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**The road to peace:
exploring the economic programs of counterinsurgency strategy as a
method to achieve peace in areas of armed internal conflict**

São Paulo

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Orientador: Prof. Dr. Rafael Antônio Duarte Villa

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Resumo

Este artigo usa a estrutura de contra-insurgência de Nathan Leites e Charles Wolf, Jr. para analisar um estudo de caso do *Plano Colômbia* de 2000-2011. Em particular, estuda os impactos dos programas econômicos financiados pelo *Plano Colômbia* e sua relação com a violência no conflito colombiano. Trabalhos acadêmicos anteriores analisaram a eficácia da contra-insurgência e os impactos das estratégias de uma abordagem “corações e mentes”, enquanto este artigo tenta analisar a eficácia a partir de uma abordagem sistêmica. Essa abordagem sistêmica considera as insurgências como um sistema que requer entradas, conversão dessas entradas e saídas ou atividades. Leites e Wolf destacam ainda que essa capacidade se deve a: 1) a adesão do governo à lei e à ordem em contraste com a insurgência e 2) sua capacidade de demonstrar que pode governar e concluir programas e atividades. Com esse arcabouço teórico, também existe uma suposição de que aumentos na eficácia e no controle do governo aumentam a legitimidade em tais áreas e, assim, embotam as atividades insurgentes. Assim, para relacionar este arcabouço, esta pesquisa utiliza uma abordagem lógica, ligando o arcabouço de Leites e Wolf aos conceitos apresentados por Galula sobre a contra-insurgência e a importância da população. Este artigo estuda a tendência entre a mudança nos valores econômicos e a mudança na atividade insurgente. Esta pesquisa não tenta mostrar uma relação causal entre os dois conjuntos de dados, mas apenas que existe uma relação entre o aumento nos indicadores econômicos e uma diminuição nos eventos e ataques que podem ser associados aos efeitos gerais dos dois programas econômicos. Este artigo sugere que há uma relação inconclusiva e, embora haja queda nos ataques e eventos da insurgência, mais pesquisas são necessárias para averiguar a correlação real entre o efeito dos programas econômicos nos ataques e eventos da insurgência.

Palavras-chave: *Plano Colômbia*, Segurança Internacional, Insurgência, Contra-insurgência, Estratégia de Defesa

Abstract

This article uses the counterinsurgency framework of Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr. to analyze a case study of *Plan Colombia* from 2000-2011. In particular, it studies the impacts of *Plan Colombia*-funded economic programs and their relationship to violence in the Colombian conflict. Previous academic works have looked at efficacy of counter-insurgency and the impacts of strategies from a “hearts and minds” approach, while this article attempts to look at the efficacy from a systemic approach. This systemic approach views insurgencies as a system that requires inputs, conversion of these inputs and the outputs or activities. Leites and Wolf further highlight that this capacity is incumbent upon: 1) the government’s adherence to law and order in contrast to the insurgency and 2) its ability to demonstrate that it can govern and complete programs and activities. With this theoretical framework, there is also an assumption that increases in government effectiveness and control increase legitimacy in said areas and thus blunt insurgent activities. Thus, in order to relate this framework, this research uses a logical approach by linking the Leites and Wolf framework to the concepts laid out by Galula regarding counterinsurgency and the importance of the populace. This article studies the trend between the change in economic values and the change in insurgent activity. This research does not try to show a causal relationship between the two datasets, but only that there is a relationship between the increase in economic indicators and a decrease in events and attacks that can be associated the overall effects of the two economic programs. This article suggests that there is an inconclusive relationship and although there is drop in insurgency attacks and events, more research is necessary to ascertain the actual correlation between the effect of economic programs on insurgency attacks and events.

Key Words: *Plan Colombia*, International Security, Insurgency, Counter-Insurgency, Defense Strategy

Contents

- I. Introduction8
 - 1.1 Introduction.....8
 - 1.2 Hypothesis.....11
 - 1.3 Definitions.....12
 - 1.3.1 Independent Variable.12
 - 1.3.2 Dependent Variable.....12
 - 1.3.3 Conditional Antecedent.....13
 - 1.4 Methods of Analysis.....14
 - 1.4.1 Cases & Case Justification.15
 - 1.4.2 Future Use.17
- II. Theory.18
 - 2.1 Literature Review.....18
 - 2.2 Peace.18
 - 2.3 Insurgency.....19
 - 2.4 Counterinsurgency Strategy.22
- III. Case Study.....29
 - 3.1 History of the Colombian Insurgency.29
 - 3.2 Plan Colombia.....35
 - 3.3 Plan Colombia.....39
- IV. Analysis.....41
 - 4.1 Economic Key Area.42
 - 4.1.1 Methodology.42
 - 4.1.2 Analysis.....43
 - 4.2 Insurgent Activity.....51
 - 4.2.1 Methodology.51
 - 4.2.2 Analysis.....52
- V. Conclusion.....56
 - 5.1 Findings.....56
 - 5.2 Way Forward for Future Research.57
- Works Cited60

I. Introduction.

1.1 Introduction.

With the signing of the treaties after the Thirty Years' War, the Peace of Westphalia confirmed the concept where individual rulers could decide the religion for their territories without the interference of the Pope or the Holy Roman Emperor among other "new" rights.¹ It further serves as the namesake for the current international system based on the equality of states in an international system and territorial sovereignty. Recently, this system has come into question. In an international system amongst equal and sovereign states, the issues within a state should normally be considered domestic issues; however, with the increasing globalization of the world and inter-connectedness of the international community, events happening in one state can and do have an impact on its neighbors and beyond. As with the situation in Syria, these seemingly "internal" disputes have a global international factor to them. The Syrian conflict continues to affect outside of its borders and region and is not solely in just areas of security, with effects ranging from the cultures of European states to the political election rhetoric of a country an ocean away.² But as these conflicts internationalize, so do the responses that begin to erode this sense of "sovereignty" within one's borders. The continued spread of the impacts of these conflicts is causing an international response as states begin to see these conflicts as being of a vital national interest, particularly in the resolution of the conflicted state's stability.³ Internal armed conflicts are startlingly rampant across the globe. The Institute for Economics and Peace estimates that the

1. For further discussion, see Derek Croxton, "The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty," *The International History Review* 21, no. 3 (September 1999), doi:10.1080/07075332.1999.9640869.

2. For more information on the effect on European culture, see James Traub, "The Death of the Most Generous Nation on Earth," *Foreign Policy*, last modified March 29, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/10/the-death-of-the-most-generous-nation-on-earth-sweden-syria-refugee-europe>. The acceptance of Syrian refugees was an issue of contention in German state-level elections and during the 2016 Presidential election, for more information see Alison Smale and Melissa Eddy, Angela Merkel Accepts Responsibility for Party's Losses in Berlin Election," *The New York Times*, October 20, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/20/world/europe/berlin-elections-merkel.html> and Ben Jacobs, "Trump Says Syrian Refugees Aren't Just a Terrorist Threat, They'd Hurt Quality of Life," *The Guardian*, last modified September 21, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/21/trump-syrian-refugees-terrorism-quality-life-bombing-attacks>.

3. Asaf Siniver and Scott Lucas, "The Islamic State Lexical Battleground: US Foreign Policy and the Abstraction of Threat," *International Affairs* 92, no. 1 (January 2016): 69-79, doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12507.

economic impact of violence in 2016 was \$14.3 trillion.⁴ This includes a wide range of factors including military expenditures and violent crimes, but if just conflict deaths, refugees, GDP losses, fear and terrorism are calculated it is still \$1.2 trillion.⁵ With over 63.9 million refugees and internally displaced people and 285,000 deaths in internal conflicts, there is a real effect on the individual countries and by extension, through the interconnected nature of today, the globe at large.⁶

As the actions and concerns of countries globalize, it is important to look at the concept that came out of the Treaty of Westphalia, the state. States are all equal amongst each other regardless of size or power, however, the development and prosperity of a state can have reputational and influence multiplier effects. As such, the development and prosperity of a state is based on the ability of its populace to develop, support and grow an economy. The conditions that allow this are numerous but hinge on one key area – security. Any society is based around the concepts of security and the rule of law. Security, to allow for economic processes to continue unhindered by excessive interference from either state (government) or non-state actors (thieves, criminals, terrorists). And the rule of law, to enable a clear understanding of expectations of both the citizen and the state. However, that understanding at times can become distorted, or in extreme cases, completely disappear. This experience can create a dichotomy in the state leading to civil war. This civil war can strain the government’s ability to control and regulate the economy as it diverts resources to maintain power. Some of these civil wars start off suddenly, but a majority start incipiently, clandestinely and become protracted engagements over a period of time. These protracted conflicts

4. Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Peace Index, (Sydney: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017), 54, <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/06/GPI-2017-Report-1.pdf>.

5. *Ibid.*, 59.

6. *Ibid.*, 30-31.

with identifiably stronger and weaker parties are generally not viewed, as civil wars, due to optics of the conflict, but as *insurgencies*.⁷

The famed counterinsurgency theorist, David Galula, states that a civil war is exactly what an insurgency essentially is.⁸ An insurgency acts to upend the social structure outside of the state construct but within the state borders. David Kilcullen defines it as “a struggle for control over a contested political space, between a state (or group of states or occupying power), and one or more popularly based, non-state challengers”.⁹ Where the insurgent’s aim is to turn “intangible assets into concrete,”¹⁰ through the “overthrow [of] the existing order”.¹¹ These *insurgencies* can be defined as “the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region”.¹² Counterinsurgencies work to counteract this phenomena and eliminate the insurgency and its ability to affect the state’s decision-making. They can span from the so called “Roman Model,” which advocates the “wholesale slaughter” of the insurgents and their followers;¹³ to Kilcullen’s three (3) pillars of counterinsurgency based on security, political and economics.¹⁴ The world has little stomach for the former and the latter provides a template for a strategy that has proven elusive, in application, to success in recent, ongoing conflicts. In Iraq and Afghanistan, elements of the Kilcullen pillars serve as the foundation for United States strategy in

7. Merriam-Webster, "Definition of INSURGENCY," Dictionary by Merriam-Webster: America's Most-trusted Online Dictionary, last modified April 3, 2018, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/insurgency>.

8. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Foreword by Robert R. Bowie (New York: Praeger, 1964), 4.

9. David J. Kilcullen, "Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency" (speech, United States Government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington, DC, September 26, 2006).

10. Galula 1964, 6.

11. *Ibid.*, 4.

12. Department of Defense, *Department of Defense (DOD) Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (The Pentagon: United States Department of Defense, 2017), 117, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/dictionary.pdf.

13. Michael Fitzsimmons, "Hard Hearts and Open Minds? Governance, Identity and the Intellectual Foundations of Counterinsurgency Strategy," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 31, no. 3 (2008): 339, doi:10.1080/01402390802024692.

14. Kilcullen 2006, 4.

those conflicts.¹⁵ This paper takes another counterinsurgency framework from Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr. They highlight two (2) main frameworks for counterinsurgency strategy:

- 1) Hearts & Minds – this approach “focuses principal attention on the preferences, attitudes and sympathies of the populace”.¹⁶
- 2) System Approach – this approach views insurgencies that as “operating systems, require that certain inputs – obtained from other internal or external sources – be converted into certain outputs or activities”.¹⁷

This latter framework, the systems approach, is the theoretical framework used to analyze the impacts of a case study of Plan Colombia from 2000-2011. The aim of this research is to assess the effect of the economic program portions of Plan Colombia on the insurgency. Thus, the research question posed is: *Do Strategies with portions dedicated to economic growth have a relationship in the decrease of insurgent efficacy in areas of civil conflict?* This research ranges a series of topics from economics to international security; however, the focus of my research will focus on the impacts of counterinsurgency strategy on the Colombia case study with the aspects of Plan Colombia’s economic programs as the focus.

1.2 Hypothesis.

The systems approach to counterinsurgency creates a framework that allows for influences at various steps in the insurgency system. In line with this approach, this research hypothesizes that **the use of counterinsurgency strategies with portions dedicated to economic programs are related to a decrease in insurgent efficacy in areas of civil conflict.**

15. For more information see Kilcullen 2006 and United States Army et al., *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

16. Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts*, (Chicago: The Rand Corporation, 1970), 29, <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2006/R0462.pdf>.

17. Leites and Wolf 1970, 32.

1.3 Definitions.

1.3.1 Independent Variable.

The independent variable, **counterinsurgency strategies**, is the series of programs or techniques used to counter an insurgent force. In *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, John Nagl describes two (2) very different methods to defeating an insurgent force, the direct and indirect approaches.¹⁸ The direct approach relates to all types of war, from unconventional (insurgency, rebellion) to total war in that, “in order to defeat the enemy, it is only necessary to defeat his armed forces”, which I will refer to as conventional war strategy.¹⁹ However, this variable relates to the second method, the indirect approach, through which, “by focusing on dividing the people from the insurgents, [and] removing the support that they require to challenge the government,” it is possible to defeat an insurgent force. I will refer to the second method as counterinsurgency strategy.²⁰ To sharpen this definition, counterinsurgency strategies will only include those that focus on the isolation of the insurgent force from the population through non-kinetic actions, or actions that do not include armed attacks between the belligerent parties. In order to capture data relatable to the independent variable, I further break down this variable, through the economics key area. This key area uses indicators that show gains or losses economically and provide analysis that can be incorporated into the assessment of the independent variable’s effect on the dependent variable. These economic indicators (metrics) are: GDP, GDP per capita, poverty rates and unemployment; which provide measures to investigate any improvement upon the quality of life for citizens and government’s ability to govern.

1.3.2 Dependent Variable.

The dependent variable, **insurgency**, is the overall ability of the insurgent organization to grow (increase its numbers), maintain territorial control and disrupt the government’s ability to provide basic services. The insurgency is based on the desire to prevent the

18. John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 26-28.

19. *Ibid.*, 27.

20. *Ibid.*, 28.

government (or counterinsurgent forces) to govern and supplanting the system. By gaining or maintaining influence or control over people or territories, the insurgency increases their legitimacy in the eyes of the people as the legitimate government and can lead to the success of the insurgency. This efficacy, as analyzed in this research, is the freedom of movement to conduct attacks on the populace.

1.3.3 Conditional Antecedent.

There is one conditional antecedent in that there must be armed internal conflict for the hypothesis to remain true. There are many levels of armed internal conflicts so to refine this definition, this research uses the international norm for conflicts as defined by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia's ruling in the case of *Dusko Tadić*. In the rejection of an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the court defined an armed conflict as "whenever there is a resort to armed force".²¹ Though originally intended regarding an international conflict, this definition was also applied to armed internal conflicts where two (2) armed groups oppose each other through the use of arms.²²

This research initially focused on counterinsurgency strategy effects through economic programs that governments can use to improve the lives of its citizens and decrease insurgent efficacy. However, under further investigation, the key element missing in this equation, corresponding to the theoretical framework, is security. By neglecting security, this research attempt to hone in on the effects of economic programs, but in doing so, fails to identify the necessary pre-conditions of a secure area that allows for these economic programs to exist, form and grow. As a result, this research makes an assumption: *the establishment of security is present*

21. See Section 1, Paragraph 30, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, *Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction: Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić*, (The Hague: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 1995), <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm>. Also see International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), *How Is the Term "armed conflict" Defined in International Humanitarian Law?*, (Geneva, Switzerland: International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 2008), <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf>.

22. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, "Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction: Prosecutor V. Dusko Tadić" 1995.

in the areas analyzed. Further research could identify what that indicator is that defines “sufficient security” for the prosecution of these economic programs.

1.4 Methods of Analysis.

To answer the research question:

“Do Strategies with portions dedicated to economic growth have a relationship in the decrease of insurgent efficacy in areas of civil conflict?”

Using the case-study approach, I plan to analyze the result of two economic programs that were a part of Plan Colombia and their effects on insurgent attacks. During Plan Colombia, government forces combated the insurgency by “attack[ing] the support of the people for the insurgents” through increased economic, social and security programs.²³ As well, this study will focus the independent variable, *counterinsurgency*, on the economic indicators to show the effects that this part of the Plan Colombia strategy had in the respective department. Then focus the dependent variable, *insurgency*, on the indicators of the efficacy of the insurgency. Using the results from these analyses, I will determine if there is a change in the dependent variable.

In order to analyze this research, I plan to take a quantitative approach to show the relationship between counterinsurgency strategy, and the change in insurgent efficacy through the government’s ability to govern by growing the economy in the affected areas. To analyze the independent variable, *counterinsurgency*, the economics key indicators serve as a broad grouping of indicators showing the increase or decrease of government effectiveness and thus, program success in particular areas. Due to the limited data available, this research looks at entire sub-national organizational units, or Departments, and are specific to the life of the respective programs in the Colombian departments analyzed. Economic programs are defined as programs designed to increase economic growth and job production. These programs increased crop and / or industry output, economic worth and created local jobs for citizens within the local community. The indicators showing these changes are: GDP, GDP per capita, poverty rates and unemployment. To analyze the dependent variable, *insurgency*, this research analyzes the number of attacks in the

23. Nagl 2005, 28.

respective department over the same time periods. The case study provides insight to the empirical details that made up the specific programs used in the strategy; while, the statistics allow for a potential generalization of any correlational results.

This research is organized in five (5) distinct section. Section I outlines the introduction, hypothesis and the definitions for terms to be used throughout the research. Section II focuses on literature review in preparation of the thesis and the theoretical framework. Section III identifies the histories behind the case study and the counterinsurgency strategies used during the conflict. In Section IV, this research describes the methods used and analyzes the case study with respect to the independent and dependent variables. Lastly, Section V summarizes and provides conclusions to assess if the counterinsurgency strategies were successful in relation to the Leites & Wolf theoretical framework for insurgency as a system. In conclusion, this research aims to add to the scholarship on the potential benefits of counterinsurgency strategies by finding strategies that focus on viewing insurgency through a systems approach.

1.4.1 Cases & Case Justification.

Several criteria were analyzed to select the country case study selected, primarily focusing on size, type of action, time period, region, strategy used and sovereignty status. The case selected shows a distinct, general degradation of insurgent control and influence as well as historical significance in its usage of counterinsurgency strategies. The research analyzes how the programs used affected the economic key area and if it had a relationship with the insurgency. The table below lays out the differences of Colombia with other potential cases based on the selection criteria.

- Colombia (2000-2011) (Self-Government)

Table 1 – Case Selection Criteria

	Colombia	Nigeria	Malaya	East Timor
Population	~40m ²⁴	~190m ²⁵	>6m ²⁶	~1.2m ²⁷
Type of Action	Self-Government	Self-Government	Foreign Government	Foreign Government
Time Period	2000-2011	2009-Present	1948-1960	1975-1999
Region	South America	Africa	Asia	Asia
Sovereignty Status	Sovereign State	Sovereign State	Colony	Occupied Territory
Strategy	Counterinsurgency	Counterinsurgency / Counterterrorism	Counterinsurgency	Hybrid Conventional / Counterinsurgency

Source: Hirschman (1980); The World Bank (2016); CIA Worldbook (2017)

As opposed to other potential choices, this case provides many distinctive differences in the general criteria used to describe the political environment. The Colombian case continues to take place, but in a much-improved fashion from its low points. A number of other locations were considered for research, such as: Nigeria and the Philippines (Mindanao); however, these countries are still in a protracted fight and not suitable for research within the parameters. An independent country, Colombia uses its government, with the support from the United States, as they continue to fight. A modern case that is slowly ending, it provides continuity to potential current cases such as Brazil and Haiti that have conflicts. These conflicts, though lesser in degree and more localized in nature, are present nonetheless.

As well, Plan Colombia provides a clear program of counter-insurgency that makes the research easier to conduct and analyze as it was adopted, generally, throughout the Colombian government. As can be seen across the world, there are numerous examples where the

24. The World Bank, "Data: Population, Total," The World Bank, last modified 2016, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?page=3>.

25. Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency: Nigeria," Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, accessed October 12, 2017, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html>.

26. Charles Hirschman, "Demographic Trends in Peninsular Malaysia, 1947-75," *Population and Development Review* 6, no. 1 (1980): 106, doi:10.2307/1972660.

27. Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency: Timor Leste," Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, accessed October 12, 2017, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tt.html>.

results of this research could help to support a shift of strategies from Azerbaijan to Peru.²⁸ Based on the research and its data, there is a potential exportability of the strategy regardless of the location, or case, in which the strategy is used. With the number of conflicts and those effects felt across the international community, it is apparent that this remains a concern internationally and through effective strategies of counterinsurgency rather than total war approaches by governments, could help to ease the suffering of millions of people across the world.

1.4.2 Future Use.

With the numerous armed internal conflicts taking place across the world, this research will provide a narrative about the way the strategies were employed, while the statistics still serve as a comparable metric that can be analyzed across other test cases in potential future research. The most interesting potential extension of this research and area for future research is the application to domestic situations. In countries that meet the threshold for having an insurgent force or areas where the central government has trouble exerting authority and control on a day-to-day basis, this research could help to create new policies and strategies to improve the lives of normal citizens while allowing central governments to regain control of lost territory.

Is there a way to operationalize these strategies at the micro-level to cause change in those areas? Examples for future research would be the favelas in Brazil or even the inner cities of metropolises in both the United States and Western Europe.

The combination of both the case study and statistics will allow the export of the findings and apply a formula to an international and domestic location to assess areas of potential improvement and consequences for improved success:

- Favelas of Rio de Janeiro (1960 – Present) (Self-Government)

28. International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Armed Conflict Database," International Institute for Strategic Studies, accessed May, 2016, <https://acd.iiss.org/>.

- Haiti (1990s – Present) (Multinational Coalition)

II. Theory.

"It goes without saying that a civilization which leaves so large a number of its participants unsatisfied and drives them into revolt neither has nor deserves the prospect of a lasting existence."

Sigmund Freud. *The Future of Illusion.*

2.1 Literature Review.

In identifying literature, this research is based around the areas of international security, peace, rule of law, social welfare and economics. Each of these distinct areas provided a distinct insight into the various strategies used throughout history in various locations with differing degrees of success.

The majority of texts focused on the counterinsurgency doctrine and theory, to understand the strategy and its effects and its relationship to insurgency. While a majority of the literature focused on the strategy itself, a few relate the impact of these strategies to the economic, social and political effects on the country. Most of the literature in this area work primarily to identify root causes and potential solutions to improve the environment. The general theme is that the problems stem from a lack of security and the inability to properly maximize the economic potential of conflicted areas.

2.2 Peace.

What can be defined as success in a counterinsurgency struggle? One measure is the absence of conflict, but overall, peace is hard to define. Peace is a transitory state that has many meanings for many different parties. Most identify peace with a distinct, separate state from war or conflict in that there is "the absence of war and physical violence".²⁹ However, with the complexities of a globalized society and upon further analysis, it is possible to view peace in more complex manners. By breaking down the concepts of peace and violence, Johan Galtung uses the

29. Michelle I. Gawerc, "Peace-building: Theoretical and Concrete Perspectives," *Peace Change* 31, no. 4 (October 2006): 438, doi:10.1111/j.1468-0130.2006.00387.x.

concept of *negative* and *positive* peace to define peace. He identifies *negative peace* as “the absence of direct violence (e.g., people being killed),” whereas *positive peace* pertains to “the absence of structural violence (e.g. dying as a result of poverty, [the system]), and cultural violence (e.g., factors that blind people to injustice or allow them to rationalize it).”³⁰ In establishing this definition, Galtung further examines the inability of peace to be reasonably assessed as a definition common to all. Doyle and Sambanis attempt to fill this void in their definition by criteria. Continuing to avoid a dichotomous view of peace and war, as the spectrum for conflict ranges, so does the spectrum of peace. In a paper published by the World Bank, Doyle and Sambanis describe six (6) criteria for identifying peace from a state of conflict:

6. **Harmony.**
5. **Participatory society and economy.** Includes mobility and social rights, participatory industrial rights for labor in corporate organizations, and societal conflict resolution.
4. **Dynamic conflict resolution through participatory government.** Requires the capability to resolve societal conflicts through deliberation and legislation. Requires productive economy to reduce demands on state.
3. **Conflict resolution through the rule of law.** Includes equality before the law (no impunity); a viable civil society, free from the threat of arbitrary violence; basic freedoms of the person and society (assembly, free speech) and primary conflict resolution through adjudication. Requires viable economy; effective subsistence rights.
2. **Legitimate monopoly of violence.** The state is effectively sovereign; no large-scale private violence.
1. **Fewer than 1,000 war-related deaths.** No war is ongoing and residual public violence is very limited.³¹

When this peace ceases to exist and the two (2) parties begin conflicts is only the visible part of when the insurgency begins.

2.3 Insurgency.

Rooted in ideological, political differences, civil wars and insurgencies are a means of violently changing the system and one’s place in it. In keeping with Galula’s definition of an

30. *Ibid.*; see also Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3 (January 1969): 183-184, doi:10.1177/002234336900600301; for a further breakdown on the concept of varying degrees of peace and the full article to understand the various definitions of violence.

31. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "Building Peace: Challenges and Strategies After Civil War," World Bank Group, last modified December 27, 1999, 2, <http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01241/WEB/IMAGES/BUILDING.PDF>.

insurgency as just another means of civil war, a study by civil conflict expert, Stathis Kalyvas shows that not only do irregular, insurgency style civil wars last the longest, they tend to “generate greater civilian victimization”.³² Insurgencies are fought on an asymmetric basis in so far as “a manifestation of military asymmetry between actors – both in terms of power and their ensuing willingness to fight on the same plane”.³³ The basis for these insurgencies can be many and dependent on the history and makeup of the parties involved. Kalyvas denotes three (3) dimensions defining the way new versus old civil war combatants form and act: noble, collective causes and motivations vs. criminal and private gain; popular support vs. the absence of support and controlled vs. gratuitous violence.³⁴

Since antiquity, insurgents have used force to change a political order whether to separate themselves from the opposing power or to change the system entirely. In Gaul and Britannia, the Romans repeatedly experienced revolts and insurrections where the local population attempted to extricate themselves from what they viewed as an oppressive regime.³⁵ The insurgent aims to change the current political arrangement, through the “pursuit of the policy of a party, inside a country, by every means”.³⁶ A protracted struggle, insurgency works to overthrow the existing order, essentially “an ordinary international war except that the opponents are fellow citizens”.³⁷ It is a movement that operates in secret until ready and then transitions from a position of weakness to a position of strength.³⁸ Insurgency is usually studied as a subset of

32. Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Warfare in Civil War," in *Rethinking the Nature of War*, ed. Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2005), 91, https://stathiskalyvas.files.wordpress.com/2016/01/wcw_kalyvas.pdf.

33. Laia Balcells and Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars," *SSRN Electronic Journal* 58, no. 8 (2014): 1390, doi:10.2139/ssrn.2206324.

34. Stathis N. Kalyvas, "'Novas' e 'antigas' guerras civis: uma distinção válida?," *Novos Estudos*, no. 66 (July 2003): 131, https://stathiskalyvas.files.wordpress.com/2016/01/ne_kalyvas.pdf.

35. For a further discussion on Roman revolts throughout its history, see Stephen L. Dyson, "Native Revolts in the Roman Empire," *Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte* 20, no. 2/3 (1971), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4435194>.

36. Galula 1964, 3.

37. *Ibid.*, 4-5.

38. *Ibid.*, 5.

counterinsurgency or an irregular-based, civil war.³⁹ However, two successful insurgents wrote descript treatises on how to successfully accomplish one.

Using the text of Mao Tse-tung and Ché Guevara, insurgents gain an insight on the principles necessary for success in insurgencies. Both fought rebellions an ocean apart in both land and time. However, both expressed very explicit directions regarding the actions of the insurgents in their care and the audiences for their publications. The criterion of popular support for success helps to press the insurgents' movement to one that respects the population. In his seminal piece on insurgency, Guevara states that the guerrilla band has "its base in the masses".⁴⁰ He divides his work into the perfect conduct of the guerrilla fighter and the examples of guerrilla warfare, taking pains to accentuate the need to prevent unnecessary harm. He discriminates his targets and operational aims in that "assaults and terrorism in indiscriminate form should not be employed" and that "guerrilla warfare obeys laws, some derived from the general laws of war and others owing to its own special character".⁴¹ He denotes that the military necessity of a target is important as it would be "ridiculous to carry out sabotage against a soft-drink factory," but "correct and advisable to carry out sabotage against a power plant".⁴² Mao Tse-Tung, the future leader of post-World War II China, states that without the "sympathy, co-operation and assistance" of the people, "guerrilla warfare must fail," citing the White Russian and the Abyssinian insurgencies as examples of failure.⁴³ Galula relates four primary conditions for the success of an insurgency:

1. A Cause
2. A Police and Administrative Weakness in the Counterinsurgent Camp

39. Numerous researchers to include Kalyvas, Kilcullen, Galula and Nagl look at insurgency but through different lens with respect to counterinsurgency or civil war.

40. Ernesto Ché Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 10.

41. *Ibid*, 91, 115.

42. *Ibid*, 22.

43. Mao Tse-tung, *FMFRP 12-18: Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, originally published as *Guerrilla Warfare*, ed. United States Marine Corps (Washington, D.C: United States Marine Corps, 1989), <http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/FMFRP%2012-18%20%20Mao%20Tse-tung%20on%20Guerrilla%20Warfare.pdf>, 43.

3. A Not-too-hostile Geographic Environment
4. Outside Support⁴⁴

However, the key for the success of the insurgency is a simple premise, *the population*. To be successful, the insurgent must simultaneously dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent (government or existing political regime) and attack at the counterinsurgent's forces.⁴⁵ Insurgency works through fear and violence to achieve its aims, each reflecting the particular circumstances that brought it to fruition.⁴⁶ Through the exploitation of real issues and the "deep seated reality of the causes that underpin them," insurgencies attempt to coopt and gain popular support for their methods and goals.⁴⁷

2.4 Counterinsurgency Strategy.

In history, governments saw insurgents as "street robbers and highwaymen."⁴⁸ In 200 BC, the Romans used "the psychological resource of fear as a strategy" to subdue Spanish insurgents, where "hand amputations, enslaving the vanquished and indiscriminate killings" were the primary means for dealing with the resistance to Roman control.⁴⁹ In the Netherlands, during the Dutch Revolt of the 1660s, Spain decided "to crush all resistance" and under the auspices of King Phillip II instituted a 'Council of Terror' to confiscate and eradicate all mention of rebels to include the sentence of death and eternal banishment of perpetrators.⁵⁰ Even in more recent history,

44. *Ibid.*, 31; Galula describes the first two as necessary, whereas the last item may become a necessity depending on conditions.

45. *Ibid.*, 6.

46. Scott R. Moore, "The Basics of Counterinsurgency," *Small Wars Journal* 14 (2007): 3, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/moorecoinpaper.pdf>.

47. *Ibid.*, 10

48. Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 7, https://books.google.com.br/books?id=iQS-1jqgeScC&printsec=frontcover&hl=pt-BR&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.

49. Francisco Marco Simón, "Insurgency or State Terrorism? The Hispanic Wars in the Second Century BCE," in *Brill's Companion to Insurgency and Terrorism in the Ancient Mediterranean*, ed. Timothy Howe and Lee L. Brice (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2015), 228-30, doi:10.1163/9789004284739_009.

50. Herbert H. Rowen, "The Dutch Revolt: What Kind of Revolution?," in *The Rhyme and Reason of Politics in Early Modern Europe: Collected Essays of Herbert H. Rowen*, ed. Craig E. Harline (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic

in Italy during the Napoleonic War, the French government dealt with a potent insurgency in Parma, Italy with harsh methods. In order to remediate these ‘brigands,’ the French set the village of Mezzano ablaze and further executed 21 civilians to include two priests.⁵¹ Unsatisfied with the results and hoping to crush the rebellion before it was mimicked in other regions of the Empire, “Napoleon asked for several hundred guilty verdicts and the burning of at least two villages, persuaded that only extreme harshness would secure domestic peace”.⁵² As a common strategy to expunge and purge all of the *malcontent* elements, extreme measures were considered appropriate to handle criminal rebellious element before more of the public caught this contagious desire for a change in the political order.

In *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, Galula exclaims the importance of the populace, in so far that, as victory “can be achieved only with the support of the population”.⁵³ Lorenzo Zambenardi describes three (3) goals in counterinsurgency: force protection, the physical elimination of insurgents and distinction between enemy combatants and noncombatants.⁵⁴ He states that harming innocent civilians generates disastrous political effects that can be counterproductive and create “political problem[s] since it contributes towards creating fresh insurgents”.⁵⁵ This distinction between combatants and non-combatants assists in securing and maintaining the relationship between the populace and the counterinsurgent forces.

Publishers, 1992), 48, doi:10.1007/978-94-011-2722-6; Geert H. Janssen, "Exiles and the Politics of Reintegration in the Dutch Revolt," *History* 94, no. 313 (January 2009): 39, 47, doi:10.1111/j.1468-229x.2009.00441.x.

51. Doina P. Harsanyi, "Brigands or Insurgents? Napoleonic Authority in Italy and the Piacentino Counter-Insurrection of 1805–06," *French History* 30, no. 1 (September 2015): 72, doi:10.1093/fh/crv034.

52. *Ibid.*

53. Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* 1964, 55.

54. Lorenzo Zambenardi, "Counterinsurgency's Impossible Trilemma," *The Washington Quarterly* 33, no. 3 (July 2010): 22, doi:10.1080/0163660x.2010.492722.

55. *Ibid.*, 23.

As the larger party of the struggle, the counterinsurgent is at a particular disadvantage as the insurgent “is everywhere and nowhere”.⁵⁶ It is a struggle that can be lost purely because “the goal of the insurgents is not to defeat the government’s army outright” as “insurgencies prevail simply by not losing”.⁵⁷ Counterinsurgency operations and strategies work to provide a quasi-military / civilian solution for a lasting peace allowing the central government to again exert control and influence across its territory.⁵⁸ While acknowledging the important nature of security in any progression towards peace or directly after conflict,⁵⁹ peacebuilding “requires the provision of temporary security, the building of new institutions capable of resolving future conflict peaceabl[y] and an economy capable of offering civilian employment to former soldiers and material progress to future citizens”.⁶⁰

In classic counterinsurgency, David Galula describes four (4) laws critical to the successful implementation of counterinsurgency strategy:

1. The support of the populace is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent;
2. Support is gained through an active minority;
3. Support of the population is conditioned;
4. Intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential.⁶¹

56. Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* 1964, 53.

57. Alexander B. Downes, "Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy," *Civil Wars* 9, no. 4 (2007): 423, doi:10.1080/13698240701699631.

58. In *The Accidental Guerilla* and *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, both David Kilcullen and David Galula, respectively, describe the ability to exert control and influence of the central government as the desired end state of counterinsurgency operations. This is also annotated in Doyle and Sambanis’ spectrum of peace through the monopoly of violence by the central government. For more information see David J. Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), Galula 1964 and Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006)2006.

59. Kirsti Samuels, "Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making," *Chicago Journal of International Law* 6, no. 2 (2006): 663-4, <http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol6/iss2/10>.

60. Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* 2006, 5.

61. Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* 1964, 55-8.

He then identifies an eight (8) step process for success with the result being “order having been re-established”.⁶² David Kilcullen, another counterinsurgency theorist, states this proper application is through a “comprehensive approach” that “closely integrates political, security, economic and information components”.⁶³

In 1970, two researchers with the RAND Corporation wrote an essay on insurgency conflicts. The two authors attempted to provide a broad understanding of how they operate, where the primary aim was “generalization and theory” and “to advance hypotheses and illustrate (rather than test) them”.⁶⁴ As described briefly previously, Leites and Wolf use two (2) models for analyzing insurgent behaviors and their understanding of how insurgencies function. The hearts and minds approach “focuses principal attention on the preferences, attitudes and sympathies of the populace,” where they relate this to demand, while contrasting it with the “neglect of opportunities and costs required to indulge these preferences” or supply.⁶⁵ They use this demand / supply distinction to illustrate the onus of stress on the insurgency and counterinsurgency forces in attempting to defeat the other party.⁶⁶ Where the demand aspect, on the insurgent side, focuses on “what people are willing to pay (or contribute) for insurgent activity,” and the supply aspect focuses on the difficulty or costs of producing insurgent activities”.⁶⁷ This systemic approach serves as the theoretical framework that this research uses to observe the effectiveness of counterinsurgency strategy and in particular, to answer the question:

“Do Strategies with portions dedicated to economic growth have a relationship in the decrease of insurgent efficacy in areas of civil conflict?”

62. *Ibid.*, 58.

63. Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla* 2009, 265-6.

64. Leites and Wolf, Jr. 1970, V.

65. *Ibid.*, 29.

66. *Ibid.*, 29, 37-39.

67. *Ibid.*, 37.

Leites and Wolf also describe this from the counterinsurgent perspective which helps to lead to their second approach, the system-based approach.

This system approach recognizes that insurgencies “require that certain inputs – obtained from either internal or external sources – be converted into certain outputs, or activities”.⁶⁸ These inputs range from food to recruits to supply, all with the ultimate goal of “acts of sabotage, violence against individuals, public demonstrations, small scale attacks and eventually larger attacks”.⁶⁹ With the same goal as described previously, of demonstrating the counterinsurgent or government as “immoral, incompetent and impotent” and unfit to govern or rule.⁷⁰ As identified by the figure of insurgency as a system, there are four (4) methods for the counterinsurgent to inhibit the system.⁷¹


Figure 1 – Leites’ & Wolf Diagram of Insurgency as a System

68. *Ibid.*, 32.

69. *Ibid.*, 32-34.

70. *Ibid.*, 34.

71. *Ibid.*, 34-35 and Figure 1.



Source: Leites & Wolf (1970, p. 35)

The first two methods attempt to 1) prevent inputs into the system and 2) their conversion into activities or outputs.⁷² Examples of this *counter production* method could be the interdiction of materiel for the insurgent (first method) or reducing their productive efficacy “by planting rumors inside the organization” and creating “distrust and frictions” within the organizational structure of the insurgency (second method).⁷³ The third method is the destruction of the activities or outputs and the fourth is the ability of the government or counterinsurgent “to blunt the effects of [the insurgent’s] outputs on the population and [the government or counterinsurgent]” or in other

72. *Ibid.*, 35-36.

73. *Ibid.*

words, their ability to absorb and continue along without impact.⁷⁴ The third method is the destruction of teams or preemption of sabotage, while the fourth method is the guarding of the populace of the effects on the normal day-to-day life of the average citizen.⁷⁵

In reducing the effectiveness of the insurgency's actions, Leites and Wolf describe two (2) aspects of improving the government's capacity through *active defense* and *passive defense*.⁷⁶ They describe passive defense as "relocating the population and fortifying the living new areas against attacks by [the insurgency]".⁷⁷ While the active defense includes "building up local defense capabilities, usually in the form of constabulary, paramilitary or militia forces".⁷⁸ Both aspects as described by Leites and Wolf primarily focus on the security key area as the main way of *increasing absorptive capacity*; however, they do allow for the concept of strengthening the government itself.⁷⁹ This capacity, to "be informed [and] under take programs", leads to this increased capacity to govern and prove it can do so effectively, thus deserving of staying in power.⁸⁰ To demonstrate effective governance, this research analyzes the different metrics (indicators) with respect to economics to show an increase in this capacity and thus the ability to govern despite the insurgency. Where government responsibility is to provide for the security and prosperity of its populace. Leites and Wolf further highlight that this capacity is incumbent upon: 1) the government's adherence to law and order in contrast to the insurgency and 2) its ability to demonstrate that it can govern and complete programs and activities showing that they "should govern because they are governing".⁸¹ The second aspect of this fourth method is what is analyzed in this research with regards to economic activities. With this theoretical framework there is also an assumption that increases in government effectiveness and control increase legitimacy in said areas and thus blunt insurgent

74. *Ibid.*, 36.

75. *Ibid.*, 36-37.

76. *Ibid.*, 82-83.

77. *Ibid.*, 82.

78. *Ibid.*, 83.

79. *Ibid.*

80. *Ibid.*, 82-83 for more info see Leites and Wolf 1970, Chapter 5.

81. *Ibid.*, 37.

activities. Indicators of this in the area of economics help to show if there is a justified improvement in government control and legitimacy in areas of tenuous control by the government, posing the question *are citizen lives better today under the government vice when under the insurgency yesterday?*

In order to relate this theory, this research uses a logical approach by linking the Leites and Wolf theory to the concepts laid out by Galula regarding counterinsurgency and the importance of the populace. It then looks at Plan Colombia, parsing out two economic programs, Areas for Municipal-Level Alternative Development (ADAM) and Additional Investment for Sustainable Alternative Development (MIDAS) as examples of programs solely focused on economic development. These programs' effect on the economy of the respective departments and their populations provide the data for analysis through key economic indicators. These indicators are: GDP, GDP per capita, poverty and unemployment rates. To analyze the insurgency, this research analyzes the number of attacks on civilians by insurgents and terrorist attacks by the insurgency. This research does not try to show a causal relationship between the two datasets, but only that there is a relationship between the increase in economic indicators and a decrease in attacks that can be associated with the overall effect of the economic programs. Where the government's ability to absorb these attacks and conduct is responsibility to the populace of providing security and fostering prosperity (increase in economic indicators) is an essential part to countering the insurgency (decrease in attacks).

III. Case Study.

3.1 History of the Colombian Insurgency.

Colombia is one of largest countries in South America comprising of over 1 million square kilometers with over 47 million inhabitants.⁸² Originally a part of the supra-state, Gran

82. Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency: Colombia," Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, accessed January 7, 2017, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html>.

Colombia, Colombia has been embroiled in a state of conflict for almost 100 years.⁸³ Those struggles trace their origins to the class struggles between the peasant population, which comprised approximately 75% of the population, and the landowners, 3% of which owned over 50% of the land in Colombia.⁸⁴ Colombia has a rich history of insurrections that has been precipitated by a gross disparity of land and money between the rich and the poor. Starting as far back as the development of Simon Bolivar's Gran Colombia to the present, insurrection and insurgent movements are a part of the existence of the country.⁸⁵ Despite the historical violence since their independence that made Colombia one of the most violent countries in the world, the current troubles have a more recent tie based on the historic inequality of Colombian societies.⁸⁶

Owing to long-stemming issues regarding the understanding of state power and its relationship with the people, a number of civil wars occurred during the late nineteenth century.⁸⁷ This constant struggle resulted in the late 1870's with the establishment of the two parties that would dominate Colombian politics well into the mid-twentieth century" the Liberal and Conservative parties.⁸⁸ The Liberal party advocated for "individualism, competition and nominal

83. Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency: Colombia." See also British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), "BBC News - Colombia Timeline," BBC News, last modified August 14, 2012, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1212827.stm>.

84. Mario Murillo and Jesus Rey Avirama, *Colombia and the United States: War, Unrest, and Destabilization* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003), 45, https://books.google.com.br/books?id=EdhCanqQN8kC&pg=PA57&dq=%22la+violencia%22+colombia+united+states&q=%22la+violencia%22+colombia+united+states&redir_esc=y&hl=pt-BR#v=snippet&q=%22la%20violencia%22%20colombia%20united%20states&f=false.

85. For more information regarding the history of insurgencies in Colombia, see Darío Villamizar Herrera, *Las guerrillas en Colombia: una historia desde los orígenes hasta los confines* (Bogotá: Penguin Random House Grupo Editorial, 2017). Also, for further information regarding the continued nature of these insurgencies into the present, see Maristela R. Dos Santos Pinheiros, "FARC-EP: Meio século de insurgência na Colômbia. Que paz é possível?," (master's thesis, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2015).

86. Betty Horwitz and Bruce Michael Bagley, "Challenges to Democracy: Drug trafficking, Organized Crime and Terrorist Networks in LAC," in *Latin America and the Caribbean in the Global Context: Why Care About the Americas?* (New York: Routledge, 2106), doi:10.4324/9780203855508.

87. Marco Palacios, *Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875-2002*, trans. Richard Stoller (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006), 1.

88. *Ibid.*, 1-3.

equality,” although with a few reservations normally attributed to political parties of “the people”.⁸⁹ As early as 1850, the Liberals advocated universal male suffrage, but by 1863 began to support restrictions to suffrage to “avoid manipulation of the votes of the poor by priests and *haciéndalos*”.⁹⁰ Constantly shifting in their views, the conservatives supported a traditional system overseen by the old elite class of Colombia. Comprised of landowners, the Catholic Church and peasants under their control,⁹¹ they served as the main force behind the Constitution of 1886 that would last, albeit with over 50 revisions, until 1991.⁹² This constitution instituted a period known as the “Regeneration,” where the nation saw a sharp decrease in personal liberties and an increase in centralization and the power of the Presidency over the legislature.⁹³

In 1946, as a result of a potential loss of power, the Conservative party government of President Mariano Ospina Perez instituted repressive measures against Liberal Party bases, particularly in the countryside.⁹⁴ This was the start of a period known as *La Violencia* (1946-1966), which would last for 20 years as a precursor to the current civil war.⁹⁵ The assassination of the charismatic leader, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948 only intensified the violence resulting in an estimated 200,000 deaths over the twenty-year period.⁹⁶ In one department, where fairly good records were kept, almost 2,000 families left, over 34,000 farms were abandoned and

89. *Ibid.*, 34.

90. *Ibid.*, 22.

91. Alfredo Molano, "The Evolution Of The FARC: A Guerrilla Group's Long History," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 34, no. 2 (September/October 2000): 23, doi:10.1080/10714839.2000.11722627.

92. Palacios 2006, 27-29.

93. *Ibid.*, 28-29.

94. Murillo and Avirama 2003, 45.

95. *Ibid.*; some attribute *La Violencia* to the assassination to an accord written in 1958 between the various parties, see Chris Kraul, "The Battles Began in 1964: Here's a Look at Colombia's War with the FARC Rebels," *Latimes.com*, last modified August 30, 2016, <http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-colombia-farc-explainer-snap-story.html>.

96. Norman A. Bailey, "La Violencia in Colombia," *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 9, no. 4 (October 1967): 562, doi:10.2307/164860.

approximately \$400-500 million worth of property was destroyed.⁹⁷ In 1958, a rapprochement was reached between the elites of the Liberal and Conservative factions, but failed to address the extreme land ownership issues still plaguing the countryside.⁹⁸ Seeing no recourse to modify the rigid social and political structures, the opposition to this, the “natural front” started an armed rebellion.⁹⁹ On July 20, 1964, the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) came into existence as groups of militants in areas affected by state-sponsored violence joined and issued a political military declaration of their intended manner in which to achieve success.¹⁰⁰ They declared that “we are revolutionaries struggling for a change in the regime... we have been forced to find another way: the path of armed revolution for the struggle for power”.¹⁰¹

These remnants of a Marxist revolution continued to attack at the central government’s ability to govern throughout the country unhindered.¹⁰² From 1964 until now, there have been numerous conflicts between the government and other parts of society who want a change in the government order. Supporters have joined the cause, and counter-cause, in distinct entities, sometimes with similar desired end states but with different violent methods of achieving those end states. This gave rise to a self-proclaimed, counter-revolutionary force and another leftist revolutionary force that further complicated efforts for handling the insurgency, creating three (3) insurgent forces the government had to counter.¹⁰³ During this same period, the response by the landowners was the support of different guerrilla organizations (the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN) in 1964 and the *Ejército de Liberación Popular* (ELP) in 1967).¹⁰⁴ The situation was further exacerbated by the administration of President Misael Pastrana (1970-1974), who

97. *Ibid.*

98. Molano 2000, 26.

99. *Ibid.*

100. Murillo and Avirama 2003, 57-8.

101. *Ibid.*, 58.

102. Jim Rochlin, "Plan Colombia and the revolution in military affairs: the demise of the FARC," *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 2 (August 2010): 719, doi:10.1017/s0260210510000914.

103. *Ibid.*

104. Molano 2000, 26.

instituted policies that saw the further consolidation of land under landowners and pushed thousands of peasants into “organized and spontaneous invasions of rural properties”.¹⁰⁵ These actions led to repression of peasant rights both in the rural and urban areas and consolidated the influence of the FARC.¹⁰⁶ This migration gave rise to the National Civic Strike of 1977 and the Draconian Security Statue of 1978, which restricted organization and protest rights. Buffeted by these issues, the FARC saw a 600% increase from a 500-man organization to 3000-man army with structure, a General Staff, training schools and political programs.¹⁰⁷ With numerous peasants caught in the middle and unable to support themselves with government assistance, there was a turn to coca planting, the main ingredient in cocaine.¹⁰⁸ Although skeptical at first, the guerrillas began to tax producers through *gramaje*, basically an extortion of coca producers and traffickers to grow and transport in areas under the control of the FARC.¹⁰⁹

In the late 1960’s, coca production and cocaine smuggling began under the control of Cuban exiles in Miami.¹¹⁰ From 1976 to 1982, the amount of cocaine entering into the United States was increased from approximately 14-19 metric tons to 45 metric tons.¹¹¹ Besides cocaine, Colombia’s marijuana production and sales to the United States accounted for around 70% of the import market into the United States.¹¹² In an effort to stem this, the United States government began supporting programs designed to eradicate the drug business in Colombia and stem the flow of drugs. Prior to 1973, the United States government provided approximately \$45,000, in the form

105. *Ibid.*

106. *Ibid.*

107. *Ibid.*, 27.

108. *Ibid.*

109. *Ibid.*

110. Bruce M. Bagley, "Colombia and the War on Drugs," *Foreign Affairs* 67, no. 1 (Fall 1988): 74, doi:10.2307/20043675.

111. *Ibid.*, 76.

112. *Ibid.*, 74,

of six (6) vehicles, towards the Colombian effort against drugs.¹¹³ This would soon balloon to \$6 million in 1973, over four years, for law enforcement training and later to \$16 million, tripling the aid provided from 1970 to 1977.¹¹⁴ As this support relationship grew, Colombia and the United States began jointly attacking drug operations throughout the country. In 1984, the two countries conducted a raid on a cocaine manufacturing complex on the Yari River that resulted in the seizure and destruction of \$1.2 billion in coca and cocaine.¹¹⁵ This led to increased violence and potential coordination between the guerrilla elements and the drug cartels. In 1984, Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla was assassinated and later in 1985, M-19, another guerrilla organization active in Colombia at the time, seized the Palace of Justice and killed the Supreme Court Justices and another 80 people.¹¹⁶

The 1980's were marked by intense levels of negotiations to attempt a rapprochement with the FARC through political participation.¹¹⁷ The administrations of Presidents Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) and Virgilio Barco (1986-1990) both attempted to offer integration into the political and social constructs under the suzerainty of the state.¹¹⁸ As negotiations transitioned through various stages, the government continued to attempt consolidation and assertion of control of guerrilla-controlled areas. After an offensive against the guerrillas in the Department of Urabá and a retaliatory strike by guerrillas on a military convoy in Caquetá, negotiations stuttered and stalled. They moved from discussions first in Caquetá, to Caracas, Venezuela and Tlaxcala, Mexico, with ceasefires established, suspended, broken and reestablished throughout the administration of President César Gaviria (1990-1994).¹¹⁹

113. *Ibid.*, 78

114. *Ibid.*

115. *Ibid.*, 81.

116. *Ibid.*, 82-85; there is debate as to whether M-19 was paid by the Medellín cartel to conduct the assault on the Palace of Justice.

117. Molano 2000, 27.

118. *Ibid.*

119. *Ibid.*, 27-28.

Based on the National Center for Historical Memory, more than 218,000 people have been killed in this armed internal conflict, with 81% being civilians.¹²⁰ Most of these civilians were killed by the rebels, but the government is responsible for at least two thousand.¹²¹ These deaths occurred because of the unstable nature of the country and "a culture of violence and lawlessness that had characterized this conflict."¹²² Moreover, during the 1980s and 1990s, crime went out of control, when criminal organizations threatened the stability of the government. The high point of instability was when the guerrillas took control of the Colombian Congress with the support of the drug lords in 1985.¹²³ In Giselle Lopez's article, she identifies that "the roots of violence in Colombia lie in a foundation of economic inequality linked to poverty, unemployment and lack of education," and that "violence would likely decline if central government and state institutions were strong enough to create and enforce rule of law and to repress violent challenges to state authority."¹²⁴ This decrease in security lends legitimacy to the guerrillas, as the government is unable to maintain its monopoly on violence or provide basic services, the reason why a government exists. The government has changed their strategies over time, but since 2000, a program in conjunction with the US government led to a change in the approach in combatting the insurgency.

3.2 Plan Colombia.

In 1999, President Andres Pastrana announced a plan to "counter the country's drug and security crisis through a comprehensive 6-year, \$7.5 billion plan linked to three (3) objectives: (1)

120. Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, "Estadísticas Del Conflicto Armado En Colombia," Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, last modified 2012, <http://www.centrodehistoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/informeGeneral/estadisticas.html>.

121. *Ibid.*

122. Giselle Lopez, "The Colombian Civil War: Potential for Justice in a Culture of Violence," *Jackson School Journal of International Studies* 2, no. 1 (Fall 2010): 16, https://issuu.com/matiasvf/docs/jackson_schoo_journal_2010.

123. William R. Long, "12 Colombian Justices Dead: Half of High Court Killed in Takeover," *Los Angeles Times*, last modified November 9, 1985, http://articles.latimes.com/1985-11-09/news/mn-3526_1_supreme-court-justices.

124. Lopez 2011, 9.

reduce the flow of illicit narcotics and improve security, (2) promote social and economic justice, and (3) promote the rule of law".¹²⁵ Plan Colombia is a program in which the United States, up to 2010, has given more than \$7 billion overall and \$1 billion to help in areas that are focused on the rule of law and governance.¹²⁶ However, the plan was not created solely as a means of helping Colombia towards peace. Plan Colombia serves as a framework primarily to stem the drug trade in the United States; however, the by-product effects of the Plan play a large role in fighting the insurgency. The gap in governance had increased the ability of drug lords to produce and manufacture illicit drugs that were having a detrimental effect on the US populace.¹²⁷ This illicit income served as operating funds for the guerrillas and thus ran afoul of the United States and Colombian governments. Thus, in essence, the agreement for Plan Colombia on the United States' side was to combat the entry of drugs into the country, but the effects were the same.¹²⁸ The cumulative effect of this program had a demonstrable effect on violence and the level of control of the Colombia government. Homicides fell from 28,534 in 2002 to 15,250 in 2008, with a slight uptick to 16,554 in 2011.¹²⁹ Kidnappings dropped from 2,882 to 376 in the same period.¹³⁰ While GDP growth increased from 2% in 2002 to 8% in 2007 with unemployment dropping to 11.1% in 2008 from 15.7% in 2002.¹³¹

125. United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), *GAO-09-71 Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance*, (Washington, DC: United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2008), 11, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/282511.pdf>.

126. June S. Beittel, *Colombia: Background, U.S. Relations, and Congressional Interest*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 38, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32250.pdf>.

127. Beittel 2012, 26-9

128. For more information, see Beittel 2012.

129. Max Boot and Richard Bennet, "The Colombian Miracle," *Weekly Standard*, December 14, 2014, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-colombian-miracle/article/272306> and for more information see Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses, "Forensis - Instituto Nacional De Medicina Legal," El Instituto - Instituto Nacional De Medicina Legal, accessed December 15, 2017, <http://www.medicinalegal.gov.co/forensis> for homicides during the years 2002, 2008, 2010.

130. *Ibid.*

131. *Ibid.*

Originally employing a clearly conventional war approach to this insurgency since the 1960's, Colombia modified its strategies to counterinsurgency with the adoption of the US-sponsored *Plan Colombia*.¹³² The initial plan, as funded in 2000 by the United States, saw approximately 78% of the budget earmarked for military operations, which would remain a fairly stable level of funding through at least 2010.¹³³ A \$7.5 billion plan over five (5) years, Plan Colombia called for \$4 billion from the Colombian government, \$1.3 billion from the United States and the remaining 2.2 billion from the international community.¹³⁴ Besides providing substantial sums to provide United States military assistance to the Colombia government, the Plan has distinct sections devoted to economic, social and rule of law improvements. Ten (10) main elements were outlined as the focus of the plan:

1. **Economic Strategy:** to generate employment, support state tax revenue collection and “support a viable counterbalancing economic force to narco-trafficking;
2. **Fiscal & Financial Strategy:** to boost economic activity;
3. **Peace Strategy:** to forge “a negotiated peace agreement with guerrillas on the basis of territorial integrity, democracy and human rights;”
4. **National Defense Strategy:** “to restructure and modernize the armed forces and the police, so that they will be able to restore the rule of law and provide security;”
5. **Judicial & Human Rights Strategy:** “to reaffirm the rule of law and assure equal and impartial justice to all;”
6. **Counternarcotic Strategy:** “to stop the flow of drug money – the fuel of violence – to insurgent and other armed organizations;”
7. **Alternative Development Strategy:** to “promote agricultural schemes and other profitable economic activities for peasant farmers and their families;”
8. **Social Participation Strategy:** “to develop more accountability in local government, community involvement in anticorruption efforts and continued pressure on the guerrillas and other armed groups;”
9. **Human Development Strategy:** “to promote efforts to guarantee, within the next few years, adequate education and health” and create opportunities for the Colombian youth and other vulnerable populations; and
10. **International Oriented Strategy:** “to confirm the principles of shared responsibility, integrated action and balanced treatment of the drug issue”.¹³⁵

Plan Colombia served as an overall framework but was not a static plan. Specific outlays called for \$122 million for human rights and judicial reform, \$81 million for alternative economic

132. Rochlin 2010, 719.

133. See GAO 2008, 15 and Table 3 for more information.

134. Gabriel Marcella, *Plan Colombia: The Strategic and Operational Imperatives*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001), 8, <http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub29.pdf>.

135. *Ibid.*, 29.

development, \$115.6 million for Colombian Police, as well, the 390.5 million for counternarcotic operations in Southern Colombia included funds for humanitarian and development assistance.¹³⁶ Other programs even listed under the military portion of the funding still further support rule of law and economic progress, if indirectly. From 2000-2008, under the auspices of police training presence programs, other programs provided additional funding to support the government at the national and local level in economic, social and rule of law growth: The National Police Interdiction Efforts (\$153 million for training specialized Police), Police Presence in Conflict Zones (\$92 million, to provide police presence in areas that previously had none) and the Infrastructure Security Program (\$115 million, to secure the Cano Lumon-Covenas pipeline and shore up the promotion of the national economy through oil production and transport).¹³⁷ As a majority of its resources were allocated to security programs, the other aspects of the plan had to be innovative and efficient with their expenditures.¹³⁸ To support the non-military programs directly, \$1.3 billion through 2008 was allocated to Alternative Development (economic, \$500 million), Internally Displaced Persons (social, \$247 million), Demobilization and Reintegration (social, \$44 million), Democracy and Human Rights (social and rule of law, \$158 million) and Promotion of the Rule of Law (rule of law, \$238 million).¹³⁹

The space created by the security programs allowed for openings to improve the economic viability of poorer sectors of Colombia as well as the country at large. During the Presidency of Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010), as a means of capitalizing on security gains and provide a united front to consolidate gains. President Uribe created the Integrated Action Coordination Center (Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral – CCAI) designed to “guarantee citizen rights throughout national territory, integrate peripheral regions into the country, and establish effective governance,” this consolidation strategy served as a subset of Plan Colombia and was further

136. *Ibid.*, 8-9

137. GAO 2008, 28, 35-45.

138. As previously noted, a majority of the assistance from the United States went to military programs. See also, Adam Isacson and Abigail Poe, *After Plan Colombia: Evaluating "Integrated Action," the Next Phase of United States Assistance*, (Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, 2009), 4, http://justf.org/files/pubs/091203_col.pdf, where Isacson and Poe identify as much as 80% of the funds allocated between 2000-2007.

139. GAO 2008, 47.

advocated after a 2006 study by the National Planning Department.¹⁴⁰ Designed to evaluate the progress of Plan Colombia, the Progress Report of 2006 highlighted the security improvements, social and economic revitalization, democratic institution strengthening and progress in the peace progress.¹⁴¹

3.3 Plan Colombia.

Economic programs for Plan Colombia were primarily administrated, funded and managed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Initially, in 2001, USAID created a crop-substitution model to create “alternative employment opportunities based on private-sector investment”.¹⁴² Through this plan of alternative development, USAID funded “over 500 families that accepted volunteer transitions to alternative plant cultivation in Putamayo”.¹⁴³ Growing anything from bananas to yucca to rice, these farms faced issues with regards to soil conditions where these plants were to be planted.¹⁴⁴ Many taking part in this project would again return to planting coca due to pressure from guerillas and financial feasibility.¹⁴⁵ This failure led to a transition in strategy. In 2005, USAID changed the focus from “a crop substitution to working with communities to create a culture of legal economic practices”.¹⁴⁶ This idea served

140. Sergio Jaramillo, "National Consolidation Policy" (presentation, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, December 9, 2010), Slide 14, <http://ccai-colombia.org/files/primarydocs/101209jara.pdf>; also see National Planning Department, *Plan Colombia Progress Report, 1999-2006*, (Bogotá, Colombia: Department of Justice and Security, 2006), https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Justicia%20Seguridad%20y%20Gobierno/bal_plan_Col_ingles_final.pdf.

141. See National Planning Department 2006, 8, 10-41.

142. Ricardo V. Meza, *USAID's Alternative Development Policy in Colombia*, (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2011), 1, <https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/brief38.pdf>.

143. Charles P. Preston, IV, "Drugs and Conflict in Colombia: A Policy Framework Analysis of Plan Colombia," (master's thesis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2004), 45, <https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/handle/10919/37148>.

144. *Ibid.* and Marcella 2001, 12.

145. Preston, IV 2004, 45.

146. Meza 2011, 1.

as the basis for Additional Investment for Sustainable Alternative Development (MIDAS) and Areas for Municipal-Level Alternative Development (ADAM).¹⁴⁷

ADAM worked in conjunction with MIDAS attempting to “create a network of municipalities and communities committed to legality”.¹⁴⁸ ADAM funded with \$189 million, served a multi-faceted approach. Implanted in 75 municipalities of primarily Afro-Colombian communities in ten (10) provinces, it “focused on productive agricultural projects, public works, municipal strengthening and civil society collaboration”.¹⁴⁹ ADAM reports assisting 50,000 families, creating 66,000 jobs and \$51 million in sales.¹⁵⁰ Besides serving an economic function, ADAM’s social aspects worked to empower citizen oversight and capacity building in community administrative and organizational functions.¹⁵¹ Throughout the life of Plan Colombia, USAID credited their work through Plan Colombia funds as having improved economic growth, contributing to the reduction by 30% in rural poverty levels over ten (10) years and planting over 350,000 hectares of licit crops in lieu of coca.¹⁵²

MIDAS operated from 2006 to 2011, using a model that leveraged public and private sector alliances in combination with targeted sector assistance and training to achieve “long-term benefits and [transform] livelihoods in Colombia’s post-conflict regions”.¹⁵³ Using a \$180 million initial investment, it operated in the regional corridors of “Antioquia, Atlantic Coast / Sierra

147. *Ibid.*, 1-2.

148. Management Systems International (MSI), *Final Report: Post-Implementation Evaluation*, (Washington, DC: Management Systems International (MSI), 2014), 5, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00JRMK.pdf.

149. *Ibid.*, vi.

150. *Ibid.*, 5.

151. *Ibid.*, 11.

152. United States Agency for International Development (USAID), *USAID Assistance for Plan Colombia*, (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 2016), https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1862/Plan%20Colombia%20fact%20sheet_020816.pdf.

153. United States Agency for International Development (USAID), *Programa MIDAS: Final Report*, (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 2011), 1, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdacw499.pdf.

Nevada, Eje Cafetero, Macizo / Putamayo, Magdalena Medio and the Southwest”.¹⁵⁴ Focused on five (5) major components: Agribusiness, Commercial Forestry / Natural Forest Conservation, Small & Medium Enterprises, Public Policy Support and Productive Ethnic Territories, MIDAS leveraged \$571 million from the public and private sector, 92% coming from the private sector.¹⁵⁵ Through over 550 projects, MIDAS benefited over 150,000 families and created over 150,000 urban and rural jobs in over half of Colombia’s 1,100 municipalities.¹⁵⁶ As well, working through ten (10) financial institutions, it increased access to credit reaching 480,000 new clients and over 1.7 billion pesos in lending over the life of the program.¹⁵⁷

IV. Analysis.

To analyze these results as reported on Plan Colombia, this research looks at each department’s indicators in the key area of analysis, economics, and the programs that were instituted there. Those specific effects on the key area indicators of economic programs in Plan Colombia help to analyze the relationship with the hypothesis. As discussed earlier, Leites & Wolf, in their systems approach to counterinsurgency, identify four methods:

1. Raising the cost to insurgents of obtaining inputs;
2. Impeding the process of insurgent ability to convert inputs to outputs;
3. Destroying insurgent outputs; and
4. Blunting the effects of insurgent outputs and / or increasing the government’s ability to absorb these outputs.¹⁵⁸

These four methods combined, equal an ability to prevent insurgent success and increase governmental authority across the population and its territories. It is in this fourth method that this research focuses its analysis.

154. *Ibid.*, 3.

155. *Ibid.*, 3, 7.

156. *Ibid.*, 8, 27.

157. *Ibid.*, 30.

158. Leites and Wolf 1970, 35-36.

4.1 Economic Key Area.

The economic progress of ADAM & MIDAS served primarily to provide alternative development to areas that were planting coca with the aims of preventing the insurgents from gaining revenue through the drug trade to stem the flow of drugs to the United States.

4.1.1 Methodology.

The data used for the economic analysis proved to be the most complete on the National Administrative Department of Statistics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadísticas – DANE) website as it used the same or similar methodology for standard economic indicators. The analysis looked at the GDP, GDP per capita, unemployment and poverty rates and focused on the years prior to and during the respective programs based on 18 case studies conducted by the United States Government. The departments selected were: Antioquia, Bolivar, Cauca, Nariño, and Putumayo for ADAM and Antioquia, Atlántico, Cesar, Nariño, Norte de Santander and Santander for MIDAS.¹⁵⁹

This research does not attempt to assign total change solely to the economic programs, but to state that in comparison to the other departments without these economics programs, in comparison to the national average there is a difference. Plan Colombia included a number of other programs as indicated above, that also could have played a role in the impact of the program on Colombia and the insurgency. By affecting the economic environment, these programs had an effect on the indicators and at the same time there is a drop in the number of attacks by insurgents. As opposed to tracking individual programs, this analysis looks at the overall economic environment in each of these departments that had these two economic Plan Colombia programs. The case studies focused on very specific programs within the respective departments; however, many other projects were conducted in and throughout the departments in the case studies. Data available excluded poverty and unemployment rates for Putumayo department. Due

159. MSI 2014, 2-4.

to solely capturing data for the top 23 departments of Colombia in the DANE surveys, Putumayo was excluded.¹⁶⁰

4.1.2 Analysis.

Through over \$300 million from just these two programs, a massive influx of money made its way to these poorer areas. In looking beyond the direct effects of the programs, there were changes across key indicators observed across the country and in the various departments. Using running prices, Colombia's GDP in 2000 was \$99.88 billion increasing to \$311.8 billion by 2011, a substantial growth with an average annual growth of 10.4%.¹⁶¹ Through the life of the ADAM and MIDAS programs, the GDP increased an average of 10.2% (including two years of lesser increases during the 2008 financial crisis). GDP per capita was \$2,189 in 2000 increasing to \$5,934 in 2011 increasing on average 8.2% annually from 2000-2005 and 9.2% annually over the life of the ADAM and MIDAS programs.¹⁶² Other national economic indicators such as poverty and unemployment show similar gains. In 2002, 49.7% were in poverty decreasing to 34.1% in 2011 with an average decrease of 5.6% per year.¹⁶³ From 2008-2011, the poverty rate

160. See Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), "Cifras Departamentales de Pobreza Monetaria y Desigualdad," Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), last modified 2016, http://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/condiciones_vida/pobreza/2016/anexos_pobreza_departamentos_R2016.xls and Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), "Boletín de Prensa: Principales Indicadores del Mercado Laboral," Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), last modified December 2012, http://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/boletines/ech/ech/bol_ech_dic12.pdf data for more information.

161. Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), "Cuentas Nacionales Departamentales: Anexos PIB Departamental / 2000 - 2016 Preliminar: PIB por Departamentos," Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), last modified June 2, 2016, <http://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/cuentas-nacionales/cuentas-nacionales-departamentales>. Exchange values were calculated through Fxtop.com, "Historical Exchange Rates from 1953 with Graph and Charts," Currency Converter Using Official Exchange Rates - Fxtop.com, accessed December 22, 2017, <http://fxtop.com/en/historical-exchange-rates.php> using historical rates equivalent to the first day of the year, respectively.

162. *Ibid.*

163. DANE, "Cifras Departamentales de Pobreza Monetaria y Desigualdad," 2016; 2006 and 2007 were excluded from national records due to a methodology change in the polls researching households See DANE, "Cifras Departamentales de Pobreza Monetaria y Desigualdad," 2016 notes for more information.

decreased an average of 7.2% per year vice 3.4% in 2002 to 2005.¹⁶⁴ Unemployment as well saw a decrease over the life of Plan Colombia. In 2001, the nation experienced 15% unemployment falling to 10.8% by 2011. Over the life of ADAM and MIDAS programs in 2006, the unemployment rate was 12% falling to 10.8% in 2011.¹⁶⁵ These show generally positive economic factors nationwide, but these programs were implemented in particular areas.

Based on the 18 case studies, ADAM had five (5) departments and MIDAS seven. After breaking out the indicators for analysis by department, the results show marked increase in comparison to the national average growth / improvement rates and within the departments.¹⁶⁶ Each of these case studies focused on economic projects to increase economic output in the respective department. Whether creating industries or assisting in the development of industry / trade associations, each of these projects in the case studies worked to improve the output and the number of jobs in the respective locations.¹⁶⁷


164. *Ibid.*

165. *Ibid.*

166. All data from DANE, "Cuentas Nacionales Departamentales: Anexos PIB Departamental / 2000 - 2016 Preliminar: PIB por Departamentos," 2016 and Fxtop.com, "Historical Exchange Rates from 1953 with Graph and Charts," based on dollar exchange rates on the first of the respective year.

167. For more information and the description and scopes of these various projects within ADAM and MIDAS conducted in the departments, see MSI 2014, 2-4 and Annex V.


**Graph 1 -
GDP Growth Rate
(Pre-ADAM Average vs. ADAM Average)**



In ADAM case studies, all but one (Antioquia) showed as low as 4% and high as 16% difference in positive growth compared to the national average (the highlighted box) during the lifetime of most of the programs in the department (2006-2011). And when accounting for the shorter duration of the Antioquia case study, it also shows a positive increase of 1% higher than the national average GDP growth during its program’s lifetime (2007-2009).

The MIDAS case studies are similar to the ADAM case study departments. All departments show a positive increase in comparison to the national average during the lifetime of the respective program ranging during from .3% (Atlántico, 2007-2011) to over 16% (Putumayo, 2006-2011).

**Graph 2 -
GDP Growth Rate
(Pre-MIDAS Average vs. MIDAS Average)**




	Antioquia	Atlántico	Cesar	Nariño	Norte Santander	Putumayo	Santander	Colombia
■ Pre-MIDAS Average	9,91%	10,28%	15,10%	11,46%	8,92%	7,76%	14,04%	10,72%
■ MIDAS Average	11,80%	9,38%	15,24%	9,77%	12,02%	23,92%	14,27%	9,61%


When analyzing the per capita GDP, the MIDAS programs and with the exception of Antioquia in the ADAM program saw rates of increase above the national average over the lifetime of the respective case studies. As well, the same case studies had rates of increase higher than pre-program implementation within the respective departments.¹⁶⁸ These two indicators show an increase in economic activity for these areas during the course of these Plan Colombia programs.

168. All data from DANE, "Cuentas Nacionales Departamentales: Anexos PIB Departamental / 2000 - 2016 Preliminar: PIB por Departamentos," 2016; Colombian national per capita GDP calculated by the author using data provided and population projections from Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), "Proyecciones De Población: Estimaciones y proyecciones de población: Estimación y proyección de población nacional, departamental y municipal total por área 1985-2020," Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), last modified May 12, 2011, <http://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/demografia-y-poblacion/proyecciones-de-poblacion>.

**Graph 3 -
GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
(Pre-ADAM Average vs. ADAM Average)**




**Graph 4 -
GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
(Pre-MIDAS Average vs. MIDAS Average)**




Further analysis shows additional improvement in other economic indicators. Poverty rates in Colombia are high with some departments with ADAM or MIDAS projects experiencing rates as high as 65% in 2002, the first year in the data set.¹⁶⁹ The analysis does not show as large improvements as in the GDP data; however, although only one case study in ADAM and two (2) in MIDAS had better poverty rates than the national average at the end of the programs' lifetime, rates of decline in poverty were improved over the national average in two (2) case studies in ADAM and four in MIDAS. As well, the poverty rates and the rates of decline within the case studies over the lifetime of the program are much improved when compared within departments to the pre-ADAM / MIDAS program years.

**Graph 5 -
Poverty Growth Rate
(Pre-ADAM Average vs. ADAM Average)**



169. Data from DANE, "Cifras Departamentales de Pobreza Monetaria y Desigualdad," 2016; the dataset for poverty had gaps in the information, with no information for 2000-2001 or 2006-2007. As well, Putumayo is not tracked at the national level as one of the lesser seven departments of Colombia. For more information, see DANE, "Cifras Departamentales de Pobreza Monetaria y Desigualdad," 2016.


**Graph 6 -
Poverty Growth Rate
(Pre-MIDAS Average vs. MIDAS Average)**




The unemployment rate as well shows a similar improvement when compared to the national average excluding the Cesar and Nariño departments in the ADAM project and the rates of improvement are better across the board except for Nariño during the MIDAS project.¹⁷⁰ The indicators across the board economically show marked improvement when compared to outside of the project lifetimes both nationally and within the respective departments.

170. Data from DANE, "Boletín de Prensa: Principales Indicadores del Mercado Laboral," 2012; excludes the year 2000 and Putumayo.

**Graph 7 -
Unemployment Rate
(Pre-ADAM Average vs. ADAM Average)**



**Graph 8 -
Unemployment Rate
(Pre-MIDAS Average vs. MIDAS Average)**



4.2 Insurgent Activity.

Across Colombia, insurgent activity and violence took its toll on the population over the 50-year insurgency, with over half of the activity taking places in the departments that housed the ADAM & MIDAS programs.

4.2.1 Methodology.

The data used for insurgent activity comes from the daily bulletins published by the now-defunct Administrative Department of Security (Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad – DAS), now know as a part of the National Intelligence Directorate (Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia – DNI). This analysis looked at two (2) indicators of insurgent activity: insurgent attacks that resulted in the death of at least one civilian and terrorist attacks.¹⁷¹ . The insurgent attack dataset includes civilian deaths in combat, incursions or attacks on military or fire department targets.¹⁷² It excludes terrorist attacks, sabotage, anti-personnel mines or unexploded ordinance. With these criteria, there are years and departments that did not meet the criteria for inclusion in one or both of these datasets. The terrorist attack dataset is based on cases that were perpetrated by an identified armed group or there was enough evidence to attribute an attack to one of these groups.¹⁷³ It excludes attacks with explosions specifically against military targets or specific civilian targets that were not indiscriminate in their execution. It also excludes attacks against banks and energy, electric or communication infrastructure. As well, for terrorist attacks, the years 2007 and 2009 are not recorded with no reason given. For analysis purposes both of these years for all departments were given a value of 0. As well, the national averages exclude the

171. All data form Centro Nacional De Memoria Histórica, "Colombia: Memorias De Guerra Y Dignidad: Bases De Datos - ¡Basta Ya!," Centro Nacional De Memoria Histórica, accessed December 29, 2017, <http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/informeGeneral/basesDatos.html#sthash.jFN2nuRD.dpuf>".

172. For more information regarding the inclusionary and exclusionary criteria, see Centro Nacional De Memoria Histórica, "Colombia: Memorias De Guerra Y Dignidad: Bases De Datos - ¡Basta Ya!".

173. For more information regarding the inclusionary and exclusionary criteria, see Centro Nacional De Memoria Histórica, "Colombia: Memorias De Guerra Y Dignidad: Bases De Datos - ¡Basta Ya!".

departments under analysis in their calculation. This allows for understanding the impact that these attacks have on skewing the data provided.

4.2.2 Analysis.

Across its insurgency, Colombia has seen a disastrous rate of violence throughout the country. Even discarding insurgent violence, regular violence affects the daily life of Colombians. With an average of 19,195 homicides per year over 2001-2011 and a rate of 43 homicides per 100,000 residents, violence, even recently, was significant. The insurgent data used in this particular research pales in comparison to these statistics.¹⁷⁴ With the insurgency across numerous groups with just FARC membership estimated at 20,000 in the early 2000s, there was a lot of potential for violence against the state and its supporters.¹⁷⁵ Across Colombia, the number of attacks resulting in a civilian death saw 707 civilian deaths across 353 attacks averaging two (2) civilians dead per attack.¹⁷⁶ This number again drops to less than half across the ADAM & MIDAS program years nationwide (90 deaths in 69 attacks).¹⁷⁷ These statistics show a general downturn in violence across the country and this holds true when analyzing departmental data. Insurgent attacks had a national average of 4.54 deaths from 2000-2005, where across ADAM all, but Putumayo, had average rates higher over the same period.¹⁷⁸

Where MIDAS had only Antioquia higher than the national average. During the program lifetime, only Antioquia and Putumayo (ADAM) and all except Nariño and Norte de

174. Data calculated using information from Instituto Nacional De Medicina Legal, "Forensis - Instituto Nacional De Medicina Legal," Instituto Nacional De Medicina Legal, accessed September 18, 2017, <http://www.medicinalegal.gov.co/forensis>; for more information, see Forensis 2000-2011.

175. Membership is an estimation from John Otis, *The FARC and Colombia's Illegal Drug Trade*, (Washington, DC: The Wilson Center, 2014), 5, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-farc-and-colombias-illegal-drug-trade> at the peak of FARC capability in the early 2000s.


176. All data from Centro Nacional De Memoria Histórica, "Civiles Muertos en Acciones Bélicas 1988-2012," Centro Nacional De Memoria Histórica, accessed December 29, 2017, <http://centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2013/bastaYa/basesDatos/CivilesMuertosAccionesBelicas1988-2012.xls>.

177. This data is inclusive of the respective ADAM and MIDAS department deaths and event numbers.


178. This average excludes the respective departments with ADAM and MIDAS Programs.

Santander had averages better than the national average (.68) across both programs. For the number of attacks, the rates were similar. In pre-program years, only Putumayo (ADAM), Atlántico (where no events took place), César, Norte de Santander, Putumayo and Santander (MIDAS) had lower event averages than the national average (2.06). During program adoption years, Antioquia and Putumayo (ADAM) and all MIDAS departments except Nariño and Norte de Santander had averages lower than the national average (.52). When analyzed within districts the program averages are universally better than previously.

**Graph 9 -
Average # of Attacks on
Civilians that Resulted in Deaths
(Pre-ADAM Average vs. ADAM Average)**



**Graph 10 -
Average # of Attacks on
Civilians that Resulted in Deaths
(Pre-MIDAS Average vs. MIDAS Average)**




For terrorist events, 178 civilians have died due to 45 terrorist events from 2000-2011.¹⁷⁹ Over the five (5) years outside of the program, 156 civilians died in 41 events, where during the ADAM & MIDAS program years (2006-2011) there was a dramatic drop to 14 civilians across four events. The results for terrorist attacks across districts are different to insurgent attack data.¹⁸⁰ Where pre-program, with already an extremely low rate of .89 events pre-program, all of the ADAM departments except for Antioquia and five (5) of the seven departments (César, Nariño – where no events took place, Norte de Santander, Putumayo and Santander) are less than the national average. After program adoption, only Cauca (ADAM) and César (MIDAS) have higher than the national average (.06) of deaths due to terrorist events. For the number of events, pre-program only Antioquia (ADAM & MIDAS) and Atlántico (MIDAS) are higher than the national

179. All data from Centro Nacional De Memoria Histórica, "Atentados Terroristas," Centro Nacional De Memoria Histórica, accessed December 29, 2017, <http://centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2013/bastaYa/basesDatos/AtentadosTerroristas1988-2012.xlsx>.


180. *Ibid.*

average (.22). During program years, every department except Cauca (ADAM) and César (MIDAS) are lower than the national average (.02).

Within department, it shows only two (2) departments Cauca (ADAM) and César (MIDAS) that did not either maintain zero events or drop to zero events. Both datasets show the indicators across the board not being vastly different than the national average either during or before program adoption in the respective districts.



**Graph 12 -
Average Terrorist Events
(Pre-MIDAS Average vs. MIDAS Average)**



V. Conclusion.

5.1 Findings.

After analyzing both the economic programs (Counterinsurgency) in five (5) departments for ADAM & seven (7) departments for MIDAS and their impacts and the number of civilian deaths and attacks / events by insurgent forces (Insurgency), this research shows significant improvement economically, in the actual departments, when compared with the national average, but less improvement in terms of insurgent attacks / events and the corresponding civilian deaths. To look at this relationship, this research returns to the theoretical framework set out by Leites and Wolf's description of the fourth method for impacting the insurgency system.

As they described this method, they state that "the basic requirement for increasing absorptive capacity for [insurgent] output is to strengthen [government] itself".¹⁸¹ By building

¹⁸¹ Leites and Wolf, Jr. 1970, 83

authority, the government displays to the populace that it can govern despite the effects of the insurgency. With respect to authority building, the improved economic capacities of the case study departments show an increase in this “authoritative capacity to govern”. And though the insurgent attacks did not cease in all areas, they did diminish in number and, in some cases, disappear. This does not show a distinct causal relationship, but it does show that as economic programs increased, insurgent attacks / events and the corresponding civilian deaths did diminish, not completely, but steadily.

This research did not find a direct link between these programs and the decrease in insurgency attacks, nor did it attempt to; however, there is a marked relationship in the increase in economic indicators of the affected departments and the decrease in attacks by insurgents, both on civilians and terrorist events.

This, thus, inconclusively answers the research question:

“Do Strategies with portions dedicated to economic growth have a relationship in the decrease of insurgent efficacy in areas of civil conflict?”

But does however, support the hypothesis regarding a relationship between counterinsurgency strategies with economic progress and the insurgency. This inverse relationship is not complete but is the start of analysis of potential further insight based on other aspects that can have a positive effect on the counterinsurgent’s outcome.

5.2 Way Forward for Future Research.

There are various aspects of additional research that could further clarify this relationship between non-military programs as a part of counterinsurgency strategy. As previously discussed, David Kilcullen provides additional insight using his operational view on what helps to make a counterinsurgency successful. To further analyze the sufficiency of counterinsurgency strategy focused on non-military programs, this research could be expanded to include two (2) additional key areas of analysis: Rule of Law and Social Welfare. With these additional key areas, there is

better ability to correlate to Kilcullen’s “best-practice counterinsurgency approach” presented by Kilcullen (see Table 3).

Table 3 - David Kilcullen’s Comprehensive Strategy Related to the Hypothesis’ Key Areas

<u>Political</u>	<u>Security</u>	<u>Economic</u>	<u>Information</u>
Social Welfare	Rule of Law	Social Welfare	Rule of Law
Rule of Law		Economics	

Source: Kilcullen (2009, p. 265-6)

A manner in which to proceed with this research would include specific aspects of social and rule of law programs that functioned within Plan Colombia. To analyze social programs, this area of the research would be those focused on the increase of social participation, human rights and social integration attempting to restore the social fissures in the social construct between the ruling class and workers. The indicators showing this could be: Life Expectancy, Access to Care, Disease Rates, Reintegration Rates and Social Assistance Programs. Rule of Law programs would be defined as those designed to increase institutional capacity and capability, justice for the common citizen and the consolidation of state authority and administration over government territory. The indicators showing this are: Governmental Structures, Levels of Corruption and Police / Military Interactions. Combined these indicators could provide an improved view of the overall impact and relationship of non-military aspects of counterinsurgency strategy and insurgency. In adding additional aspects of non-military programs to the research question and hypothesis with respect to the pillars as defined by Kilcullen, there is an opportunity to see if there is additional benefit in expanding these programs.

As well, this research could be expanded in looking at cases of counter-authority, counter-government and even criminal areas within large urban centers. As urban centers are becoming the loci for human activity and 56-64% of the world population will live in an urban center by 2050, an expansion of this research in this area could prove critical to several developing and developed nations that have sub elements countering government authority.¹⁸²

182. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision*, (New York: United Nations, 2014), 1, <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/publications/files/wup2014-highlights.pdf>.

These areas of expansion and elaboration of this research could have an impact not only in the academic research of counterinsurgency and in areas of internal armed conflict, but also on the lives of everyday global citizens as they attempt to make the best lives for themselves, their families and their communities.

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