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Doctoral Thesis
DOI
10.11606/T.12.2005.tde-08062006-095234
Document
Author
Full name
Daniel Augusto Motta
E-mail
Institute/School/College
Knowledge Area
Date of Defense
Published
São Paulo, 2005
Supervisor
Committee
Rocha, Fabiana Fontes (President)
Alves, Denisard Cneio de Oliveira
Barrionuevo Filho, Arthur
Bender, Siegfried
Leme, Maria Carolina da Silva
Title in Portuguese
A economia política dos acordos preferenciais de comércio: aplicação de um jogo não-cooperativo de Stackelberg na análise da Área de Livre-Comércio das Américas
Keywords in Portuguese
ALCA
barganha
economia política
teoria de comércio internacional
teoria dos jogos não-cooperativos
Abstract in Portuguese
O objetivo desta tese é analisar a economia política dos acordos preferenciais de comércio (APC) a partir de um jogo político seqüencial não-cooperativo de Stackelberg entre uma grande economia e uma pequena economia, onde a disputa política entre grupos lobistas rivais define as preferências unilaterais dos governos no primeiro estágio e o equilíbrio coalitionproof de Stackelberg define o formato do acordo de livre comércio no segundo estágio. Então se modifica a estrutura inicial do jogo político bilateral para um processo de barganha entre n países. Finalmente, aplica-se o modelo teórico ao caso particular da ALCA.
Keywords in English
FTAA
game theory
international trade theory
political bargaining
political economy
Abstract in English
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the political economy of preferential trade agreements (PTA) based on a sequential non-cooperative Stackelberg political game between a large economy and a small economy, in which the political dispute of rival lobby groups defines the unilateral stance of both governments in the first stage and the Stackelberg coalition-proof equilibrium defines the format of the free trade agreement in the second stage. Then the initial bilateral political game hypothesis is relaxed to accomplish a more complex bargaining game with n economies. Finally the theoretical framework is applied to FTAA.
 
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Tese_Daniel_Motta.pdf (504.58 Kbytes)
Publishing Date
2006-06-30
 
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