Convênio de Intercâmbio Cultural em substituição ao que foi aqui invocado, e que não se preste a futuras interpretações duvidosas, aproveitando a próxima visita do Presidente da Colômbia no Brasil."
fevereiro-60	Chefe da Divisao Cultural	Sub-Chefe da Divisão Cultural	"o Ministério das Relações Exteriores daquele país (Costa Rica) volta a interessar-se pela assinatura de um Convênio Cultural com o Brasil. Informa ainda que as negociações nesse sentido foram interrompidas em 53 por motivo de falta de continuidade na embaixada da CR no Rio". (...) a missão acrescenta que " a inexistência do Convênio em nada prejudicou o trabalho da embaixada na parte cultural, SALVO no que se refere aos estudantes costarriquenses interessados em cursar escolas brasileiras . E que o Convênio que venha a salar esses inconvenientes terá, pois, além do valor de uma declaração de elevados propósitos, uma importância efetiva". (...) "no qual seriam concedidos facilidades para a matrícula de estudantes, concessão de bolsas de estudo, reconhecimento de títulos e diplomas, intercâmbio de professores, etc."

			<p>"O projeto de Covêncio junto é uma espécie de coletânea de todos os assuntos que podem ser regulados através de acordos culturais" (...) " podendo servir de modelo para uma revisão geral dos acordos assinados pelo Brasil com os países da América Latina, principalmente com aqueles que formarão a Zona de Comércio Livre na América do Sul.</p> <p>Dentro do programa enunciado pela atual administração d o Itamaraty, vinculando a ação cultural da nossa política exterior com os objetivos políticos e econômicos do Brasil na América Latina, acreedito ser indispensável uma revisão geral dos acordos culturais que foram assinados pelo Brasil. Com raras exceções, os atos até agora assinados não obedeceram ao critério de integração da política cultural com os objetivos delineados na OPA, isto é, de combate ao subdesenvolvimento, através de maiores facilidades na troca de conhecimentos técnicos e científicos e informações de caráter econômico e comercial." (...) "O projeto junto trata: divulgação da língua e da cultura; da inclusão do idioma português e da literatura brasileira no currículo das escolas sendiárias ou pré-universitárias; ... cria um sistema para um intercâmbio de professores das Universidades, Instituições científicas e Escolas Técnicas; concede bolsas de estudos aos estudantes pós-graduados, profissionais, técnicos, cientistas ou artistas; ... regula e disciplina o problema da matrícula de estudantes nas Universidades, método efetivo de criação de profundas raízes de amizade entre os países hispano-americanos e o Brasil". ... "Para melhor executar a nova política cultural do Brasil, tendo em vista os crescentes interesses do Brasil no continente, poderia ser criada uma comissão composta de representantes do Itamaraty, dos Ministérios da Educação e do Trabalho..."</p>
fevereiro-60	Chefe da Divisão Cultural	Diplomata Classe M	Resposta ao documento anterior: Criação da Comissão Permanente para a Celebração e a Implementação de Acordos Culturais
fevereiro-60	Chefe do DPC	Chefe da Divisão Cultural	

março-60	-	Chefe do Departamento Político e Cultural	Programa Cultural em Roma: concessão de verba para a difusão da cultura brasileira
março-60	Chefe do Departamento Político e Cultural	Chefe da Divisao Cultural	Assinatura da Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional: " A publicação em apreço é instrumento de penetração da diplomacia brasileira no cenário internacional " porquanto divulga ... Os próprios informadores da política externa brasileira, notadamente quanto à Operação Pan-Americana "
março-60	Chefe da Divisao Cultural	Sub-Chefe da Divisão Cultural	Considerações sobre o texto da contraproposta do Governo Japonês para a assinatura de um Acordo Cultural entre os dois países.
setembro-60	Chefe do Departamento Político e Cultural	Chefe da Divisao Cultural	Concessão de 12 bolsas de estudos a bibliotecários latino-americanos, para o exercício de 1961 "tendo em vista o interesse que representa para a divulgação da nossa cultura a vinda desses bibliotecários latino-americanos ao Brasil , sugiro que V.Exa., como parte do programa de bolsas oferecidas pelo Itamaraty a estudantes estrangeiros em 1961, sejam reservadas para o Instituto BRasileiro de Bibliografia..."
outubro-60	Chefe do Departamento Político e Cultural	Chefe da Divisao Cultural	Viagem de difusão cultural pela América para a " divulgação da cultura brasileira "
novembro-60	Chefe do Departamento Político e Cultural	-	" novo programa de concessão de bolsa de estudos para 1961 no qual será dada especial importância aos estudantes provenientes da América Latina e África ". ... Em 1961, em colaboração com o CNPq, concederá 19 bolsas de estudo, para a formação de especialistas em bibliografia e educação. Além da concessão das bolsas acima referidas, por força de convênios culturais e em forma de prêmios aos alunos dos nossos Centros de Estudos, vieram ao Brasil, como bolsistas em 1960, 42 alunos latino-americanos. 2. Deseja a Divisão Cultural criar, em 1961, um programa de concessão de bolsas-de-estudo a estudantes provenientes do continente africano" de imensa " importância político-cultural ".

dezembro-60	Chefe da Divisão Cultural	Diplomata Classe M	Submissão do projeto de Convênio Cultural entre Brasil e Costa Rica que, entre outros, concede bolsas de estudos e servirá de base para as negociações de futuros acordos culturais a serem assinados pelo Brasil
janeiro-62	-	-	A aliança para o progresso: Em reunião Extraordinária do Conselho Interamericano Econômico Social (CIES), convocado pelos EUA e realizado em Punta del Este... Os representantes das Repúblicas Anerucabas, inspirados nos princípios consagrados na Carta da Organização dos Estados Amerivanos, na Operação Pan-Americana e na Ata de Bogotá, concordaram em constituir a Aliança para o Progresso.
maio-62	Secretário Geral de Política Exterior	Chefe do Departamento Cultural e de Informações	" Ação cultural do governo brasileiro na África tem sido limitada. Oferecemos também 25 bolsas de estudos àqueles países da África negra, mas, por circunstâncias várias, apenas quinze africanos puderam vir para o Brasil. Tendo em vista a necessidade de dar maior relevo à nossa política de aproximação cultural com o continente africano " sugiro um Congresso Cultural brasileiro-africano (...) que teria por finalidade precípua aproximar as intelectualidades brasileira e africana mediante a discussão de temas culturais de interesse comum, de acordo com uma agenda a ser oportunamente organizada. Serviria também para provocar a vinda ao Brasil de líderes intelectuais africanos , aos quais serão proporcionadas facilidades para conhecêrem o nosso país." Caso a ideia funcione, verificar a receptividade de diversos governos a ela.
abril-63	Secretário Geral Adjunto para Assuntos Americanos	Chefe do Departamento Cultural e de Informações	Cooperação Intelectual: "dentro do programa de bolsas-de-estudos do Itamaraty, foram concedidas em 1962, 6 bolsas para estudantes pós-graduados chilenos. De acordo com o acordo Cultural entre o Brasil e o Chile..."
abril-63	Secretário Geral de Política Exterior	Chefe do Departamento Cultural e de Informações	Matrícula de Estudantes Nigerianos: dificuldade de obter matrícula no primeiro ano em escolas superiores para os estudantes nigerianos que receberam bolsa do governo brasileiro. Estudantes reportam como racismo . Preocupação do governo brasileiro em " causar a prior impressão na Nigéria ,

			tornando contraproducente a concessão de bolsas."
agosto-63	Secretário Geral	Chefe do Departamento Cultural e de Informações	Centros Brasileiros na América Latina padronizados para seguirem orientação do departamento cultural e de informações "com o objetivo político de suma importância, qual seja o melhor conhecimento do Brasil e do Português, fundamental para nossa aproximação com a AL , da qual, até há pouco, estávamos completamente alheios."
agosto-63	Secretário Geral	Chefe do Departamento Cultural e de Informações	Sondagem do governo indiano para a elaboração de um convênio com o Brasil para que não fosse perdida a tradição da língua portuguesa naquele país.
outubro-63	Chefe da Divisão de Cooperação Intelectual	Albino Peixoto Jr.	"A situação dos alunos estrangeiros nos estabelecimentos de ensino superior no Brasil, matriculados em virtude de convênios culturais que facilitam a não realização de exames vestibulares e os isentam do pagamento de taxas a que são obrigados os estudantes brasileiros é um problema afeto à DCI que reclama estudo especial, sobretudo quanto a estudantes latinoamericanos. A matrícula de estudantes estrangeiros, isto é, estudantes-convênio , nas escolas superiores do país envolve obrigatoriamente a aquiescência das autoridades do MEC ." (...) "Eis os problemas: a) afluxo extraordinário de candidatos de determinados países latino-americanos, na grande maioria com preparação deficiente, atraídos pelas facilidades dos convênios; b) limitação de vagas nas escolas superiores brasileiras, motivada pelo crescente número de estudantes brasileiros; c) Obrigatoriedade do enquadramento dos estudantes estrangeiros na LDB; d) necessidade de impedir que os diplomados exerçam suas profissões no Brasil, com disvirtuamento do espírito do convênio e possível competição com diplomados brasileiros. Solução..."
janeiro-64	Chefe da Divisão de Cooperação Intelectual	Mauricio Magnavita	Interesse da Tchecoslováquia nas bolsas de estudos de 4 meses, oferecidas pelo governo brasileiro, para intercâmbio com o Brasil

fevereiro-64	Chefe do Departamento Cultural e de Informações	Chefe do Departamento Cultural e de Informações	Interesse de acordo cultural com os Países Baixos, a exemplo de varios assinados com a Europa. Por exemplo, com a Belgica, assinado em 1960 e em tramitação final no Congresso.
fevereiro-64	Secretário Geral	Chefe do Departamento Cultural e de Informações	O Departamento Cultural e de Informações segue uma política previamente planejada , dentro da qual é feita uma seleção cuidadosa dos aspectos da cultura brasileira a serem difundidas no exterior.
abril-64	Chefe da Divisão de Cooperação Intelectual	3o. Secretário	<p>o MRE vem concedendo bolsas de estudo a estrangeiros através da Divisão de Cooperação Intelectual e a critério da Comissão Educacional do Itamaraty, já há varios anos, sem contudo aparelhar-se para este fim. Não faz, muito justamente, por ser um organismo político que tem a sua atenção voltada para a educação como meio para a promoção da política externa e não como um fim em si. (...) Entretanto, o programa de bolsas estudo carece de uma orientação técnico-educacional, podendo-se dizer que os seus resultados, até a presente data, não corresponde ao dispêndio em dólares correspondentes. Seria conveniente a reformulação do programa de bolsas de estudo para o próximo ano (...) confiada a CAPES, por convênio, onde ficasse expressamente declarado que a orientação política do programa seria dada pelo MRE." Desse modo: parte técnico-educacional com a CAPES e orientação política e seleção dos bolsistas (através das Missões Diplomáticas e Repartições Consulares com o MRE).</p>
maio-64	Chefe da Divisão de Cooperação Intelectual	Albino Peixoto Jr.	Organização da Seção Educacional da Divisão de Cooperação Intelectual: Por intermédio de Convênios Culturais, matriculam-se anualmente 600 estudantes latino-americanos nos estabelecimentos de ensino superior do Brasil . Estes estudantes são selecionados por Comissões Especiais nas Missões Diplomáticas dentro de quotas previamente distribuídas pela Divisão de Cooperação Intelectual, de acordo com a política do Departamento Cultural e de Informações . A divisão de Cooperação intelectual não se encontra aparelhada para arcar com os problemas de cerca de 3mil

			estudantes - média de 5 anos - que em todo o Brasil usufruem as regalias de convênios culturais. (...) Por essa razão, houve necessidade de, em 1963, celebrar-se o protocolo com a Diretoria de Ensino Superior do MEC, sistematizan-se a seleção, distribuição e encaminhamento de estudantes-convênio...	
novembro-64	Chefe da Divisão de Cooperação Intelectual	Assessor Educacional da Divisão de Cooperação Intelectual	Carteira de Identidade Estudante-Convênio para "estudantes beneficiários de convênios culturais (estudantes-convênio)"	
março-65	Chefe do Departamento Cultural e de Informações	Chefe da Divisão de Cooperação Intelectual	Planejamento para 65 dos estudantes-convênio: "A) enquadramento e controle de todos os estudantes estrangeiros (estudantes-convênio) com emissao da carteira de identidade."	
maio-65	Chefe da Divisão de Cooperação Intelectual		Acordo Cultural = Convênio Cultural	
novembro-65	Chefe do Departamento Cultural e de Informações	Chefe da Divisão de Cooperação Intelectual	Atraso nos trabalhos dos setores da Divisão de Cooperação Intelectual: Acordos Culturais, Unesco, Catálogo de bolsas de pós-graduação a estrangeiros, estudos de 2 Casas do Brasil e 2 institutos brasileiros. Deviso à "massa brutal de expedientes"	
novembro-65	Secretário Geral de Política Exterior	Chefe do Departamento Cultural e de Informações	Acordo Cultural com El Salvador: assinatura	

Annex 3: Cultural and Educational Agreements found in the Concordia Platform

<u>Convênio Cultural entre os Estados Unidos do Brasil e a República do Líbano.</u>	24/02/1933	expirado
<u>Convênio Cultural entre o Governo dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e o Governo da República Dominicana.</u>	09/12/1942	em vigor
<u>Convênio Cultural entre o Governo dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e o Governo da República do Paraguai.</u>	06/03/1944	em vigor
<u>Convênio Cultural entre o Governo dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e o Governo da República do Equador.</u>	24/05/1944	Substituído
<u>Convênio Cultural entre o Governo dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e o Governo do Canadá.</u>	24/05/1944	Em vigor
<u>Convênio Cultural entre a República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e a República do Perú.</u>	28/07/1945	Substituído
<u>Convênio Cultural entre a República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e a República da China.</u>	27/03/1946	Em vigor
<u>Convênio Cultural entre os Governos dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e do Reino Unido da Grã-Bretanha e Irlanda do Norte.</u>	16/04/1947	Substituído
<u>Convênio Cultural entre os Estados Unidos do Brasil e a República do Líbano.</u>	30/08/1948	Substituído
<u>Acordo Relativo aos Efeitos do Convênio Cultural de 16 de abril de 1947, com o Reino Unido, sobre a Entrada e Residência de Estrangeiros.</u>	03/07/1950	Substituído
<u>Convênio Cultural entre o Governo dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e o Governo dos Estados Unidos da América.</u>	17/10/1950	Superado
<u>Convênio Cultural entre os Estados Unidos do Brasil e a Espanha</u>	23/06/1951	Superado
<u>Convênio Cultural entre o Governo dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e o Governo Real do Egito (válido para a Síria, nos termos da República Árabe Unida)</u>	08/09/1951	Em vigor
<u>Convênio Cultural entre os Estados Unidos do Brasil e o Reino do Egito</u>	08/09/1951	Substituído

<u>Convênio Cultural entre a República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e a República Oriental do Uruguai.</u>	28/12/1956	Em vigor
<u>Convênio Cultural entre o Governo dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e o Governo da República de Honduras</u>	22/10/1957	Em vigor
<u>Acordo Relativo à Interpretação dos Artigos IV e VI do Convênio Cultural Brasileiro-Peruano, Firmado no Rio de Janeiro, a 28 de julho de 1945.</u>	25/03/1958	Substituído
<u>Convênio Cultural entre o Governo dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e o Governo da República da Colômbia.</u>	28/05/1958	Substituído
<u>Convênio Cultural entre a República Federativa do Brasil e a República Cooperativista da Guiana.</u>	28/08/1968	Em vigor
<u>Convênio Cultural entre o Governo da República Federativa do Brasil e o Governo de Trinidad e Tobago.</u>	09/11/1971	Em vigor
<u>Ajuste Relativo à Execução de Projetos de Cooperação Técnica, Complementar ao Convênio Cultural entre a República Federativa do Brasil e a República Cooperativista da Guiana.</u>	11/11/1971	Em vigor
<u>Acordo Complementar, ptn, ao Convênio Cultural Subscrito entre a República Federativa do Brasil e a República da Costa Rica em 19 de novembro de 1964, para o Intercâmbio de Cooperação no Campo da Ciência e da Tecnologia (entre o CNPq e o CONICIT).</u>	11/10/1976	Em vigor
<u>Convênio Cultural entre o Governo da República Federativa do Brasil e o Governo do Reino Unido da Grã-Bretanha e Irlanda do Norte.</u>	14/10/1976	Em vigor
<u>Protocolo Adicional ao Convênio Cultural, na Área de Rádio e Televisão entre a República Federativa do Brasil e a República Oriental do Uruguai.</u>	14/08/1985	Em vigor
<u>Protocolo Adicional ao Convênio Cultural na Área do Ensino Superior entre a República Federativa do Brasil e a República Oriental do Uruguai.</u>	14/08/1985	Em vigor

<u>Programa Executivo do Convênio Cultural entre a República Federativa do Brasil e a República do Panamá</u>	25/05/2007	Em vigor
<u>Programa Executivo Relativo ao Convênio Cultural entre o Governo da República Federativa do Brasil e o Governo da República da Guiana para os anos 2009-2012</u>	14/09/2009	Em vigor
<u>Acordo Cultural entre os Estados Unidos do Brasil e a República Francesa.</u>	06/12/1948	Em vigor
<u>Acordo Cultural entre República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e Nicarágua.</u>	12/01/1953	Em vigor
<u>Acordo Cultural entre o Governo dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e o Governo Imperial do Irã.</u>	22/11/1957	Em vigor
<u>Acordo Cultural entre República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e República da Itália</u>	06/09/1958	Substituído
<u>Acordo Cultural entre o Governo dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e o Governo do Reino da Bélgica</u>	06/01/1960	Em vigor
<u>Acordo Cultural entre os Estados Unidos do Brasil e a República Árabe Unida</u>	17/05/1960	Em vigor
<u>Acordo Cultural entre o Governo dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e o Governo da Espanha</u>	25/06/1960	Em vigor
<u>Acordo Cultural entre os Estados Unidos do Brasil e Japão.</u>	23/01/1961	Em vigor
<u>Acordo Cultural entre o Governo da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e o Governo da República Popular Húngara</u>	15/05/1961	Superado
<u>Acordo Cultural entre o Governo dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e o Governo da República Popular da Polônia.</u>	19/10/1961	Denunciado
<u>Acordo Cultural com República Tcheca</u>	16/04/1962	Expirado
<u>Acordo Cultural entre a República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e a República do Senegal.</u>	23/09/1964	Em vigor
<u>Acordo Cultural entre o Governo dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e o Governo da República da Coréia.</u>	07/02/1966	Em vigor
<u>Acordo Cultural entre o Governo dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e o Governo da República Portuguesa.</u>	07/09/1966	Substituído
<u>Acordo Cultural entre a República Federativa do Brasil e o Reino dos Países Baixos.</u>	12/10/1966	Em vigor
<u>Acordo Cultural entre o Governo dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e o Governo da República Islâmica do Paquistão.</u>	08/02/1966	Em vigor

<u>Acordo Cultural entre a República Federativa do Brasil e a República da Tunísia.</u>	04/06/1968	Em vigor
<u>Acordo Cultural entre o Governo da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e o Governo da República Federal da Alemanha</u>	09/06/1969	Em vigor

Annex 4: Students with Scholarships in the decade of 1960

Scholarship identification	Date	Nationality	Name
BOLSISTA	OUTUBRO / 1960	ITALIANO	LUIGI STIRPE
BOLSISTA	OUTUBRO / 1960	BRITÂNICO	GUY ROSWELL GERVIS
BOLSISTA	OUTUBRO / 1960	PARAGUAIO	HERMANN BRUNO GUGGIARI BRUN
BOLSISTA	OUTUBRO / 1960	BRITÂNICO	GIOVANNI PONTIERO
BOLSISTA	OUTUBRO / 1960	JAPONÊS	TAKAO NISHIMURA
BOLSISTA	OUTUBRO / 1960	ARGENTINO	MIGUEL ANGEL LIMA
BOLSISTA	OUTUBRO / 1960	ARGENTINO	ANGEL LASALA
BOLSISTA CONVÊNIO	DEZEMBRO / 1960	EQUATORIANO	HERNÁN RECALDE CEVALLES
BOLSISTA CONVÊNIO	DEZEMBRO / 1960	PANAMENHO	MANUEL ANGEL ESCALA LUZCANDE
BOLSISTA CONVÊNIO	DEZEMBRO / 1960	NICARAGUENSE	FEDERICE KELLY
BOLSISTA CONVÊNIO	DEZEMBRO / 1960	BOLIVIANO	CARLOS HERNÁN TRIGO GANDARILLAS
BOLSISTA CONVÊNIO	DEZEMBRO / 1960	EQUATORIANO	RAÚL PATRICIO MANZANO MANZANO
BOLSISTA CONVÊNIO	DEZEMBRO / 1960	EQUATORIANO	AUGUSTO FEDERIO PARRA GARCÍA
BOLSISTA CONVÊNIO	DEZEMBRO / 1960	ARGENTINO	MIGUEL F. FÁBREGAS
BOLSISTA CONVÊNIO	DEZEMBRO / 1960	VENEZUELANO	RAFAEL GONZALE PERRAS OMAÑA
BOLSISTA	OUTUBRO / 1960	BOLIVIANA	BERTHA SANGUEZA MUÑOZ
BOLSISTA NÃO CONVÊNIO	MARÇO / 1964	BOLIVIANO	ANGEL CANDIA RIBERA
BOLSISTA CONVÊNIO	MARÇO / 1964	EQUATORIANO	EDUARDO ALFREDO MORENO MORENO
BOLSISTA	MAIO / 1965	BRITÂNICO	ANTHONY JOHN RUSSEL RUSSEL-WOOD
BOLSISTA	MARÇO / 1964	BOLIVIANA	TIRSO FERNANDO MUÑOZ RIVERO
BOLSISTA NÃO CONVÊNIO	MARÇO / 1964	BOLIVIANA	AGUSTIN VACA PEÑARANDA
BOLSISTA	MARÇO / 1964	NORTE- AMERICANO	MICHAEL JOHN ULIL

Annex 5: Countries participants of the PECs

Total: 60 countries

Africa

26 countries

- South Africa
- 2. Angola
- 3. Algeria
- 4. Benin
- 5. Botswana
- 6. Cape Verde
- 7. Cameroon
- 8. Côte d'Ivoire
- 9. Egypt
- 10. Gabon
- 11. Ghana
- 12. Guinea Bissau
- 13. Equatorial Guinea
- 14. Mali
- 15. Morocco
- 16. Mozambique
- 17. Namibia
- 18. Nigeria
- 19. Kenya
- 20. Democratic Republic of the Congo
- 21. Republic of Congo
- 22. São Tomé and Príncipe
- 23. Senegal
- 24. Tanzania
- 25. Togo
- 26. Tunisia

Latin America y Caribe

25 countries

- Antigua & Barbuda
- 2. Argentina
- 3. Barbados
- 4. Bolivia
- 5. Chile
- 6. Colombia
- 7. Costa Rica

8. Cuba
9. El Salvador
10. Ecuador
11. Guatemala
12. Guyana
13. Haiti
14. Honduras
15. Jamaica
16. Mexico
17. Nicaragua
18. Panama
19. Paraguay
20. Peru
21. Dominican Republic
22. Suriname
23. Trinidad & Tobago
24. Uruguay
25. Venezuela

Asia

8 countries

- China
2. India
3. Iran
4. Lebanon
5. Pakistan
6. Syria
7. Thailand
8. Timor-Leste

Europe

3 countries

1. Armenia
2. Northern Macedonia
3. Turkey