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Doctoral Thesis
DOI
10.11606/T.12.2014.tde-14072014-185506
Document
Author
Full name
Carlos Henrique Silva do Carmo
E-mail
Institute/School/College
Knowledge Area
Date of Defense
Published
São Paulo, 2014
Supervisor
Committee
Carvalho, Luiz Nelson Guedes de (President)
Lourenço, Isabel Maria Estima Costa
Martins, Eliseu
Salotti, Bruno Meirelles
Weffort, Elionor Farah Jreige
Title in Portuguese
Lobbyng na regulação contábil internacional: uma análise do processo de elaboração da norma sobre reconhecimento de receitas
Keywords in Portuguese
Contabilidade internacional
IASB
IFRS
Lobbying
Padrões e normas contábeis
Regulação contábil
Abstract in Portuguese
A ascensão de um organismo internacional e privado como o IASB e a adesão maciça de inúmeros países às suas normas, trouxeram mudanças na dinâmica da regulação dos relatórios financeiros em diversos países, que assim como o Brasil, tiveram historicamente as normas contábeis de suas empresas definidas por legislações nacionais sob a responsabilidade de entes públicos. Essa nova dinâmica levanta preocupações para as empresas, normatizadores nacionais, governos, investidores, acadêmicos e outros interessados pelas normas contábeis. Esta pesquisa buscou analisar a associação das características específicas dos participantes do processo de regulação contábil internacional promovido pelo IASB e a sua influência na elaboração das IFRS, investigando o alinhamento entre as decisões do órgão e as opiniões manifestadas por stakeholders específicos. Para isso, foram utilizadas as cartas de comentários enviadas no processo de elaboração da nova norma sobre reconhecimento de receita, Revenue from contracts with Customers. Foi realizada a análise de conteúdo de 1.177 cartas relativas à consulta pública ao Discussion Paper, de dezembro de 2008 e ao Exposure Draft de junho de 2010. Os resultados iniciais demonstraram que o IASB atendeu as preferências da maioria dos participantes. No entanto, algumas características dos lobistas se revelaram mais associadas às decisões do regulador do que outras. Os resultados do modelo de regressão logística revelaram que os comentários emitidos pelas empresas preparadoras de demonstrações contábeis tiveram maior associação com as decisões do IASB, do que os comentários de reguladores nacionais, profissionais em geral, acadêmicos ou usuários. Essa associação foi ainda maior quando ocorrem divergências com as preferências prévias do regulador e este modificou a sua opinião. Empresas estadunidenses que discordaram dos procedimentos propostos tiveram maiores chances de ter seu comentário aceito do que as sugestões feitas por preparadores de outro país. Constatou-se ainda a existência de associação entre os comentários das grandes firmas multinacionais de auditoria e as decisões do IASB. Os comentários das Big Four mostraram ter até 5 vezes mais chances de ser aceito pelo regulador, do que os comentários feitos por outros interessados. Esses aspectos vão de encontro às pesquisas que relatam que a maior homogeneidade de interesses entre os preparadores funciona como incentivo para o exercício de lobbying e que essa pressão está associada às decisões tomadas pelos reguladores. Adicionalmente, a análise da história e da estrutura do IASB, aliadas a um conjunto de pesquisas empíricas, trazem evidencias que sugerem os mesmos resultados em relação a associação entre as decisões do regulador e as preferencias das grandes firmas de auditoria. A cumplicidade ideológica documentada nas pesquisas, entre as Big Four e o regulador internacional, facilita a associação entre as ideias das entidades e implica na possibilidade de influência dessas firmas sobre as decisões do IASB. A teoria dos grupos de interesses (Becker, 1983), em conjunto com os resultados desta pesquisa, contribuem para explicar que a falta de um mandato legal para impor suas normas e a necessidade de construir legitimidade fazem com que o IASB funcione como um mediador de interesses. Nesse cenário, a escolha de determinado tratamento contábil reflete uma decisão onde os reguladores procuram gerenciar os conflitos, mas acabam por atender com maior atenção as preferencias daqueles que forem mais efetivos em convencê-lo.
Title in English
Lobbying in the international accounting regulation: an analysis of the process of development of a standard on revenue recognition.
Keywords in English
Accounting regulation
Accounting standards
IASB
IFRS
International accounting
Lobbying
Abstract in English
The rise of an international and private body like the IASB and the massive convergence of many countries to its standards, have brought changes in the dynamics of the financial reporting regulation in different countries that, just like Brazil, historically had their accounting standard set by national laws under the responsibility of governmental entities. This new dynamic raises concerns for businesses, national standard-setters, governments, investors, academics and others interested in accounting standards. This research aimed to assess the association of specific characteristics of the participants of the international accounting regulation process promoted by the IASB and their influence in the definition of IFRS, investigating the alignment between the decisions of the Board and the opinions expressed by specific stakeholders during the period that draft standards were publicly exposed. For this, the comment letters sent to the IASB during the process of drafting the new standard on revenue recognition, Revenue from contracts with Customers were read and a content analysis was performed of 1,177 letters relating to both the public consultation to the Discussion Paper (December 2008) and the subsequent Exposure Draft (June 2010). Initial results showed that the IASB has met the preferences of most participants. However, some features of the lobbyists proved more associated with the regulatory decisions than others. The results of the logistic regression model revealed that the comments made by preparers of financial statements have a greater association with the decisions of the IASB, than the comments of national regulators, professionals in general, academics or users. This association is even greater when diverging views areraised in relation with the previous preferences of the regulator and their view is ultimately changed. If the company was American and showed disagreement with the proposed procedure, the chances of having its comment accepted were greater than if the suggestion came from a preparer from another country. Another finding was the existence of a strong association between the comments of the large multinational audit firms and the decisions of the IASB. A comment from one of the Big Four showed up to 5 times more probability to beaccepted by the regulator than a comment made by any other stakeholder. These aspects confirm the researches that report that the greater homogeneity of interest between preparers act as incentives for the exercise of lobbying and pressure that is associated with the decisions taken by the regulator. Additionally, analysis of the history and structure of the IASB, as well as a group of empirical studies are rich in reporting evidence that confirms the results in the association relationship between the decisions of the regulator and the preferences of the large audit firms. The ideological complicity among the Big Four and IASB, documented in researches, facilitates the association between the ideas of these organizations and imply in the possibility of influence of these firms on IASB´s decisions. Thus, the use of the theory of interest groups (Becker, 1983) together with the results presented in this research, explain the lack of a legal mandate to enforce its rules and the need to build legitimacy makes the IASB to act as a mediator interests. In this scenario, the choice of a particular accounting treatment reflects a decision in that regulators seek to manage conflicts, but eventually meet more closely the preferences of those who are most effective in convincing him.
 
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Publishing Date
2014-07-28
 
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