UNIVERSITY OF SAO PAULO

FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY AND HUMAN SCIENCES

POST-GRADUATION PROGRAM IN SOCIOLOGY

Coloniality and Security: discourses and practices of security sector reform in Liberia

Revised Version

GERMANA DALBERTO

Sao Paulo

2020

GERMANA DALBERTO

Coloniality and Security: discourses and practices of security sector reform in Liberia

Revised Version

Supervisor: Prof. Sergio Adorno

Thesis presented to the Postgraduate Program in Sociology of the University of São Paulo.

Sao Paulo

2020

Autorizo a reprodução e divulgação parcial deste trabalho, por qualquer meio convencional ou eletrônico, para fins de estudo e pesquisa, desde que citada a fonte.



Catalogação na Publicação
Serviço de Biblioteca e Documentação
Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas da Universidade de São Paulo

DALBERTO, GERMANA
D373c Coloniality and Security: discourses and practices of security sector reform in Liberia / GERMANA DALBERTO ; orientador SERGIO ADORNO. - São Paulo, 2020.
159 f.

Tese (Doutorado)- Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas da Universidade de São Paulo. Departamento de Sociologia. Área de concentração: Sociologia.

1. Security Sector Reform. 2. Liberia. 3. Post-colonialism. I. ADORNO, SERGIO, orient. II. Título.

Termo de concordância

Nome: Germana Dalberto

Data da defesa: 5 Junho 2020

Nome do Prof. orientador: Sergio Adorno

Nos termos da legislação vigente, declaro estar ciente do conteúdo deste exemplar corrigido elaborado em atenção às sugestões dos membros da comissão julgadora na sessão de defesa do trabalho, manifestando-me plenamente favorável ao seu encaminhamento e publicação no portal digital de teses da USP.

São Paulo, 5 Outubro 2020

Assinatura do Orientador

SUMMARY

Between 1989 and 2003, Liberia went through two phases of a war that left Africa's oldest republic devastated. The war led to an estimated 250,000 deaths, displaced millions and shattered the country's infrastructure. The resonance of the Liberia civil war in the neighbouring countries of Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast combined with the multiplicity of other conflicts that spread through Sub-Saharan Africa at that time – including in Somalia, Burundi, Congo, Southern Sudan, Angola, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, Rwanda, Uganda, etc. – justified a wave of new international interventions in Africa. The traditional forms of colonialization evolved to new forms of interventions which, by the end of the Cold War, will often aim to promote the democratization and securitization of many global south countries, in particular those countries emerging from the decolonization movements or those which, having gained their formal independence in the previous century, such as Liberia, were undergoing internal conflicts and, therefore, were considered a threat to international peace and security of the West. Like many other African post-conflict nations, Liberia will initiate a process to rebuild its State institutions in 2003. This thesis approaches this post-conflict scene to understand how international actors engaged in reforming the country's security sector apparatus. The first part analyses the formulation of the United Nations international policy on security sector reform. It begins with a genealogy of the rationalities that shaped its founding documents and the structures of the organization and recollects – the often forgotten – imperial context from which it emerged. It reveals how the Member States perceived the colonial problem since its early years; and how the coloniality permeated the political technologies established by the organization over time. The second part describes the implementation of policy on security sector reform in Liberia. It analyses the challenges of such reforms and their contributions to the country post-conflict reconstruction.

Keywords: Security Sector Reform; Liberia; Post-colonialism

RESUMO

Entre 1989 e 2003, a Libéria vivenciou duas guerras civis que deixaram o país – até então referenciado com a mais antiga república da África – completamente devastado. O conflito provocou mais de 250.000 mortes, deslocou milhões de pessoas para os países vizinhos e destruiu quase toda infraestrutura governamental do país. A guerra liberiana coincidiu com uma série de outros conflitos que ramificaram-se pela África Ocidental – Serra Leoa, Mali e Costa do Marfim – e Subsaariana – como Somália, Burundi, Congo, Sudão do Sul, Angola, Etiópia, Eritreia, Ruanda e Uganda – no final do seculo vinte, perído caracterizado pelo fim do colonialismo formal e pela emergência de Estados africanos independentes. Essas guerras deram à África o nome de “continente sem esperança” e justificaram uma série de novas formas de intervenção voltadas a reconstrução dos Estados africanos e a implementação de aparatos de segurança segundo o modelo ocidental. Essa tese adentra o cenário de pós-conflito da Libéria com o objetivo de compreender as diferentes racionalidades e técnicas de controle aplicadas pelos atores internacionais na formação das instituições de segurança pública. A primeira parte do trabalho analisa o processo de formulação da política internacional das Nacões Unidas para a reforma do setor de segurança em países pós-conflito. A partir de uma análise histórica, relembramos o contexto imperial do qual a organização emergiu e como as racionalidades da época permearam as tecnologias de controle geradas pela Liga das Nações (1919) e depois resignificadas pelas Nações Unidas (1945). Analisamos o processo histórico que levou a racionalizacao das práticas tradicionais de colonização em novas formas de intervenção na África, sobretudo nos países que emergiam dos movimentos de descolonização ou mesmo naqueles países que, tendo conquistado sua independência formal no século anterior, como a Libéria, passavam por conflitos internos e, portanto, representavam uma ameaça à paz e segurança internacional. A segunda parte deste trabalho analisa a implementação da política da ONU na reforma das instituções de segurança pela Missão das Nações Unidas na Libéria a partir da pesquisa de campo.

Palavras-Chave: Reforma do Setor de Segurança; Libéria; Pós-colonialismo

Contents

INTRODUCTION 10

RESEARCH PROBLEM 13

Theorical rationale 14

Methodology 26

CHAPTER I

The colonial question and the birth of the United Nations 30

1.1. From the League of Nations to the United Nations: discourses of colonialism, security and protection 30

The imperial crisis and its impacts in the League of Nations 31

The end of traditional colonialism and its impacts in the United Nations 37

1.2. The Cold War and the impact of the bipolar divide in (post)colonial nations 47

CHAPTER II

The conceptualization and legitimation of the security sector reform as an international policy 52

2.1. The era of democracy and the revival of the rule of law 52

Pro-democracy interventions in the post-Cold War 52

The post-September 11 attacks and expansion of international efforts on democratisation 61

2.2. The international approach to security sector reform 64

From state to human security: concept shift 64

The United Nations role in reforming national security sectors 68

The Security Council Resolution 2151 (2014) on security sector reform 79

CHAPTER III

Securing Liberia, building its State: practices of reform, control and resistance 83

3.1. From the Upper Guinea Coast to the creation of the Liberia 83

Before Liberia there was the Upper Guinea Coast 83

The return of the freed slaves to Africa and the formation of Liberia 87

3.2. The Liberians civil wars and the politicisation of the security forces 91

The raise of the Krahn and the ethnicization of the army 91

Disputes for power and control in the Liberian civil wars 94

3.3. Post-conflict reconstruction and security sector reform 98

The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants 99

The rebuilding of the Liberian state-forces 106

CONCLUSION 117

ANNEXE………………….. 123

REFERENCES 135

Dedicated to Professors Sérgio Adorno e Fernando Mourão (in memoriam) in gratitude for their support.

INTRODUCTION

Between 1989 and 2003, Liberia went through two phases of a war that left Africa’s oldest republic devastated. The war led to an estimated 250,000 deaths, displaced millions and shattered the country's governmental infrastructure. The resonance of the Liberia civil war in the neighboring countries of Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast and in the multiplicity of other conflicts that spread through Sub-Saharan Africa at that time – including in Somalia, Burundi, Congo, Southern Sudan, Angola, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, Rwanda, Uganda, etc. – earned Africa the designation as a “hopeless continent” and justified a series of new forms of international interventions. The traditional forms of colonialization evolved to new forms of intervention which, by the end of the Cold War, will often aim to promote the democratization securitization of the African countries, in particular those countries emerging from the decolonization movements, or those which, having gained their formal independence in the previous century, such as Liberia, were undergoing conflict and therefore were considered a threat to international peace and security. Like many other African post-conflict countries, after the war, Liberia will be subjected to a series of foreign interventions aimed at rebuilding its State institutions.

This thesis approaches Liberia’s post-conflict social scene to understand the different approaches applied by international actors to support the country to reform its security apparatus after the civil war in 2003. It begins with an analysis of the formulation of the United Nations international policy on security sector reform at the Security Council and ends with a description of its operationalization in Liberia. It describes the power relations that shape such reforms and the rationalities and technologies of control that characterize international assistance in the field of security sector reform. It analyses the challenges of such reforms as well as their contributions to the country post-conflict reconstruction.

Structure of the analysis

This thesis is structured in three chapters which elucidate the theoretical and empirical dimensions of the thesis:

The first chapter analyzes the series of events that during the second half of the twentieth century led to the emergence of the first set of international policies aiming to legitimize foreign assistance in building and reforming security institutions of sovereign countries. It provides a historical analysis of the emergence of the United Nations as a global political organization at a time often called the "end of the traditional colonialism" (Hobsbawm, 1995). It also examines the genealogy of the rationalities that first constituted the organization and recollects – the often forgotten – imperial context from which it emerged. This historical approach will enable us to reflect how the organization addressed the colonial question in its early years; the influence that individual Member States had over the content of its discourses and agendas; and identifies the mechanisms put into place for the continuation or rupture of (neo)colonial interventions in the postcolonial nations.

The aim is to assess how the colonial power permeated the documents and practices of the League of Nations (1919) and the United Nations (1945); and demonstrate the rationalization of the colonial practices into more modern forms of intervention at the end of the Cold War – when the organization and its Member States will take on the role of supporting the democratization and securitization of numerous countries in the global south, in particular those that at the time emerged from the decolonization movements or those which, having gained their formal independence in the previous century, were undergoing conflict and therefore posed a threat to international peace and security.

This historical overview provides the background to the second and third chapters, which aims to analyze the emergence and operationalization of the modern concept of security sector reform in the international arena in the 1990s. Although many multilateral organizations have been influential in shaping the security sector reform agenda by developing policies and providing support on the ground, the focus of the second chapter is on the United Nations considering its global character and the United States due to its relevance to the Liberia context. The analysis recollects how the United Nations Security Council justified intervention in sovereign countries to reform their national security sectors and reflects on the power dynamics that shape the United States' engagement in this field in particular after the September 11. The third chapter of the thesis aims to examine the challenges and opportunities for the operationalization of the international assistance to security sector reform in Liberia. The objective is to reflect on the historical colonial dynamics that shaped the country's security sector and describe how international actors returned to support its reform after the end of the civil war in 2003.

RESEARCH PROBLEM

In dialogue with the postcolonial studies and the sociology of conflict, this thesis applied theoretical categories of analysis and empirical observation to answer the following sociological questions: how colonial practices of security have been rationalized into modern forms of interventions? To what extent did the new forms of international interventions formulated during the imperial crisis reinforce or break colonial relations? How were the new forms of international assistance operationalized in the context of the Liberia security sector reform at the end of the civil war in 2013?

The study problematized the social universe of international security sector reform assistance at both large and micro scales to assess (i) central processes of change in the discourses and practices on security sector reform within the structure of the global international regime, and (b) power dynamics between the international-local relations that constitute the process of reforming security sectors. The hypothesis that guided this work is that the establishment of the Western-based models of State security institutions in post-colonial nations in Africa results from a long process of rationalization of – and not the rupture from – the colonial practices of security.

The central argument of the study is, as stated by Fanon (1968), that the ways in which security apparatuses are instrumentalized by foreign interventions to serve as an essential criterion to reveal the permanence of the colonialism in a given society. As per my initial analysis (Dalberto, 2015), in the early days of colonialism, the local security institutions have been established by the colonial power to control the population and territories, as well as to insert the colonial divides of race and social classes. Over time, the colonial security sector also played an essential role in criminalizing the culture, language and knowledge of the local population. They served as an extension of the colonial power and aimed to promote Western knowledge-based systems of security and economic divisions among classes. In the post-independence, those security institutions gained new legal mandates and responsibilities, and in many contexts, continued to behave under similar logic of economic and cultural exclusion that informed colonialism and imperialism.

This thesis argues that although neocolonial rationalities influence many elements of the contemporary international discourses on the reform of security institutions, local and international actors involved in those processes have a significant agency to reinforce, break, or resignified such relations. Domestic and international agents negotiate these processes of reforms to which they are subjected and, in different ways, adapt, or even refuse such mandates.

Theorical rationale

This investigation adhered to the field of postcolonial studies that seeks to address the practices and discourses of control that characterize colonialism and how they permeate regimes of security in societies both during the colonial period and after the independence of the colonies (Sousa Santos, 2002). It pursues to explore the new sociological possibilities, prompted by the concept of *coloniality of power* (Quijano, 2005), to understand the practices of designing, planning, and delivering security in the South[1].

The *coloniality of power* refers to the pattern of power that took shape in the colonial period. Quijano (2005) forges the term to demarcate the two elements that constituted its rationality. The race is the first element and refers to the justifications articulated by the colonizers as a way of granting legitimacy to the relations of domination imposed in favour of economic exploitation. Another fundamental element of this rationality is the economy, which emerges from articulating all historical forms of control around the capital and the world market.

---

[1] The “South” is a metaphor. It only partly overlaps with the geographic South – which represents a set of countries and regions of the world that have been subjected to colonialism and which, except for Australia and New Zealand, have not reached levels of economic development like those of the North, such as Europe and North America. The overlap is not total because it recognizes that, within the geographic North, there are groups that are subject to same capitalist and colonial domination; and that, within the geographic South, there are social classes that constitute what is called as the “small Europe” – a group formed by colonial elites who benefited from the colonial relationship and after independence continued to exercise similar forms of domination (Meneses; Santos, 2009: 12)

For Quijano (2005), *eurocentrism* is the political rationality formed within colonial domination experiences. It embodies the colonial practices of controlling and disciplining the space, territories and people; and sets out how the subjects should be viewed, managed and governed. The race is the first element of this rationality that granted the legitimacy needed to exploit the colonial territories and their populations. The second element is the economy. Together they gave birth to a new identity of a racial-based division of labour, which was systematically imposed by the capitalism, through which all forms of unpaid labour should be performed by the colonized races and the paid work by the colonizing race (Quijano, 2005: 108),

The term *postcolonial*, as explained by Sousa Santos (2002), refers both to the closure of a historical time, which is the period following the independence of the colonies, as well as to the set of analyses about the building of State after the end of colonialism, its political-social conjuncture and its ruptures and continuities with the colonial system. It also means the set of theoretical and analytical studies that seek to deconstruct the colonial narrative previously built by the West and replace it with narratives written from the local population's point of view (Sousa Santos, 2002). The postcolonial analysis reflects how the rupture with colonialism is never completed, considering that “the end of colonialism as a political relationship did not mean the end of colonialism as a social relationship, as an authoritarian and discriminatory mentality and form of sociability” (Sousa Santos, 2004: 8).

Postcolonial studies represent the effort to elaborate a theoretical framework that challenges and overcome the hegemonic and colonized ways of seeing the world (Go, 2013). It is the criticism of the continued practices domination of culture, politics, ideology, and knowledges. Influenced by the writings of Albert Memmi, Frantz Fanon, Aimé Cesaire, representatives of the first wave of postcolonial studies in the 1950s and 1960s, Eduard Said, Homi Bhabha, and Gayatri Spivak began a series of analyses of the process of global decolonization during the Cold War and the post-independence moment of many countries. These studies sought to understand how racialized and colonial forms of thought continued to dominate social and interstate relations and the postcolonial state's building, causing feelings of denial, cultural annihilation, and marginalization among formerly colonized peoples. In response, the second wave of postcolonial studies will emerge from the need to rescue and document stories and knowledge that have been silenced by colonialism and create new forms of knowledge that are capable of not acting against colonialism but, most importantly, replace the dominant forms.

The study also departs from the sociology of conflict and, in particular, from the Foucauldian thought. It analyses the “will to govern” (Rose, 1999: 5) of Western powers by establishing security institutions in postcolonial nations as means to control, reinforce and extend the authority of the former colonial State. The category *governmentality* is appropriated from Foucault (1979), who defines the term as any calculated way of thinking and acting to shape, regulate, and manage the behaviours of others toward specific goals. The practice of governing is essentially the “conduct upon conduct,” which means any deliberate effort directed at influencing or guiding human conduct, following its hopes, desires, and fears, and the circumstances of time and space.

While reflecting on the manifestation of political power in modern society, Foucault (1979) forged a peculiar approach to analyze power relations. This research applied, with some adaptations, his three main categories of analyses: rationalities, techniques of control, and subjects of government. It seeks to understand the *rationality* behind the strategies of securitization of the postcolonial spaces, exploring the subjectivities that made possible modern political programs within the United Nations to establish and reform the security apparatus in the South. Mitchell Dean (1999) uses the term “episteme” to describe the political act of calculating activities aimed at directing others' conduct and influencing, appropriating, redistributing, allocating, or maintaining power in the State or other organizations.

The study analyses how the *ambivalence* present in the discourses produced international actors in the context of security sector reforms. The ambivalence upholds the "other" in two fixed contradictory representations, on the one hand, a savage, and, on the other, the obedient servant (Bhabha, 1998: 117). The instability of the stereotype as "a complex, ambivalent and contradictory mode of representation" makes it, according to Bhabha (1998: 117), a strategy of permanent subordination. The colonized is placed in a lower position of hierarchy from where the colonizer can watch over continually and provide ambivalent forms of discourses. On the one hand, the colonized is recognized as alike, and, on the other side, as someone radically different.

To fully understand the neocolonial rationality, it is also essential to identify its techniques of control and subjects of the government of security sector reform of assistance, which represent, respectively, the second and third investigative dimensions proposed by Foucault. *Techniques of control* refer to the set of mechanisms, instruments, and programs that the political power use to shape human conduct. This study seeks to identify the new techniques developed by the imperialist countries in the early years of the United Nations to ensure the continued domination of formerly colonized territories, including the mandate and trusteeship systems.

Differently from the traditional colonial order, where the exploitation was a technique applied by the colonizer to assert its sovereignty in the colonised territory, as well as the slavery, imposed by the colonizer on the indigenous body to obtain profit; in the post-colonial era, the technologies applied by the neocolonial power are justified by the discourse protection, security, and international assistance, including by establishing security sector institutions to control and discipline people and their territories. The thesis detected the nuances and differences among these forms of control and oppression, which are responsible for many of the intensifying social fissures and divisions in postcolonial countries.

Control techniques are inserted, on the one hand, by the mechanisms of legitimization of international assistance – Security Council resolutions etc. – and, on the other hand, by the domestication of the State security apparatus, its ideologies, forms of management, and functioning of the institutions, including through "capacity building" programs of local actors.

The relevance of these technologies emerging in the Liberian context lies in need to uncover the meanings hidden by the international "law and order" movement, which in on the one hand, promotes the political-economic exclusion of peripheral countries and, on the other side, the disciplinarization of their governments and societies. In this ambivalent scenario, international security policies require more increasingly demystified analyses by introducing new concepts and methodological possibilities. Therefore, this investigation critically reflects on the coloniality impregnated in the practices of control and security implemented in postcolonial societies, deconstructing hegemonic discourses and proposing a new perspective to the reform of security sectors.

The category of *subjects of govern* allowed us to reflect on how local actors refine and refute practices of governmentality. For Foucault, subjectification represents a self-formation process through which "a human being becomes subject" (1982: 208). The subjects of governing, according to Dean (1999), are the various types of people, actors, and agents who are targeted by the techniques of control. For Fanon (2008) colonial domination is not only material but also cognitive subordination; that is, it aims to shape how the subjects of colonialism will express and understand themselves. Practices of interventions in Africa with specific capacity, status, and attributes, through their governmentality programs, seek to cultivate and secure certain types of individual and collective identities. They are intimately involved and concerned with the creation of specific subjects and with inducing behaviours. This, however, does not mean that they manage to do so, because agents negotiate these processes to which they are subjected and, in different ways, adapt or even refuse those programmes.

The thesis analyses how international assistance has produced a form of "mimicry" though which Africa security actors are trained to be as 'almost' the same but 'not exactly' as the North security forces. Bhabha (1998) explains that "mimicry" is the desire to create a colonial subject almost the same as the colonizer but not as precisely. In it, rational lies the desire for a “reformable and recognizable other” who is more normal, civilized, and looks like the colonialist, but who is at the same time described in “its error, its excess, its difference” (Bhabha 1998: 130). The creation of this unstable stereotypes – which is the main strategy of colonial discourse and the primary point of subjectification – demonstrates the colonizer’s dependence on the ‘fix’ concepts, a “form of knowledge and identification that is always ‘in place,’ already known, and something that should be anxiously repeated” (Bhabha, 1998: 106). A stereotype is a form of violence that aims at controlling the colonized, fixing it in the position of subordinate and inferior.

The production of a specific colonized subject through this powerful surveillance system is marked by resistances that eventually weaken the colonial discourse. The colonized does not fully take on the expected roles and, in some contexts, uses those roles and stereotypes imposed by the colonizer to gain freedom. While analyzing forms of resistance within power relations, Foucault noted that “in power relations, there are necessarily possibilities of resistance, because if there were no possibility of resistance – violent resistance, escape, subterfuge, strategies that can reverse the situation – there would be no power relations at all” (Foucault, 2006: 277).

In his terms, Bhabha (1998) also noted that the power of authority is never as complete as it seems because it is always marked by confrontation and forms of resistance. Colonized peoples resisted colonizing power though hybridism, which is a concept that reflects the braking of polarities such as the East versus the West or the “I” and the “other,” seeking the meaning of this relationship in “between places.” The intention is to eliminate identities and fixed poles in power relations, contesting any rigid separation between the colonizer and the colonized. According to Bhabha, “if the effect of colonial power is perceived as the product of hybridization rather than a noisy order of colonialist authority or the silent repression of native traditions, there is a major change of perspective” (1998: 163). In the hybridization, the subject of the surveillance is not repressed, but “repeated as something different – a mutation, a hybrid” (Bhabha, 1998: 162).

Within the framework of resistances, the study identifies the latent and silent struggles undertaken by African countries to promote decolonization and resist consistent interventions and ensure that African perspectives are included in the concepts of security sector reform. *Decolonization* usually is referred to as a process for political independence in Africa that started with the sudden and momentous withdrawal of Europeans from the continent in the aftermath of World War II. Although self-government was not new before the end of the war in 1945, given Liberia's independence in 1848, South Africa in 1910, and Ethiopia in 1943, the end of traditional colonialism at that period is considered unprecedented. Between 1945 and 1965, almost all African colonies – except the Namibia and Zimbabwe – regained their independence. Decolonization is this thesis, however, understood as not only a process for political freedom, but rather an “ontological restoration,” which encompasses the recognition of knowledge and reconstruction of humanity. It includes “people’s inalienable right to have their history and make decisions based on their reality and experience” (Sousa Santos, 2018:109).

Oppositions to the international assistance and practices of intervention, including by the United Nations, are also revealed in the Liberian government's refusal and its population to appropriate some of the technologies, institutions, and knowledge being transferred by international actors. In the study-case of Liberia, we identify the groups and actors that constitute the security sector reform process, including ex-combatants, traditional groups, security officers, and international actors, mapping and underlining their perspectives and discourses about ownership and the ways that they resisted or transformed such process leading to the formation of a hybrid form of the security sector.

….

The combination of the Foucaultian and postcolonial categories is not an easy theoretical exercise despite their strong similarities. The stories captured by this thesis are situated in a very different context from where Foucault conceived his theory. In turn, the postcolonial studies require this research to incorporate concepts and authors who have been subjected to the practices of domination or at least considered the local perspectives. This theoretical displacement is not intended to establish boundaries between knowledge and its place of origin, but, as Edgar Morin (1999: 27) points out, but rather "to transform what generates those boundaries." The need to contextualize the authors and their theories, encouraged by Morin, motivates us to "produce the emergence of ecological thinking in the sense that all events, information or knowledge are in an inseparable relationship with its environment – cultural, social, economic, political and of course, natural" (Morin, 1999: 27).

Despite how much Foucault's investigative methodology and categories inspire this research, the postcolonial perspective provokes thinking beyond his European historical and theoretical records. His genealogy presents the emergence of modern power as a European historical fact, with no analysis of the governments, constituted beyond the Western borders. This thesis, therefore, aims to broaden Foucault's geographical, historical, and epistemological horizons by displacing the "art of governing" to the analysis of the neocolonial relations and the Liberia social and political spaces.

Postcolonial studies have also punctuated Foucault's contribution to the construction of its analyzes of coloniality. Brennan (2006) points out that Foucault has significantly influenced postcolonial studies since the 1980s and 1990s. Stoler (1995) highlights the multiple possible ways of reading colonization from Foucault; and notes that "no analytical framework has more saturated colonial studies as intensely over the past decade as Foucault" (Stoler, 1995:1).

However, many researchers have been producing this dialogue with Foucaultian categories, transposing the analysis of power relations and forms of control to colonial and neocolonial contexts. Said (2007) in "Orientalism: East as an invention of the West" produced one of the first analyzes which used Foucault to understand the colonization processes. The postcolonial studies' birth is commonly dated from its influential publication in the 1970s, which shows that the “East” is not a geographical name, among others, but a cultural and political invention of the “West.” Said’s concept of orientalism is defined by the notion of discourse by Foucault. He argued that “if you do not examine Orientalism as a discourse, you may not understand this form of discipline by which the European culture has been able to manipulate and direct the Orient from a political, sociological, military point of view” (2007: 22-23). Said further states that Foucault’s most significant contribution is both to reveal “technologies” and, with them, to show how society became governable, controllable and normalized, as well as to deconstruct anthropological models of identity, bringing a new reflection on subjectivities.

Timothy Mitchell (1991) also makes an interesting analysis of colonization, using the Foucaultian categories. In “Colonizing Egypt,” he elaborates a study of the Egyptian army, showing how the structure of that military apparatus, with its rigid disciplinary mechanisms, enabled the formation of “men in machines.” Mitchell incorporates the concept of the microphysics of power to emphasize how, since colonization, disciplinary processes permeate all fields of social life, with their notions of order and regulation of space. The criticism constructed by the author falls on the element “order,” which is inserted in the idea of “reality,” which is, in the representation of reality that is made by the West in relation to itself and in relation to the “other.” He demonstrated how the West is confronted by the diversity of the Arabic world's realities and, in many contexts, is incapable of understanding its differences because they did not fit into the expected aesthetic of “order.”

In the same vein, Peter O. Nwankwo (2010) analysis the colonial heritage in Nigeria’s penal apparatus using the perspective of Franz Fanon. The Zaffaroni (1989, 1988) also examines how the punitive regime established by the neocolonial power has been crucial to the maintenance of the peripherical condition of Latin America. Sozzo (2008), in turn, investigates the cycles of military violence in Latin America and emphasizes how the security apparatus were used as set rationality, programs, and government technologies for the management of individuals and populations. Scott (1999) does this exercise by bringing the governmentality concept to the context of British colonial rule in Sri Lanka. Duncan (2007) analyzes governmentality in Ceylon (as Sri Lanka was called during English colonization) in the nineteenth century, demonstrating the strategies set by the colonial government to create modern forms of bureaucracy, governmentality and biopower.

Despite Foucault's importance for the postcolonial studies, the themes of colonialism and race were not among the issues to which he devoted his research. This has generated many critics. Young (2001) in "Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction" devotes a chapter to analyzing Foucault's contribution and expresses many of the problems that must be overcome in the appropriation of his theory in colonial and postcolonial contexts. Spivak in "Can the Subaltern Speak? Defines the subaltern as one who is in a situation of marginality, belonging to "the lower layers of society constituted by the specific modes of exclusion from the market, political representation and the possibility of becoming full members of the dominant social stratum" (2010: 12). She criticizes Foucault's approach to the subject, which, according to her, generated a theory of extreme valorization of the subject as a target of power; instead of problematizing the subject, Foucault elaborates it by its transparency, through which power crosses.

Del Olmo (2004) analyzes the history of Latin American criminology and denouncing its colonial tendencies and misleading stereotypes**.** She defends a "criminological rupture" through the deconstruction of theoretical imports and examining the security question in Latin America from its local realities and perspectives. In the same vein, Castro (2005; 1983) proposes a "Criminology of Liberation" with an emphasis in need for studies in the field to go beyond the simplistic analysis of the forms of controls applied by State security sectors to reflect on the silenced stories of resistance against the penal system.

Bhabha (1998) stresses the Foucaultian perspective of a universal white collectively, to be controlled by the panoptic's one eye, does not exist, at least in this way, in the colonial universe. According to him, the exercise of colonialist authority requires the production of differentiation and binary identities through which discriminatory practices can map populations and divide them – a dynamic that has been called the “rule of colonial difference”. This mode of subjection, for Bhabha, is distinct from Foucault's description of the panopticon, in which only one eye would exercise control over a stable and unitary collectivity. In colonial contexts, such as “enlightenment assumption of a collectively and the contemplating eye” is inadequate (Bhabha 1998: 161).

According to Bhabha (1998), Foucault formulates a theory based on the notion of European individuals and collectively. In his view, Foucault did not consider the main historical developments – which took place outside of Europe – to analyze the emergence of Enlightenment thought. He refused “the colonial moment as an enunciative present in the historical and epistemological condition of Western modernity” and described the modern power relations without remembering the colonial past that intrinsically constituted them (Bhabha, 1998: 272). By excluding this historical time from his analysis, Foucault eventually disregarded important colonial events in the formation of modern political power, such as racism and mercantile domination. Bhabha, punctuating this criticism, goes so far as to suggest a “Foucaultian forgetfulness”:

> Are we demanding, from the postcolonial position, that Foucault should historicize colonialism as the missing moment in the debate of modernity? Do we want him to “complete” his argument by appropriating ours? Not. I want to suggest that the postcolonial is metaleptical present in his text in that moment of contingency that allows the contiguity of his argument—thought following thought—towards progress. Then, suddenly, at the point of its closure, a curious indeterminacy grips the chain of discourse. This becomes the space for a new discursive temporality, another place of enunciation (1998: 272).

Foucault’s omission is found in other European thinkers' work dedicated to analyzing the emergence of modernity. It results from their intention of forming broader theories by exclusively analyzing the historical events that took place in Europe, particularly in the eighteenth century – which were triggered mainly by the sequence of events that took place also in Italy, Spain, Portugal (fifteenth century), Germany (sixteenth and eighteenth centuries), England (seventeenth century) and France (18th century). Such historical delimitation – in different ways and dimensions propagated by Weber, Marx, Foucault, Habermas, etc. (Dussel, 2005) - is criticized by the postcolonial study (such as Menezes et al. 2004; Souza Santos, 2000; Bhabha, 1998; Mignolo, 2000, Dussel, 2005; Quijano 2005; among numerous others) as provincial. It considers as the starting point for the development of modern powers only the European events of the Italian Renaissance, the Reformation, the German Enlightenment, and the French Revolution.

Perplexed by the historical silence that the term "modernity" represents, Quijano (2005) and Mignolo (2007) question the maintenance and use of this term. By highlighting the process of subordination of knowledge, epistemologies, and world representations resulting from the constitution of modernity, they propose a new concept, "coloniality modernity." This conceptualization generally starts from the understanding that the origin of modernity lies in the colonial conquest, rather than the more commonly accepted European landmarks, such as the Enlightenment and the late eighteenth century. It is based on the understanding that there is no modernity without coloniality since the latter is constitutive of the former.

In this understanding lies the conception that colonialism, postcolonialism, and imperialism are constitutive structures of modernity and shaped its rationalities, such as the Eurocentrism, which derived from Europe's position as a center during colonization, remains as a form of knowledge that claims to be hegemonic and universal (Escobar, 2005). The conception of *coloniality modernity* that guides this study is conceived within the global frame and aims to include the events and stories that took shape beyond European borders. The assumption is developments in the Western African, including Liberia, alongside with other countries and societies in the South, have influenced the formation of modern forms of governmentality since colonization.

The postcolonial critics have targeted the classics of sociology. While these sociological efforts played an essential role in identifying the inequalities between the center and the periphery as well as in criticizing the ideals of modernity and development, the postcolonial studies point that the Marx and Weber vastly reduced their analysis of dependency theories in the international regime to the economic issues based on the European events. For Seidman (2013), postcolonial thinking goes beyond the economic determinism of classical sociology. It contributes to a more holistic understanding of the colonial legacies by reflecting on the gender, culture, discourse, episteme, textual dimensions, psychological and semiotic dimensions. Colonial power was undoubtedly based on economic exploitation and racial differences, religious subjugation, male domination, and cultural oppression.

Postcolonial studies have "provincialized" (Chakrabart, 2008) Foucaultian and other classic sociological concepts and understandings by reinserting the role that the colonies played in the production of modern government practices and their control techniques, such as discipline, biopolitics and governmentality. In the same vein, this thesis sought to constructively appropriate Foucault and other classical sociological concepts by contextualizing them to the realities of colonialism and adopting an open and horizontal approach to the Liberia context's empirical analysis.

Methodology

This research adopts the concept of prudent knowledge of Boaventura de Souza Santos, which defines it as "the knowledge that is aware of its limits," which consists of multiple methods developed mainly through the qualitative analysis of content, semi-structured interviews, and participant observation.

Through the *field research*, I witness the power dynamics between the local and international actors throughout the security sector reform processes. The first field immersion took place at the Security Sector Reform Unit of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions

Services of the United Nations Mission in Liberia in Monrovia from October 2015 to April 2018, and the second immersion took place the Security Sector Reform Unit of the Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions of the United Nations Headquarters in New York from May 2018 to today.

In both immersions, I had the opportunity to observe the development of security sector reform policies and programmes over a long period, which enabled me to identify trends in people's and groups' behaviour and navigate their networks and relationships. Like any other participant observation, the research was based on my interaction with these actors. The information received ultimately depended on the relationships that I developed with them, as well as my position within these relationships: United Nations staff, Brazilian, women, white, from the middle class, that does not have English as a primary language.

The participant observation experience implied for me as a researcher knowing how to listen, see, and when to ask questions. Formal interviews became mostly unnecessary and were just used at the end as a subsidiary form of information gathering. While conducting interviews for this research, my role at that moment as an outsider – in my only capacity as a sociologist doing research – was consistently affirmed and reaffirmed to both United Nations staff and local actors. It is understood, however, that many of those actors chose to release or not more information due to my position.

The qualitative data for the analysis was collected naturally and annotated on personal field notes. In both Liberia and New York, I was also able to identify key informants, who became local collaborators and helped me to clarify uncertainties throughout the investigation. This participant-observation made it possible to map the empirical universe, identifying the actors involved in the security sector reform process in United Nations Headquarters and Liberia, and then collecting qualitative data about these actors and their practices. It further enabled me to enhance the research conclusions' validity by asking participants if the assumptions and interpretations were correct. Prolonged and consistent interactions with both groups in a different capacity also led to a deeper involvement of the research participants in the investigation process, creating a much more blurred division between the thesis and the subject.

My continued employment with the United Nations-led to a profound immersion within the organization's work and dynamics. While this influenced my interpretations and affected the critical and more neutral views that could arise from an outsider, it also enabled me to truly understand its contexts, challenges, and limitations. I also reviewed my old assumptions (Dalberto, 2015) and proposed a more constructive approach.

Such an approach, however, it is still intellectually critical. The analysis of the organizations' challenges does not represent disbelief of the vital role that the organisation plays but rather represents a strong commitment and will contribute to the continued improvement of practices. It's also important to affirm that the views expressed in this study are only of myself. They represent neither the views of the United Nations or any other related institution.

The *analysis of content* involved examining retrospective or contemporary official and academic documents, defining their characteristics, contradictions, and tendencies. Such reports were used as references to the thesis writing and as sources of discourse to be critically analyzed. Therefore, the analysis of the discourses focused on responding to the research questions while keeping an open frame for other new ideas and facts that could add and benefit the investigation. I opted not to frame the discourses' analysis into specific categories, given that by adjusting these writings would fail to grasp all that did not fit into the chosen formulas.

In the context of the United Nations, discourses create the frameworks that structure social relations and set limits to communication content and processes (Foucault, 2002). Because these communications styles and concepts precede Member States' admission into the organisation, their contents are partly shaped by its norms and values.

The research considered discourses registered in the context of debates and meetings of the Security Council, which mainly communicate through resolutions, the repertoire of practices and presidential statements. The resolutions legitimize practices of assistance by the United Nations Secretariat. They usually lead to debates and create new identities and roles for the international and national actors – such as the United Nations Secretariat in the implementation of the mandate in a specific country, and the role of the national actors as receivers of the assistance. The shifting of the narratives in some of these documents does not just describe and explain reforms but also set new ways of defining security sectors and its reform. Such forms of communications are considered not as passive discourses but rather as a form of action that has been shaping the security sector reform assistant as it is known.

For the analysis of field and discourse, I opted to separate the actors into two groups – the nationals and the internationals – as per the social categories utilised by them for their self-identification, but also considering the power relations among them. The nationals are all the Liberians born in the country who belonged to its main ethnic groups, and the internationals are considered those who are temporarily living in Monrovia or New York as employees of the international organisations, non-governmental and embassies.

For the historical elements of the research, I considered the classical literature, but also United Nations reports, norms, and other works published by governments and expert organisations. For the analysis of Liberia history, I tried to favor the local literature, but given the difficulty of accessing books produced by local intellectuals – partially because of the oral culture but also as a result of the long civil war which not only burned out the country libraries but also impacted on the production of scientific research – we also conducted unstructured interviews regarding their memories about critical events. The semi-structured interviews enabled actors to go beyond a fixed frame and speak more freely about the subject instead of conditioning them to standardised alternatives.

CHAPTER I

The colonial question and the birth of the United Nations

1.1. From the League of Nations to the United Nations: discourses of colonialism, security and protection

The United Nations was founded in the wake of the Second World War (1939-1945), when the Group of Allies (United States, Great Britain, France, China and Soviet Union), after winning the war against the Axis (Germany, Italy and Japan), called other 46 countries to San Francisco in the United States to establish a new global political platform aiming at preventing war and promoting international security – an aspiration today is embraced by 193 countries.

The birth of the United Nations led to the closing of the League of Nations, which until then had been the major international organisation formed to regulate relations among States. However, its founding document, the United Nations Charter (1945), carries similarities to the one signed at the time of the creation of the League in 1919. An analysis of the discourses of these founding documents demonstrates the continuities and ruptures in the way that the two organisations and its Member States perceived the colonial problem at the end of the two world wars; and helps explain how colonial rationalities first influenced policies and practices of assistance to national security institutions under foreign and international governance.

The imperial crisis and its impacts in the League of Nations

At the time of the establishment of the League of Nations in 1919, the colonial order was facing a profound crisis – a factor which is often overlooked by official historical accounts of the organisation[2]. Such crisis was a direct result of the First World War (1914-1918)[3], which is regarded as the "first set of events that seriously shook the structure of the world colonialism" (Hobsbawm, 1995: 210). In addition to destroying two empires, the German and the Ottoman, whose possessions were split between the victors, and temporarily overthrowing a third, the Russian, the First World War destabilised the economic power of the remaining empires, like the British, and expanded the political space for the emergence of the pro-independence movements in the colonized territories (Hobsbawm, 1995).

Before the First World War, the colonialism was undergoing its second significant expansion. Such growth had only been seen in the first phase of colonisation (1492-1775), when the oceanic explorations provided Europe with possession of a considerable portion of the Americas and the establishment of settlements and trading ports at the coasts of Africa,

---

[2] The United Nations Library, Registry, Records and Archives Unit main reference on the History of the League of Nations - 1919-1946 can be accessed at <https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/36BC4F83BD9E4443C1257AF3004FC0AE/%24file/Historical_overview_of_the_League_of_Nations.pdf> on 31 March 2018. This study does not aim to analyze the complete body of bibliographical references on the League of Nations and its Mandate System. Relevant references on their history include the book of the Deputy Secretary-General of the League of Nations, F. P. Walters, "A History of the League of Nations" (1952) as well as the writes of Wright (1930) in "Mandates under the League of Nations"; Anghie (2001) in "Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations"; and Hall (1948) in "Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship". The United Nations Library, Registry, Records and Archives Unit archives the original documents of the League of Nations and its catalogue is available at https://biblio-archive.unog.ch/detail.aspx?ID=245. The digital access to the League's archives is also being made available by United Nations through the "Total Digital Access to the League of Nations Archives Project – LONTAD" with support from Swiss foundation. More information, please see < https://lontad-project.unog.ch/>.

[3] The First World War was a conflict between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire (the Central Powers) and Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Romania, Japan and the United States (the Allied Powers). The Allied Powers gained the war, which left more than 16 million people dead. With the exception of the United States, the Allied gathered in the League of Nations at the end of war.

Arabia and Asia. The emergence of the anti-colonial movements in the Americas caused colonialism its first loss. The United States achieved independence in 1776 and Haiti in 1804 followed by Argentina, Venezuela, Paraguay, Colombia and others.

By threatening the profitable imperial structure consolidated in the second phase of colonialism across the Middle East, Asia and Africa, the First World War forced the colonial powers to rethink their control practices and to articulate new methods for the domination of its possessions overseas. The command of the colonies under the rule of Germany and the Ottoman Empire, the two powers defeated in the conflict, was the subject of dispute among countries that first formed the League of Nations.

Consensus on the command of these former colonies was reached through the Mandate System, a new legal solution created by the League of Nations whereby these colonies were distributed among some of the Allied and/or its supporters (Wright, 1930). The League of Nations came to be a platform through which the colonial powers reframed their discourses and formulated new tools to intervene in the colonised territories. Its founding document, the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919), contains fragments of the eurocentric discourse that shaped the perspective of its Member States and how they came to justify interventions in the other territories.

In the Article 22 of the Covenant, the domination of the territories “inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world” was described as a “sacred trust of civilisation”. Thus, the League of Nations awarded the territories previously under the control of Germany and the Ottoman Empire to Britain and France, with the belief that:

> the best method of giving practical effect to this principle [sacred trust of civilisation] is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League (League of Nations, 1919, Article 22).

As a result of the imperial crisis, many of the Allied powers used the Mandate System to refine and legitimate their interventions. Differently from the traditional colonial order, when colonies were formally acquired with the explicit purpose of exploitation, the dominance of the territories were now justified through the discourse of protection. *The* colonial powers considered a moral duty to govern those territories on the assumption that they were unable to govern themselves. The position of "protector" was given to countries based on their resources, geographical location and experiences.

At the reluctance of some Allied powers but at the insistence of few internationalists, the League requested mandatory authorities to report annually on the administration of those territories. No provisions, however, were made by the Covenant on the duration of mandates and the accountability procedures to protect the areas in case the governing powers failed to uphold the principles of the "sacred trust" (Pedersen, 2015). The Deputy Secretary-General of the League of Nations, F. P. Walters, in "A History of the League of Nations" (1952) would underlined that "the responsibility of trusteeship was accepted by individual States, not by the League as such; and that a direct League trusteeship could not be considered until the Allies had announced what military and financial resources they would provide for the purpose" (1952:109).

The Mandate System was established without a prior consultation with populations living in those territories under its control. Without their consent, it divided the colonies into classes A, B, and C[4], and article 22 stated that "the character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances" (League of Nations, 1919).

---

[4] The Class A covered the former Ottoman, including Iraq and Palestine, which were assigned to the mandate of United Kingdom, and Syria and Lebanon, which were assigned to France. The Class B covered the former German territories of: Tanzania, which was assigned to the United Kingdom; Rwanda and Burundi, which were assigned to Belgium, and Tagoland (Togo) and Cameroon which were assigned to United Kingdom and France. The Class C covered the German colonies of: Namibia, which was assigned to South Africa (through the South African Union); Western Samoa, which was assigned New Zealand; the New Guinea and Nauru, which were assigned to Australia, United Kingdom and New Zealand; and a small group of islands in the Pacific, which were assigned to Japan (League of Nations, 1919). The mandates were legalized thorough a treaty signed between the League and administrative authorities.

The sovereignty of territories under Mandate System was considered a title to be awarded according to the degree of development attained by the colonies. Each society could be placed at some point along this linear continuum towards sovereignty according to its proximity to the ideal model of the European nation-state. While the communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire were considered by the Article 22 of the Covenant at the "stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone" (Class A); other peoples, especially those from South-West Africa and the South Pacific Islands, "owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances", would be "best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory" (Class C) (League of Nations, 1919).

By categorising these classes of government in this linear continuum, the Mandate System presented itself as a tool of political homogenization. It was fostered through a structure of ideas by which Western political institutions and practices were asserted to be civilised and universal. The evolutionist perspective through which the classes were built at that time demonstrates the coloniality imbued within international rationale that gave rise to the League of Nations. It was with this rationale that the Allied powers deliberated on the fate of many people and their territories and helping to determine how they should be perceived by the new international system.

In this new imperial order, from which the Mandate System emerges, the interventions will start being justified and legitimised through the protective discourse. Anghie (2001:116) argues that "while the positivist international law of the nineteenth century endorsed the conquest and exploitation of non-European peoples, the Mandate System, was created to achieve precisely the reverse" of the old colonial order as it aimed to protect. Differently from Anghie, we argue that this new intervention practice, as opposed to protecting and promoting self-determination, proved to be as forceful as many of the former ways of colonisation.

Our understanding is that this form of intervention created with the Mandate System was the product of a rationalisation of existing forms of colonisation – not a breakthrough with the imperial project. Such rationalisation is demonstrated in the transition from the violent practices to the protective practices of colonialism, which was only conceivable due to the economic and moral unfeasibility of sustaining the old imperialist totalitarian models. This change was also necessary for the financial preservation of the imperial power at the end of the First World War.

The Mandate System secured a dividing line between advanced and non-advanced States and established a legal structure that recreated the neocolonial relations. The characterisation of the other as inferior based on racial categories had begun to be unacceptable and unscientific; so, the civilising mission came to be justified on the understanding that countries geographically located in the North, with more resources and experiences, would be, in the League's view, better positioned to govern the ones in the South.

One of the problems that some colonial powers had at that moment were the realization that the security officers from the colonialized territories trained to support their masters with the administration of the colonies but also with the fights of the First World War had a military value that could potentially endanger their white supremacy. The spectre of deploying armed black troops in a "white man's war" preoccupied colonial officials. Yorke (2005:75) references Europeans concerns and proposal for a new arrangement "for the military training of the natives in the area", "otherwise, armies may be trained so large that properly led by whites and properly equipped they may be a danger to civilisation itself".

The colonial powers had often engaged in forming “indigenous security forces” as means to enhance and maintain control of the colonized territories and their populations during the first phases of colonisation. In West Africa, the recruitment of natives was the backbone of the French colonial army. The formation of the Senegalese Tirailleurs (Senegalese Infantrymen) in 1857 was central to extend its presence and authority in the region. For Ginio (2017), French rules found the Africans more resilient to the climate and geographical conditions, cheaper to use, and their death would not raise criticism in France. In the Zambia, the British formed the Northern Rhodesia Police in 1895 to guard the properties, carry messages between administrative official and “native chiefs” and, between 1914 and 1918, had nearly doubled its size from around 800 to approximately 1,500 effectives (Yorke, 2005:4)

During the First World War, these security officers were either used by their masters to defend the borders of the colonized territories or deployed to Europe battlefields. In line with Koller (2008:114), France recruited more Africans than any other colonial power during the war and deployed in Europe around 172,800 soldiers from Algeria, 134,300 from West Africa, 60,000 from Tunisia, 37,300 from Morocco, 34,400 from Madagascar, 2,100 from the Somali Coast, and 44,000 from Indochina. Italy deployed 2,700 soldiers from Libya to Sicily in 1915. Britain mobilized about 1.5 million Indian soldiers to fight in Europe and but also in Mesopotamia against the Ottoman empire.

In many contexts, such as in France colonial rule in West Africa, these recruitments were forced. In 1912, French Parliament passed several acts authorizing a recruitment policy in West Africa by conscription of natives if there were not enough volunteers. These recruitment campaigns “met all sorts of resistance, ranging from malingering and self-mutilation to flight into the bush or to Liberia, Gambia, Portuguese Guinea and the Gold Coast” and during the 1915/16 campaign in the region only 7,000 out of 53,000 were volunteers (Koller, 2008:115).

The colonial powers had, therefore, accumulated a lot of experiences with the recruitment, training and deployment of the "native security officer" in their oversees possessions and during the First World War. In different forms, these practices were continued during the League of Nations Mandate System, which authorized the mandatory to establish local security forces. In the case of Central Africa, for example, the Covenant established that the Mandatory must guarantee the "military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory" (League of the Nations, 2019). Other example is Iraq, where Britain, as the Mandatory, instituted for airpower imperial police to control the rural and nomadic communities for a fraction of the cost of maintaining a permanent army garrison (Omissi, 1990).

The end of traditional colonialism and its impacts in the United Nations

The First World War was greatly influenced by imperial interests in the colonised territories – for which the creation of the League of Nations and the Mandate System meant in many ways a new form of occupation. Although the map of colonial Africa was not redrawn after the War, as it was the map of Europe and the Middle East, where the old empires collapsed, the League facilitated the passage of parts of the continent, including the former colonies of Germany, to France (e.g. Togo), Britain (Tanganyika) and South Africa (Namibia) (Rathbone, 1978).

The League of Nations not only facilitated the continuation of the foreign interference in those countries, but little did to interfere in the wider colonization programme across the globe, in particular in Africa, which was largely occupied by colonial rulers. Such colonial structure will remain intact until the arrival of two events: (i) the Great Depression in the 1930s which, according to Hobsbawm, profoundly trembled the imperial order and was a milestone in the history of anti-imperialism liberation movements and, (ii) the Second World

War in 1939 which, for Hobsbawm, led to “the end of old forms of colonialism (Hobsbawm, 1995). See map in the next page.


Mediterranean Sea
NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN
SOUTH ATLANTIC OCEAN
INDIAN OCEAN
COLONIES
Anglo-Egyptian
Belgian
British
French
Italian
Portuguese
South African
Spanish
COUNTRIES
1 Egypt
2 Libya
3 Tunisia
4 Algeria
5 Spanish Morocco
6 French Morocco
7 Rio de Oro
8 French West Africa
9 Gambia
10 Port Guinea
11 Sierra Leone
12 Liberia
13 Gold Coast
14 British Togoland
15 French Togoland
16 Nigeria
17 British Cameroons
18 French Cameroons
19 Rio Muni
20 French Equatorial Africa
21 Anglo-Egyptian Sudan
22 Eritrea
23 French Somaliland
24 British Somaliland
25 Ethiopia
26 Italian Somaliland
27 Uganda
28 Kenya
29 Belgian Congo
30 Ruanda-Urundi
31 Tanganyika
32 Angola
33 Northern Rhodesia
34 Nyasaland
35 Mozambique
36 Southern Rhodesia
37 Bechuanaland
38 South-West Africa
39 Basutoland
40 Swaziland
41 South Africa
42 Madagascar
43 Mauritius (Brit.)

Figure 1 - Map of Africa in 1945 (McMahon, 2003:101)

The Second World War not only defeated the colonial empires but also destabilised the belief in their superiority: “what fatally damaged the old colonialists was the proof that white men and their states could be defeated, shamefully and dishonourably, and the old colonial powers were patently too weak, even after a victorious war, to restore their old positions” (Hobsbawm, 1995: 216). The violence, racism and fascism of the War challenged the idea of Europe as a superior civilisation in such way that the African pro-independence movements could no longer be silenced.

Returning Africans recruited by the Allies to fight in Europe, Asia, and North Africa were aware of the promise made in the Atlantic Charter (1941)[5] by Wilson Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, and ready to fight for them. The third paragraph of the Charter notes that “respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they will wish to see sovereign rights of self-government restored to those who have been forcibly retrieved by them.” The African Charter also noted that “after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny” they hoped “to see established a peace which will afford to all nations means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford the assurance that all men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.”

In 1945, colonial institutions started to be subjected of countless resistance across Africa. By the 1950s, almost every colony in Africa had organized nationalist parties. Those independence struggles destabilised the imperial international order and, at the time of the emergence of the United Nations, it was clear to the surviving empires that traditional colonialism had to be terminated. The arrival of the new sovereign states[6] between 1950 and

---

[5] Roosevelt; Churchill. The African Charter, 1941. Available at: https://larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2015/eirv42n10-20150306/25_4210.pdf.

[6] Libya gained its independence in 1951; Egypt in 1952; Sudan and Tunisia in 1956; Ghana in 1957; Senegal, Togo, Mali, Madagascar, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Benin, Niger, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon and Mauritania in 1960.

1960 in the international arena set the “diplomacy in motion” contrasting with the “with the immobile and petrified world of colonisation” (Fanon 1968:60).

This changing political geography inevitably influenced the early years of the United Nations founded by the Group of Allies (United States, Great Britain, France, China and Soviet Union) with other 46 countries in 1945.

The imperial powers responded to that moment of weakening of their domains by creating institutional mechanisms to maintain their supremacy vis-à-vis the newly independent States. Among their strategies were the establishment of new forms of intervention and technologies of control and surveillance over this distinctive international arena to maintain some level of command and authority over former colonies.

The birth of the United Nations put an end to the League of Nations. The negotiations on the structure of the organization also led to the termination of the League’s Mandate System. In its place, the United Nations would now use the “Trusteeship System” through which a specific Member State could administer a territory under the supervision of a newly established Trusteeship Council. The organisation entered into agreements with those Member-States, now called administrative authorities on their responsibility to look after these territories. These agreements were approved by the General Assembly and, in some cases, by the Security Council, in line with articles 79, 83 and 85 of the United Nations Charter (1945).

The Trusteeship System encompassed territories which at that time were under the Mandate System of the League of Nations, being separated from the enemies that lost World War II, but also those territories interested in being voluntarily placed under system (for which there were none)· (United Nations Charter, 1945, article 77). Eleven (11) territories were placed under the International Trusteeship System (*List of Countries in Annexe I*). It would take forty-eight (48) years for all these territories to either become independent States or voluntarily join neighbouring independent countries. In 1993, the Trusteeship Council suspended its operations after the last territory in its agenda, the Pacific Islands (Palau)[7], under the administration of the United States, became independent[8].

Colonization issues were not fully discussed at the United Nations Charter Conference as not to affront the imperial powers. Only some of the former territories under the mandates inherited by the League of Nations received their immediate independence – such as Syria and Iraq – and that the rest remained under the management of the new administrative authorities established by the Trusteeship System (Cuadra, 1975). Questions on whether to include the word "independence" in the founding document were cause for concern. Founding members debated on whether the aim of the trusteeship should be defined as "independence" if some "areas too small ever to stand on their own legs for defence", and many proposed the use of "self-government" instead. An agreement was reached that "the promotion of the progressive development of the peoples of trust territories should be directed toward "independence or self-government."[9]

The Trusteeship System retained many of the procedures of the League of Nations Mandate System, including annual reports and regular meetings. One of the main differences, is that United Nations Charter allowed for the inhabitants of the trustee territories to petition the Trusteeship Council directly, rather than through the administering, as it was the case during the Mandate System. By 1950s, local activists inundated the Council "with tens of thousands of petitions, lobby visiting missions, form alliances with such international human-rights and anti-colonial organisations" (Pedersen, 2015:399). Another meaningful change made by the United Nations Charter is that the Trusteeship Council would now report not to the Security Council but rather to the General Assembly, a "stipulation that meant that pressures for decolonisation would grow as the Assembly became less European and less white" (Pedersen, 2015:399).

---

[7] The Security Council terminated the United Nations Trusteeship Agreement in 1994 for Palau, after it had chosen free association with the United States in a plebiscite in 1993. Palau became independent in 1994, joining the United Nations as its 185th Member State. With no Territories left in its agenda, the Trusteeship Council suspended its operations on 1 November of the same year. Today, the Trusteeship Council continues to exist as an organ of the United Nations and meets as and where occasion requires.

[8] United Nations. International Trusteeship System. 2020. Available at: <https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/history/international-trusteeship-system-and-trust-territories>. Accessed at: January 2020

[9] United Nations (a). "1945: The San Francisco Conference", 2020. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/sections/history-united-nations-charter/1945-san-francisco-conference/index.html. Accessed at: January 2020

Differently from the Mandate System, the new Trusteeship System's sought to ensure that the trust territories contribute to, and are not be held apart from, the global security arrangements (Pedersen, 2015:398). The article 85 of the United Nations Charter also established the administering authority had the duty to "ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security." To this end, the:

> administering authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for local defense and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory (United Nations Charter, 1945, article 85)

While today official accounts recognize that "when the When the United Nations was founded in 1945, some 750 million people, nearly a third of the world's population, lived in Territories that were dependent on colonial Powers"[10], the organization's Charter in 1945 did call for the sovereignty of other countries under the colonial system. Instead, it called them "Non-Self-Governing Territories", "whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government" (article 73). The General Assembly in its resolution 66 (I) of 14 December 1946, identified 72 Territories to which this provision applied[11]. The colonial interests in many ways influenced the international relations between the countries that at that time constituted the nascent United Nations, and inevitably permeated some of the initial discourses and practices of the organisation.

---

[10] United Nations (b). Decolonization. In: "Global issues". Available at: https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/decolonization/index.html

[11] United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 66(I) of 14 December 1946. Available at: https://undocs.org/A/RES/66(I)

With the end of the old colonial order, for many countries the Trusteeship Systems and the category of Non-Self-Governing Territories meant a new political space through which they could maintain some forms of control over the national political systems and process towards the independence of their colonies. The hierarchy and disparities of power, knowledge and resources that characterised formal colonialism remained between some administering authorities and those territories, which illustrates the continuing effect of the colonial encounter within the United Nations.

The economic crises provoked by the Second World War not only overthrew the largest empires but also destabilized the belief in the superiority of the ruling colonial powers and expanded the political space for the decolonization movements. The future of the territories which until then were dominated by the Axis were at the centre of the international agenda at the end of the War. It was over and for the colonized or postcolonial countries that the two powers competed throughout the post-war, where there was the greatest friction zone between them, the where conflict continued (Hobsbawm, 1995).

The representation of the Trust and the Non-Self-Governing Territories as a space to be governed by the administering authorities positioned the United Nations not just as sphere of regulation, but also a locus from which techniques of inclusion and exclusion emerged to build trust and identity among certain group of nations and reaffirm their power against others. These categories served in many contexts as instrument for some colonial power to continue exercise control over the populations which, they argued, did not feet into the western model of political government, and therefore, could not self-govern and be considered “independent”.

The Trust and the Non-Self-Governing Territories became the space where some colonial powers maintained domination-type ties under a “pacifist” varnish and through discourses intrinsically tied to concepts of “international security”. The rationalisation of the colonisation discourses and practices is shown in the transition from violence to protective intervations and responded the economic and moral infeasibility of the traditional colonial models. The political disputes that marked this era gave shape to a new form of governmentality over the colonised territories, which shape much of the contemporary power dynamics of international relations today.

In addition to the Trusteeship System, other bodies were established by the United Nations in 1945. The formation of a Security Council with only five-permanent members[12], to be known as the "P5", with the authority to make decisions through which all other members are obligated to comply is a clear demonstration of the economic and political hierarch that characterized the organisation at that time (Articles 23, United Nations Charter, 1945).

As a result of the structural reforms advocated by global south countries, the Council membership many years later increased to 15 Members. While five of them remained as permanent members as specified in the Charter, the rest are elected for two-year terms out of the United Nations General Assembly under a formula that ensures representation of the five regions of the world.

Only permanent members can veto any substantive Security Council resolution, including those on political interventions, the admission of new member states or candidates for Secretary-General. Each Member of the Council has one vote; and all obligated to comply with decisions, which surpass any conflicting domestic law or treaty passed by its members (Articles 25 and 103, United Nations Charter, 1945). While the issuing body of a resolution determines if it is considered binding on Member States, Article 25 of the Charter establishes that resolutions issued by the Security Council as binding: "all members of the organisation are to agree to carry out and accept the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter" (ibid).

In addition to the Security and Trusteeship Councils, the Charter established other four principal organs of the United Nations: the General Assembly, the Economic and Social

---

[12] These are the United States, Russia (replacing the Soviet Union in 1991), China, the United Kingdom, and France.

Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat. Upon an agreement with the United States government, the founding members decided that the United Nations Headquarters would be based on an 18-acre tract of land in the city of New York. The site, however, would be considered international territory[13].

The General Assembly was established as the deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the organisation, where all member nations would have equal representation. Each country has one vote on the Assembly decisions, which concerns issues of peace and security, admission of new members and budgetary matters of the organisation, which follows a two-thirds majority model (Article 18, United Nations Charter, 1945).

Different from the Security Council, the United Nations Charter did not make the General Assembly resolutions binding and, in its Articles 10 and 14, refer to the Assembly resolutions as "recommendations". Similarly, the Economic and Social Council, where all members have equal participation, was established to coordinate and formulate policy recommendations on the economic and social fields through its specialised agencies and commissions.

In 1960, the General Assembly initiated a series of concrete initiatives to end colonialism – largely as a result of the larger number of independent countries[14] that that moment started joining the organization. As the process of decolonization continued to advance, resolution 1514 (1960) was proposed in the General Assembly – instead of the Security Council due to risks of veto to any permanent members that still had "colonial" legal ties or associations. The General Assembly adopted the resolution as landmark Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples[15], which affirmed the right of all people to self-determination and proclaimed that colonialism should be brought to an unconditional end. A Special Committee on Decolonization was also established to monitor its implementation.

---

[13] The base of the United Nations Headquarters is considered technically extraterritorial through a treaty agreement with the United States. In exchange for local police, fire protection and other services, the United Nations agreed to acknowledge most local, state, and federal laws.

[14] Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Tanzania in 1961; Burundi, Rwanda, Algeria and Uganda in 1962; Kenya in 1963; Malawi, Zambia in 1964; Gambia in 1965; Botswana, Lesotho and 1966; Mauritius, Swaziland and Equatorial Guinea in 1968; Morocco in 1969; Guinea-Bissau in 1973; Mozambique, Cape Verde, Cameroon, São Tomé and Principe, Angola in 1975; Western Sahara and Seychelles in 1976; Djibouti in 1977; Zimbabwe in 1980; Namibia in 1990; and Eritrea in 1993.

Since 1960, total of eighty 80 former colonies have gained their independence, including all 11 trust territories. However, 17 countries remain non-self-governing territories which combined represent 2 million people living under colonial rule (see List of Territories in Annex V)[16]. The General Assembly has continued to play a central role in the decolonization, including by proclaiming in 1990 the three International Decades for the Eradication of Colonialism, with the third to be concluded in 2020[17].

The United Nations Charter also provided for the establishment of the International Court of Justice to settle disputes among member countries and give opinions on legal matters. The Court dissolved the former Permanent Court of International Justice of the League of Nations. Nevertheless, the San Francisco Conference considered that a degree of continuity should be maintained between the two courts, and the Charter, therefore, stated that the Statute of the International Court of Justice was based upon that of the former Permanent Court of International Justice (Article 92, United Nations Charter, 1945).

In support to the implementation of the decisions of its bodies, the Charter established the United Nations Secretariat, which headed by a Secretary-General, shall serve as a neutral body and “not seek or receive instructions from any government or any other authority external to the Organization” (Article 100, United Nations Charter, 1945). Over time, the Secretariat should comprise of staff employed on the principle of geographical diversity and merit who abide by the goals of the organisation and not national interests. It should be organised along departmental lines, with each department or office having a distinct area of action and responsibility. The organogram of the United Nations Secretariat is presented in Annex II.

---

[15] United Nations General Assembly (b). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 1514 (XV). Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 14 December 1960. http://www.un-documents.net/a15r1514.htm

[16] United Nations (c). Non-Self-Governing Territories. 22 September 2020. Available at: <https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/nsgt>

[17] United Nations (d). International Decades for the Eradication of Colonialism. 2020 Available at <https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/history/international-decades>

Through the Security Council, the organisation would start developing different political tools of assistance. One of them would later become one of the highest expressions of its governing practices: the peace operations. Although not foreseen in the United Nations Charter, the operations were established in 1948 to help conflict-affected countries to re-establish peace. The first operation authorised by the Security Council was the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, which encompassed the deployment of military personnel to the Middle East to monitor the Israel-Palestine conflict. This peace operation has completed approximately seventy-72 years of presence in Palestine.

The peacekeeping mandates, established by the Security Council resolutions, ranged from traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully under Chapter VI, such as promoting reconciliation, assisting with the implementation of a peace agreement, or performing mediation and good offices, and more forceful action as authorized under Chapter VII which can authorize a range of measures including the use of force under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter (1945).

1.2. The Cold War and the impact of the bipolar divide in (post)colonial nations

Soviet–American relations progressively deteriorated at the end of Second World War. Conflicting views over the international control of atomic weaponry and disputes for territories in the global south led to the demise of the Grand Alliance in 1946 and the beginning of the Cold War after that lasting until 1991 (McMahon, 2003). The United States and the Soviet Union had emerged out of the Second World War preoccupied with their national security. Neither the economic benefits nor the rising military power and international prestige gained by winning the Axis had lessen the fears.

On the one hand, United States has become world’s leading capitalist state[18]. The preoccupation with national security became central to its foreign and defence policy, especially after the Japanese attack to Pearl Harbour on 1941. Concerns were centred in the Red Army communist expansion in Eastern Europe as well as its appetite for additional territories, resources, and concessions, including in the Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean, Manchuria and Germany (Powaski, 1998). the United States expanded the establishment of defence bases in other countries as to more easily deter enemies before they gained the power to enter American territory. The State Department compiled a list of essential’ sites for its bases in 1946, which included Fiji Islands, Cuba, Greenland, Ecuador, French Morocco, Senegal, Iceland, Liberia, Panama, Peru, and the Azores (McMahon, 2003:26).

On the other hand, the Soviet Union was severely traumatized by the impact of the German occupation during the war[19]. Its territory had been subjected to the German invasion during the First World War, to the Allied intervention during the Civil War, as well as to Napoleon’s attempt of conquest. Now, its leaders were determined to establish a strong national defence for a nation which, at that point, covered one-sixth of the earth’s land and was three times larger than the United States (LaFeber, 2002).

While the Cold War is primarily alluded as a historical event set in the West, the conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union were related to the developments taking place in the global south. The practices of interference in the countries which, at that time were called “the third world”, became increasingly justified through the discourse of national security. Under a state of exception that regularly invoked the fear of returning to war, the United States and the Soviet Union sustained the need to expand military presences in some places of Europe, most notably in Latin America, Africa, Middle East and Asia, and increase their arsenal of armaments, including nuclear weapons. The promotion of democracy or communism was among the political strategies of the duellists, who used ideological propaganda to convince governments and people around the world about their relevance (Feste, 1992). The Soviet Union intervened to spread communist ideology and halt the presence of the United States, while the Americans sought to contain communism.

---

[18] The United States domestic product doubled between 1941 and 1945. The country was producing approximately 50% of the world’s goods and services at war’s end (McMahon, 2003:26).

[19] Of the 15 Soviet Republics, 9 had been occupied by the Germans. The war costed millions of lives and demolished 1,700 cities, 70,000 villages, and 31,000 factories (McMahon, 2003:30).

The sudden acceleration of decolonization process by the revolutionary movements seemed to favour the Soviet communism (Hobsbawm, 1995). The fear that the future of world capitalism and liberal society was not secure led the United States to support its own political program in other countries. The American presence was felt primarily through the Marshall Plan, a comprehensive program aimed at rebuilding the European economies based on free-market policies. Such policies, coupled with the requirement that countries who accepted the program implement multiparty democracy, made the Soviet Union and its satellites reject this and any American aid (Harsanyi, 2007).

The global south deeply felt the impacts of the Cold War, including through "precautionary wars", such as the Korean War (1950-1953), the Vietnam War (1962-1975), the Cuban missile crisis (1962) and the Falklands War (1982), which led to the increased economic instability and political polarization across their populations and governments, as well as with dictatorial regimes, including in Guatemala in 1954; in Brazil in 1964, in Chile in 1973, among others. The power struggles between 1945 and 1983 would kill around 30 million people in the third world (Hobsbawm, 1995).

Noam Chomsky (2002) portrays the wars experienced in the twentieth century, including the Cold War, as a struggle for a share of the revenues of world production. As noted by Westead, "the Cold War was a continuation of colonialism through different means" (2005: 396). Global institutions at that time, including the Organization of American States founded in 1948 in Washington, reflected liberal preferences by expelling Cuba after its socialist revolution. Also did the reestablishment of a multilateral liberal economic trade (Cohen, 1993) including through the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group.

As noted by McMahon (2003:35), the "developing nations of the Third World, most just emerging from decades, if not centuries, of Western colonial rule, became a focal point of Soviet–American competition during the 1950s". Both Americans and Soviet recognized that the resources and markets of those regions were essential to the West capitalist economy, including the economic recoveries of post-war and their own commercial and military needs. This became clear in the discourse of the Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the Senate of United States in February 1961, which says that the Soviet–American struggle had shifted "from the military problem in Western Europe to a genuine contest for the underdeveloped countries" (McMahon, 2003:25).

Fanon (1964) described neocolonialism as the continued exploitation of Africa from outside and within by the West economic and political interventions during the post-independence years, like if "every new sovereign state found itself practically under the obligation of maintaining definite and deferential relations with the former oppressor" (Fanon, 1964: 120). The continued interaction with formal colonial powers affected the countries autonomy and political viability, as it only benefitted small high and middle classes. The continued West interference generated strong tensions and grievances between the elite classes and the majority population.

The Cold War permeated the debates and negotiations of United Nations committees, especially in the Security Council. In the period 1946-1989, Security Council had an annual average of 15 resolutions– very different from the average of 60 resolutions after the end Cold War (Wallenstein & Johansson, 2004). Between 1948 and 1988, the Security Council also undertook 13 peacekeeping missions involving generally lightly armed troops from neutral countries – very different from the total of 20 operations just between 1989 and 1994. Another challenge left by the Cold War was division within the P5 along the bipolar divide – Britain, France, the United States versus the Soviet Union and China – each side traded vetoes counting of 279 in all during the Cold War (Farrell 2007:309).

CHAPTER II

The conceptualization and legitimation of the security sector reform as an international policy

2.1. The era of democracy and the revival of the rule of law

Pro-democracy interventions in the post-Cold War

The fall of the Berlin Wall[20] in 1989 symbolizes the conclusion of the most significant event of the twentieth century: the clash between democratic and totalitarian political powers (Todorov, 2012). Such encounter provided the background against which the history of Second World War unfolded when governments devoted their full economic, political, scientific and human capacity to a conflict that killed hundreds of millions of people. With the victory of democracy, represented by the Allied, the political spirit in the world changed significantly: Nazism was defeated in 1945 and, with at the end of the Cold War, the communist threat weakened in 1989[21].

No longer influenced by the ideological rift between Americans and Soviets, the United Nations embarked "a new chapter"[22], characterized by the development of a set of new pro-democracy policies and practices aimed at establishing security institutions in post-colonial countries and addressing conflict factors that threaten international peace and security. These interventions will be justified by the large-scale violence left behind by the colonial regimes, ethnic conflicts and internal disputes and military cups emerging in the global south.

---

[20] The fall of the Berlin Wall symbolized the breaking of the physical barrier between two forms of government: West Germany, which was a United States-backed capitalist democracy, and that the East Germany, which was a socialism system sympathetic to the Soviet regime.

[21] Todorov (2012: 12) argues that although there are still countries with communist ideology, they are not perceived as a threat but "as anachronisms that cannot survive long".

[22] Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. Empowering the United Nations. Congers: Foreign Affairs Magazine, 1992. Also available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48466/boutros-boutros-ghali/empowering-the-united-nations>.

Such conflicts were aggravated by the politicized security forces, increasing economic divisions and competitiveness, the high degree of military technology and equipment available in post-colonial countries, as well as the migrant and refugee movements and environmental degradation. Such interstate conflicts came to be categorized as specific type of organized violence, in which the differences between peace and combat zones were not as visible. In the way as it was “difficult to distinguish between political and economic, public and private, military and civilian, it [was] also increasingly difficult to distinguish between war and peace” (Kaldor, 2001:143).

In the field of international relations, the discourses of security that characterized the post-wars are gradually converted into democracy, and the promotion of peace by the United Nations is reimagined as connected with the process of institutionalization of democratic governments (Richmond, 2001). Offences to democracy are now seen as offences to peace; democracy is pointed as the best path to create a safer world, and international intervention programmes were reorganized around the ideal of democratization (Boutros-Ghali, 1996). Conflict and violence are perceived as resulting from the inability of governments to manage their political regimes and security forces, and the establishment of the rule of law’s political-administrative apparatus is presented as a potential solution (Elman, 1997; Held, 2006).

Conflicts emerging in the global south largely resulted from the impacts of the colonial interventions. However, Western discourses about these conflicts tended to present those conflict as compelling proof that the postcolonial nations did not have the political capacity to govern their people and territories (Dominguez, 1998). Countries that do not fit the development model of democratic governments will be described as spaces of disorder, irrationality and excessive violence (Duffield, 2002). The international community will begin to advocate for a new way of maintaining international peace, based on the homogenization of forms of government and security institutions according to the standard of western democracy.

As noted by Call (2007), it’s in the imbrication of the security and the development elements that this new rule of law consensus emerges, based on the belief, rooted in the 1990s, that the State and its security apparatus is essential to virtually all Western projects of foreign liberal policy (human rights, democracy, economic and political stability, international security against terrorism and other crimes, free trade) and therefore, international interventions, especially peace operations, whether through money, people or ideas, should include the rule of law component.

The international community will constitute itself as a hostile universe and contrary to the “undemocratic Other” (Rosow, 2000:35). The post-Cold War context was marked by stereotypical speeches about totalitarian authorities by which socialist and communist rulers were presented as irrational or political aberrations. Foucault explains the hostility against the tyrannical power in the emergence of a new tendency of political reason, which is concerned with “how not to overrule”; it is in a “delimitation of what would be excessive for a government that the rationality of government practice will be measured” (Foucault, 2008: 18).

Consequently, with the end of the nuclear conflict, the commitment to combat oppressive regimes, spread democratic values and institutions and promote individual rights is expressed by a multiplicity of different State and non-state actors at the international, regional, national and local levels. Questions surrounding the ideologies of postcolonial governments dominated international debates and framed their political cartography: in one side, countries with democratic, central, metropolitan rationality of government and, in the other side, countries with nationalist and peripheral irrationality, symbol of disorder and insecurity. This dualism between order and chaos will confront, oppress and interiorize people in the global south, including through justifying new forms of intervations.

In many ways, these conceptualizations demonstrate the limited capacity of many western powers to understand and respect the cultural differences of the global south, under the belief that their economic, ethnical and geographical positions placed them in a position of superior knowledge. Douglas (1996) explains that “disorder” is how a misunderstood reality which is beyond our control is described. Societies resist to disorder to the extent that it represents an object or idea that confuse precious cultural classifications, “ideals of separating, purifying, demarcating, and punishing transgressions are primarily intended to impose systematization on an inherently disordered experience” (1996:15).

In the context of post-colonialism, the desire of many western powers to retake the old international “order” is demonstrated by a set of new discourses that demarcate differences, such as those of “developed and undeveloped” countries, since “it is only by exaggerating the difference between inside and outside, above and below, female and male, with and against, that a semblance of order is created” (Douglas, 1996: 15).

The colonial rational and its binary concepts were a crucial component in the discourses through which assistance on democracy was first articulated, sustained and expanded. Interventions aiming at rebuilding the state and institutions according to the western rule of law model emerges at a moment when a range of peoples and territories previously colonized, and until then seen as “unable to govern themselves”, begin to lead their political and security apparatus.

Chatterjee (1993) notes that the primary concern of the West at the time was the resurgence of nationalism, which served as the ideology and practice of the post-colonial countries against the continued interference of foreign powers. According to Anderson (1993), nationalism took many forms in the post-colonial state, but mainly represented the struggle by the people for the right to create their own governments, for the preservation of their territories and cultures, and for the protection of their natural resources. However, the emancipatory aspect of nationalism was overwhelmed by political stories and speeches that pointed to it as a new communist danger and as “reason why people killed each other in the third world" (Chatterjee, 1993:3). The postcolonial states were pressured to follow the lines of the liberal development, which, unlike nationalism, sought the promotion of national economic growth by using foreign loans, technologies and resources.

Profoundly concerned about "failed states" which would be those post-colonial nations that, dominated by poverty, lacked basic institutions, and are unable to provide basic security services to its State and the people, foreign support through practices of peacebuilding, or also in the past called "state-building" or "nation-building" (Sisk, 2013) could act effectively to rebuild governments capacities to manage territories, prevent conflicts and enable international surveillance.

The conceptualizations created in the space of international assistance, such as state-building or nation-building, are not in a vacuum. On the contrary, these concepts represent what Foucault elucidate the way that one attempts to conceptualize this practice consisting in "governing" (Foucault, 2008: 04). Among the episodes of the history of government reason, there are, as Foucault points out, the emergence of the modern reason of the state which will regulate the ways to govern within the framework of an existing state or a state to be built.

The term "reform" of the security sector, for example, which is widely used in the field of security assistance, refers in the strict sense of the term to the act of building something that already exists. This term fits into rationality elucidated by Foucault, within which "state reason is the rationalization of a practice that will lie between a State presented as given (ideal) and a State presented as building (Foucault, 2008: 06).

Since the founding of the United Nations, democracy has been a cross-cutting issue at its major meetings. The theme was avoided and considered sensitive in the context of the Cold War. But at the end of the bipolar conflict, especially since the 1980s, the United Nations General Assembly will start adopting at least one annual resolution on democracy and openly declaring that “the ideal of democracy is universally recognized as one of the core values of the United Nations.”[23]

The organization will further expand the scope of its engagement to a broad and multidimensional set of services, ranging from supporting the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants to the formation of stable governments, including through supporting election process, monitoring human rights, reforming institutional security apparatuses (such as the security forces, the judiciary, the prison system), as well as assisting with country development needs in health, education, among other areas.

The number of peace operations will also increase. After the Cold War ended, there was a rapid growth in peacekeeping operations, what was called the “second generation of operations”. With a new consensus, the Security Council authorized a total of 20 new operations between 1989 and 1994, raising the number of peacekeepers from 11,000 to 75,000. This second-generation involves civilian experts and not only soldiers to achieve multiple political and social objectives. Another difference is that soldiers in are often authorized to employ force for reasons other than self-defence including to protect civilians. Up to today, a total of 70 peacekeeping operations and were carried out by organisation out of which 13 remain operational today with around 110,000 military, police and civilian staff (see Annex III for a list of past and present peacekeeping operations).

In addition to the peacekeeping operations, the Security Council has also authorized special Political Missions which are engaged in conflict prevention, peace-making and post-conflict peacebuilding. In many contexts these missions are established during the negotiations of peace agreements supporting complex political transitions and later are replaced by peaceeking operations. In other contexts, they are established at the exit of peacekeeping overseeing longer-term peace-building activities. There have been 63 political missions established out of which 26 remain operational (see Annex IV for a detailed list of past political missions).

---

[23] United Nations (e). Democracy. 2020. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/democracy/index.html



Figure II – United Nations peacekeeping and political missions' presences in 2020[24]

Such operations, for example in Namibia, aimed at supporting the drafting of the new constitution and organizing the elections. Namibia became a democracy, even though some country's political movements for independence were, according to Paris (2001), aimed at establishing a socialist community. Nicaragua and El Salvador, too, were fundamentally impacted by the ideologies brought by the international assistance, even if such ideologies were not a tradition before their arrival. The case of Nicaragua, as highlighted by Paris (2001), is also significant, since its government had hitherto been opposed to a market-oriented economy.

---

[24] The map of figure II only covers world regions with peacekeeping and political missions. It is a copy of the one part of map developed by the United Nations, available at:: https://www.unmissions.org/

The United Nations involvement in democratization activities entails support to civil society, strengthening rule of law institutions and accountability mechanisms, and assisting in the drafting of new constitutions in post-conflict nations. Furthermore, the organization provides electoral assistance to approximately 60 countries each year, either at the request of Member States or based on a Security Council or General Assembly mandate (United Nations (e), 2020). The assistance includes advisory services, logistics, training, civic education, computer applications and short-term observation of electoral processes. It also includes capacity building of voters, media, political parties, civil society, as well as the parliament and the judiciary.

Although the United Nations Charter did not mention of the word democracy, and many of the Member States did not adopt democracy as a their political system in 1945; the opening words of the Charter “we, the people of the United Nations” reflects, as per the official discourses of the organization (United Nations (e), 2020), a fundamental principle of democracy, which means “that the will of the people is the source of legitimacy of sovereign states and therefore of the United Nations as a whole” (ibid).

The United Nations works to support democratic norms, but it is also structurally committed to the sovereign equality of States, which means that each State shall determine its system and model of government. This dual obligation to both independent states and democracy creates tension at the centre of the organization. This tension has been articulated and managed through the formulation of norms and policies that stipulates the role of the organization in this field. This includes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly in 1948, which states that “the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures”.

Another source of legitimacy of the organization work on democracy is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations General Assembly, 1966). In mid-2004, the Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented a report to the General Assembly on the United Nations' role in promoting the rule of law around the world. Annan urged Member States to "restore and expand the rule of law throughout the world," and pledged to make the rule of law a priority for the rest of its mandate (United Nations Secretary-General, 2004). The General Assembly and the former Commission on Human Rights in 2002 declared ten essential elements of democracy[25] and did the World Summit in 2005 (United Nations (e), 2020).

Given the intense debate surrounding democracy assistance, the United Nations Secretary-General developed an organization-wide strategy that further defined its approach on democracy in 2007. The Guidance provided a set of principles to be followed by the organization and areas of strategic focus. Other Guidance notes, including on the United Nations Approach to Rule of Law Assistance (United Nations Secretary-General, 2008), and on the United Nations Assistance to Constitution-making Processes (United Nations Secretary-General, 2009), provided the principles for engagement in constitution-making.

The United Nations study on common challenges facing States in their efforts to secure democracy and the rule of law found that democracy was being "challenged at the political, security and social levels, domestically and globally, by weak or dysfunctional institutions, the erosion of the rule of law, poor leadership, violence, sectarianism, radicalism, extremism, terrorism, intolerance, corruption and impunity" (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2012). It further recommended that democracy assistance should revolve around building States' capacities to undertake comprehensive reforms.

---

[25] Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; Freedom of association. Freedom of expression and opinion; Access to power and its exercise in accordance with the rule of law; holding of periodic free and fair elections by universal suffrage and by secret ballot as the expression of the will of the people; a pluralistic system of political parties and organizations; the separation of powers; independence of the judiciary; transparency and accountability in public administration; and free, independent and pluralistic media.

Whilst the United Nations leads international efforts on democratization (United Nations (e), 2020), other organizations have also integrated this endeavour. International financial institutions that, for a long time, have avoided engaging with democracy because they consider it a political object and, therefore, outside the scope of their work, began to do so, including the World Bank. The concepts of democracy-development-security are increasingly intertwined with each other and created a need for promoting security policies that protects populations in the face of the immense dangers that could affect their lives, such as violence, poverty, natural disasters and abusive governments.

The emergence of new political policy and programme in the international arena in a historical context of recent decolonization leads to perceive the discourse of democratization as a potent form of regulation and normalization of various aspects of social and political life in postcolonial countries. Such discourses prescribed a series of practices and forms of government deemed adequate to the performance of a "civilized" nation. The reform of security institutions in postcolonial countries, together with other global space securitization mechanisms, attested a demand for order and control. Democratization programs derive from political rationality that is firmly engaged in the constitution of states through the establishment of institutions that work in a predicted and regulated manner . The management of liberal democracy would thus forge nations with more measurable, foreseeable, and codifiable political systems for international scrutiny.

The post-September 11 attacks and expansion of international efforts on democratisation

The events of the twenty-first century only strengthened this role of the international community, regional organizations, bilateral partners in the assistance to rule of law and security programmes. Terrorist attacks September 11, 2001 helped convince conservatives that "peripheral" countries, lacking population control and surveillance institutions, pose a threat to Western security.

Shortly after the September 11 attacks, George W. Bush, in response to the incident, called the terrorists “enemies of freedom”: “tonight we are a country that has awakened to danger and has been called to defend freedom”. In asking Americans “why do they [terrorists] hate us?” Bush concludes: “they hate what we see right here in this chamber – a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms – our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and to associate and to disagree with each other.”

The United States support to the establishment of democracies (Scott, 2004) will become an increasingly important component of its foreign policy, after the end of the Vietnam War and the advance of the “third wave” of democratization (Huntington, 1991). It will reach its peak with the attacks on the twin towers. The “manifest destiny” of spreading its political-economic model to the rest of the world, to “make the world safe for democracy,” as Woodrow Wilson once said, embodies in this context the conviction that the United States interventionism are necessary for the preservation of freedom and security.

The triumph of liberal democracy was made possible through generation of fear of societies located in the global South and their representation as threat and their alternative political and security systems as illegitimate. The ideal of freedom on the political ground very often functions as an instrument of domination. Foucault's scepticism toward all the grand emancipation narratives demonstrates freedom is a technology of governing and controlling, because “the lights that discovered freedoms also invented disciplines” (1998: 183).

Similarly, for Prozorov (2007), the support to the establishment of Western democracies around the world found in the beginning of the twenty-first century is remarkable. The consensus on democracy is a consensus on freedom. Prozorov speaks of “fried freedom” to highlight the hypocritical logic that makes discourse against freedom “manifestly impossible” (2007: 31). According to the author, no contemporary political regime claims, in the self-conscious discourse, “not to be free,” even when the despotic nature of these regimes is evident to observers. Such discourses of freedom engender the “illusion of a perfect order” and for this reason are hard to debate and overcome. In the same vain, in “The Enemies of Democracy,” Todorov (2012) shows how democracy itself produces forces that threaten its basic principles. The threats to democracy do not come from the declared enemies, but rather from those who rightly defend democratic values.

In response to the September 11 attacks, democratization initiatives carried out in the 1990s will be perceived as insufficient. The international community felt unprotected. It has been realized that on a globalized planet inhabited by open societies, the danger is liquid and “security cannot be obtained, much less reliably guaranteed, in a single country or a group of countries; not by their means and not independent of the state of affairs in the rest of the world” (Bauman, 2008: 127). Dangers did no longer recognize borders, and to regulate States, interventions would be required, including by creating institutions capable of overseeing and acting more directly on the management of populations.

The relations of coloniality in these contexts of international assistance are guaranteed by science and the power-knowledge relations: foreign experts bring their security practices and institutions – created by superior knowledge – to social universes that are seen as lacking experience and valid models to overcome their social conflicts and establish security. These operations enable the formation of new dependency ties, which are highly hierarchical and based on the discrimination of local cultural practices.

If in the 1990s, the goal was to transform governments of postcolonial countries into democratic systems, after the attacks, the control and discipline of populations and the establishment of Western security apparatus, especially the police, became the primary aim of western interventionism; sovereignty will be reconceptualized in terms of the performance of a government in meeting democratic standards, produce normalized subjects e build spaces of order, security and vigilance.

The United Nations The constitution of an enemy in contexts of political instability shows us how the September 11 terrorist attack become useful discourse for the delineations of the new neo-colonial control programs (Zaffaroni, 1988). In many contexts, such programs will carry striking similarities with the old colonialism: they often remained run by foreign outsiders, using force and technologies to implement western political and economic models. In other contexts, however, efforts will be made to regulate the interference of dominant countries and ensure support in the areas of democracy, rule of law and security sector reform is guided by national ownership and respect for sovereignty. The United Nations will be led efforts in this regard.

2.2. The international approach to security sector reform

From state to human security: concept shift

The United Nations developed a comprehensive set of programmes to support its Member-States in establishing institutions considered essential to the prevention of conflicts and to the maintenance of international peace and security. One of its prominent endeavours, is the United Nations assistance to security sector reform, known by the acronym SSR. Born of the post-Cold War global "revival of the rule of law", security sector reform is based on the belief that democracy and its security institutions are essential to the prevention of conflicts and economic growth.

The emergence of the security sector reform agenda is associated with a drastic change in the way that the international community understand the concept of security at the end of the Cold War. For a long time, the concept of security had been closely associated with the defence of the state. The state-centred classical theory of international relations defined security as the protection of the state's territorial integrity and external sovereignty. The Report of the Commission on Global Governance in 1995, however, provided a radical different concept of security. It suggested that the "security extends beyond the protection of borders, ruling elites, and exclusive state interests to include the protection of people"

(Commission on Global Governance, 1995:78). The Commission noted that the security of people must be regarded as a goal as important as the security of state.

Until then, security was largely understood as the protection of the national territory and the military defence. The "national security", which refers to this traditional conception, was intrinsically associated with military organisms – especially after Second World War and the Cold War, when the "culture of national security" (Katzenstein, 1996) was reinvigorated.

But the debates on the national security reached a new political consensus at the end of the Cold War. An analysis from different fields will identify, for the first time, a range of non-military threats (Reveron; Mohaney-Norris, 2011). The existing security paradigm was considered inadequate to address these problems, and even though military security continued to be regarded as important, it was not sufficient to address wider threats, such as disease, poverty, immigration and crime.

Therefore, the concept of security, which was traditionally centred on the State, shifted to people and their well-being (Duffield, 2008, 2005; Macfarlane, 2006). The notion of security began to encompass the need for States to provide essential elements of survival, dignity and subsistence to their population. Security will be considered as an indispensable element for the exercise of fundamental human rights.

The traditional concept of national security was shifted to the concept of human security, which places people and their needs at the centre of government policies. This expansion of the concept of security aimed to include not only the protection of the population, but also the security of their economic and social well-being.

Amidst these developments, the concept security sector reform emerged in a speech by the Secretary of State at the British Department for International Development, Clare Short, in 1998 in a lecture at the Centre for Defence Studies in King's College London.

Ten years later, she recalled the motivations that led to the origins of the concept in the international arena:

> The Cold War was over. The international system had been thrown into disarray by the ending of 40 years of division between the West and the Communist world, which had shaped every division and conflict in the world. […] we needed to re-examine all the old assumptions and develop policy focused on helping end conflict and building competent state institutions that would encourage economic growth and human development in the poorest countries. […] Turning this understanding into a shift of policy across the UK government and the international system was going to be more difficult (Short, 2010:10).

Concerns over security threats were not limited to dominant nations but were part of the global discussions taking place at the United Nations, regional organizations but also in the global south. A series of speeches, documents and policies would start to emerge within the international community revealing the creation of a new consensus around the concept of security. The Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2000 stated that "once synonymous with defence of the territory from territorial attack, the requirement of security today come to embrace the protection of communities and individuals from internal violence" (United Nations Secretary-General, 2000).

The understanding that weak security institutions that cannot protect the State and the people are a source of conflict and threaten peace and stability, led the international community to recognize that the formation of strong security sectors is critical to prevent countries from relapsing into countries as well as to extending their legitimacy and authority:

> reforming the security sector in post-conflict environments is essential to the consolidation of peace and stability, promoting poverty reduction, rule of law and good governance, extending legitimate State authority, and preventing countries from relapsing into conflict, and further stressing that, in this regard, a professional, effective and accountable security sector and accessible and impartial law-enforcement and justice sectors are equally necessary to laying

> the foundations for peace and sustainable development (United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2151 of 2014).

This new rationality that emerges at the end of the Cold War recognizes the need for a “profound transition in thinking – from nuclear security to human security” (United Nations Development Programme, 1994: 22). Human security would be the best way to address global threats as its concept encompasses economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal safety, community safety and political security. For Amartya Sen, exponent of this conceptualization, the “simple recognition of the vulnerability of economic growth makes it imperative to see security as a central part of development” (Sen, 1999: 28). The United Nations norms and mandates on security sector reform will reflect the new consensus on the concept of security and integrate broader efforts to combat instability, terrorism, drug trafficking, and other emerging transnational crimes.

The postcolonial moment is also a fact to be considered in this context of the emergence of the concept of human security. Dominant western powers will begin to intervene more strategically in the newly sovereign nations, as their new governments were seeing as unprepared to address internal threats and therefore posed risks to their national and human security. While international liberalism sought to institutionalize specific ideologies of government, contemporary global governance will seek, in this context, the management of the life of the population through the implementation of biopolitical technologies (Dillon & Reid, 2001).

One of the practices to be exercised by the dominant countries, including through their international organizations, will be the reform of the security bodies of the peripheral countries to ensure that they behave in line with certain standards and more efficiently manage the delivery of security in line with the Western models of State.

The United Nations role in reforming national security sectors

The purpose of the United Nations in reforming security sectors of its member's governments was first articulated within the work of the Security Council. Its discussions on the role of the organization in assisting the reform of national security sectors often relied on the commitment of individual Member States – in particular of non-permanent members who took the opportunity of a two-year non-permanent membership in the Council, to propose an agenda for debates – and also the Secretariat, an international bureaucrat body which over the time have gained significant influence in the agenda of the organization by generating knowledge, promoting international norms, negotiating processes within and outside of the organization and implementing programmes.

A review of the Security Council meetings on the topic demonstrates conflict views among Member States on the role of the organization in this area and enables to capture the emergence of a political push in the international arena for nationally-owned security sector reforms programmes. Some countries presented a lot resistance to the idea of the United Nations interfering on national security institutions matters. Other countries saw the organization role in this area as central to limit, regulate and provide principles for growing bilateral foreign assistance on security to nations in the global south. Intervations by the Secretariat slowly articulated a concept of security sector reform that despites of its references to western-model of security, identified for the first time a strong need for countries to (re)build their security sector based on the formulation of their own vision of security grounded on their historical and cultural specificities. From the start of the Security Council discussion in 2005, it would take nine years to reach consensus and articulate the first stand-alone Resolution 2151 on security sector reform in 2014.

Under the initiative of Greece, as the monthly president of the Security Council, one of the first meetings concerned with security sector reform and other rule of law areas was convened in 2005 to discuss ways to prevent the re-emergence of humanitarian suffering and the potential recurrence of the conflict. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece stated that to prevent the re-emergence of humanitarian suffering and the potential recurrence of the conflict, “three key fields of post-conflict security had to be adequately addressed: the promotion of the rule of law; the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants; and security sector reform” (United Nations Security Council, 2005: 780). The Secretary-General at the same meeting noted that “Member States should recognize that whenever a particular State was unable or unwilling to protect its citizens against extreme violence, there was a collective responsibility for all States to do so, a responsibility that must be assumed by the Council” (ibid).

The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations stressed the need for “comprehensive national security review to identify the threats to State and human security and develop a security architecture that was responsive to identified risks”; and expressed concerns that “international approaches in support of security sector reform in post-conflict countries often applied foreign models and standards, which might be unsuitable in the light of the realities on the ground” (United Nations Security Council, 2005: 780).

In response, all members of the Council, including Canada, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Norway, Peru, Venezuela, and the United Kingdom on behalf of the European Union; made statements. While most speakers acknowledged the link between security and development and agreed that security sector reform was vital to address the fundamental causes of most conflicts, conflicting views were expressed. While recognizing the role of the Council in international peace and security, China also emphasized that the United Nations should respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries concerned. Venezuela said that the “responsibility to protect was rooted in the belief that the international community had the right to intervene in any Member State in a false rescue operation on behalf of the people supposedly afflicted by State repression”; and that:

> while peacekeeping operations were the responsibility of the Security Council and, on a subsidiary basis, the General Assembly, peacebuilding operations were exclusively the responsibility of the

> people of the country afflicted by conflict. The United Nations was obliged to respect the self-determination of peoples and therefore its sole task was to support the process through international cooperation and based on the parameters, norms and principles freely established by the people concerned (United Nations Security Council, 2005: 780).

Amidst diverged arguments, the Security Council was able to reach consensus and issued a statement that recognized security sector reform as “an essential element of any stabilization process in post-conflict environments”. Importantly, the Statement acknowledged “the need for more adequate preparation and coherent approaches by the United Nations and the international community” and that security sector reform deserved more attention in the future, considering best practices developed in this area (United Nations Security Council (b), 2005).

Two years later, security sector reform became the centre of the agenda of Slovakia’s presidency of the Security Council in February 2007, as one of its non-permanent members of the year. In preparation for its presidency, an expert workshop “Developing a Security Sector Reform” was held July 2006 in Bratislava (Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2006). The meeting was dominated by a broad consensus on the need to define the Council approach as well as the idea that security sector reform should be primarily implemented in developing countries and some African regions:

> United Nations Security Council should make a universal effort in the field of the security sector reform and define general principles and rules which would respect the specifics of individual countries. [….] In regard of the fact that the concept of the SSR should be primarily implemented in developing countries and some African regions may serve as the main recipients, organizations like the African Union or ECOWAS – organizations that were able to evolve proper initiatives or were capable of applying instruments and mechanisms allowing democratic control of the security sector – are addressed as the most important partners in Africa (Slovakia, 2006:46).

The Slovakians also agreed that they would be in a position to support the development of such concept by applying its own “transformation experience of the transition from a non-democratic model of the armed forces to a democratically controlled one” (Slovakia, 2006:46). Slovakia convened other dialogues on the security sector reform in New York on November and December 2006, including in collaboration with Netherlands, to initiate a process which would result in the elaboration of a common understanding among Member States on the United Nations role in the security sector (Slovakia and Netherlands, 2006).

In 2007, the Security Council held its first even open debate on security sector reform chaired by Slovakia on “the role of the Security Council in supporting security sector reform” (United Nations Security Council, 2007:784). With the support of the Secretariat, Slovakia presented a paper with suggestions for the definition of the organization’s role in the area. Most Council members expressed support for the paper’s emphasis on national ownership and an integrated, comprehensive, coordinated approach, acknowledging that a malfunctioning security sector posed a sophisticated threat to lasting peace, development and human rights. However, some members presented concerns, including Cuba, who spoking on behalf of the Non-Alignment Movement, to assert that the “lack of clarity in how to assess the ineffectiveness of the security sector could lead to arbitrary implementation and infringement upon the concept of sovereignty”. Cuba also noted “it was not the prerogative of the international community to prescribe the road that countries emerging from conflict should follow”; and warned that the “Council should not repeat the past mistake of attempting to impose reforms on the judicial and security sectors without the prior consent of the concerned State” (United Nations Security Council, 2007:784).

Similarly, Egypt “warned that controversial ideas linked to security sector reform, such as the responsibility to protect and human security, sought to utilize humanitarian concepts to codify interference in the internal affairs of States” (United Nations Security Council, 2007:785). Echoed by Honduras, Egypt further called for a debate also in General

Assembly to reach consensus on the objective of security sector reform, and then the "Security Council could then discuss its limited role in supporting the national will of States to reform their own security sectors, only in areas affecting the maintenance of international peace and security" (ibid).

Building on the suggestions of Security Council members, Slovakia made a statement on behalf of the Council, by which it acknowledged the need to identify core security sector reform functions that the United Nations system can perform, and requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report with concrete recommendations on the identification, prioritisation and sequencing of United Nations support with emphasis on post-conflict environments (United Nations Security Council (b), 2007).

On the same year, Member States supportive of the agenda established an informal "Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform", which under the leadership of Slovakia, provided political support to the advancement of the agenda. In parallel, within the Secretariat, the Secretary-General approved an internal Policy Committee decision on security sector reform which dedicated resources and staff as to support advancing the Council recommendations. This would lead to the establishment of a dedicated Secretariat office, the Security Sector Reform Unit, within the Department of Peace Operations in 2009 to provide secretariat for the Inter-Agency SSR Task-Force formed by United Nations 14 entities engaged in the field; and the creation of a global roster of security sector reform experts in 2010. Other specialized capacities for security sector reform were also to be established at field levels over the time as part of the Security Council mandates of peace operations.

In response to the Council's request, the Secretary-General with the assistant of the Secretariat produced a Report on "Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform" (2008). The report was presented at the second Council open debate on security sector reform chaired by the United Kingdom. The report defined for the first time the United Nations concept of security sector reform as a:

> process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law (United Nations Secretary-General (b), 2008).

The concerns over the organization's interference in countries sovereignty was addressed in the report which recognized that Member States are the "primary providers of security" and that the task of the United Nations is to support national actors in achieving their security, peace and development goals based on the principle of "national ownership". The report found that a number of the Secretariat entities, United Nations agencies had been engaged in security sector reform for decades in collaboration with international and regional organizations. Despite the Organization's extensive experience in assisting national actors to enhance or re-establish security, such support had been pursued as an ad hoc undertaking, hampered by lack of "common principles and standards, a system-wide approach, requisite resources and, in some cases, capacities to deliver effective support to national authorities" (United Nations Secretary-General (b), 2008:7).

The report also conceptualized for the first time the term "security sector", which includes a set of structures, institutions and state and non-state actors responsible for management and delivery in a country. It also encompasses the defence sector, the legislature, the judiciary, the penitentiary, the intelligence services, and the institutions responsible for border security, customs and civilian emergency services. Non-State security actors, such as the media, traditional groups and civil society organizations, are also part of the sector and considered to play an essential role in the provision of oversight to the security institutions (United Nations Secretary-General (b), 2008:7).

The report also articulated common features of effective and accountable security sectors:

> (a) A legal and/or constitutional framework providing for the legitimate and accountable use of force in accordance with universally accepted human rights norms and standards, including sanctioning mechanisms for the use of force and setting out the roles and responsibilities of different actors;
>
> (b) An institutionalized system of governance and management: mechanisms for the direction and oversight of security provided by authorities and institutions, including systems for financial management and review as well as the protection of human rights;
>
> (c) Capacities: structures, personnel, equipment and resources to provide effective security;
>
> (d) Mechanisms for interaction among security actors: establishing transparent modalities for coordination and cooperation among different actors, based on their respective constitutional/legal roles and responsibilities;
>
> (e) Culture of service: promoting unity, integrity, discipline, impartiality and respect for human rights among security actors and shaping the manner in which they carry out their duties (United Nations, 2008)

The concept advanced the notion of human security by demonstrating that security goes beyond traditional military elements and involves a much more comprehensive range of national and international institutions and actors, including an institutionalized system of governance and management. However, as the first global attempt to define common elements of countries security sectors, the concept was heavily influenced by Westphalia-model of the national state. It also carried a stated-centred approach that did not fully consider non-state actors and traditional mechanisms of security common in many global south countries.

Through this model, the security sector would fit into the liberal rationale of the social contract, through which a State would have the structures, personnel, equipment and resources provide effective security to the people and its borders. Beyond its conceptual limitations, the countries which had those apparatus – which were very expensive to maintain – were majority from the West. Many post-colonial countries, for example, inherited a fraction of those apparatus from the colonial powers and their institutions severely suffered from a number of pro-authoritarian interventions during and after the Second World War.

In 2011, the Secretariat took further steps to institutionalize its support to the reform of the security of the Member States, including by developing a human rights due to diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces (United Nations, 2011c); and the United Nations policy on Defence Sector Reform in 2011. The policy, which applies to all staff of the United Nations, describes the elements and parameters of the Organization's support to nationally led reform processes, including by identifying principles, core tasks, and limitations and constraints (United Nations, 2011)

In 2011, Nigeria took the lead in its capacity of President of the Council to push the agenda on security sector reform, with the assistance of the Security Sector Reform Unit. After convening a forum in collaboration with South Africa on African Perspectives on SSR (Nigeria; South Africa, 2010), Nigeria lead a Security Council open debate to assess United Nations efforts on security sector reform. Among the nearly 30 speakers to participate in the discussion[26] and the main points expressed by them at the time were around the effectiveness of the organization in assisting countries in reforming the security sector; as well as the recognition that the assistance in the area of security sector reform takes place in and is directed to countries in Africa.

---

[26] including China, Germany, Russian Federation, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Portugal, Brazil, France, Lebanon, Colombia, United Kingdom, South Africa, Gabon, Morocco, Canada, Slovakia, Finland (also on behalf of Nordic countries, Luxembourg, Italy, Slovenia, Sudan, Egypt (also on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement), Pakistan and Australia.

African Member States emphasised that the focus of the organization's peace operations in the region should be to ensure that perspectives of the countries concerns were better included in the concepts and mandates approved by the Council. The Secretariat at that time was already undertaking numerous attempts to strengthen the leading role of the Africa Union on security sector reform in the continent, including by assisting the organization in developing its first Policy on Security Sector Reform and establish a dedicated office. At the meeting, Nigeria emphasised the need "to expand the consideration given to African perspectives on security sector reform" (United Nations Security Council, 2011)

The discussions were also dominated by concerns around the effectiveness of the organization in assisting countries in reforming the security sector. India noted with the tendency in the Council to shorten mission mandates before domestic institutions were fully capable of assuming their role – risked relapse into conflict (United Nations Security Council, 2011). The Presidential Statement that follows recognized the United Nations assistance to security sector reform is a long-term endeavour, requires more inclusion of African perspectives as well as that recipient countries in taking the lead in security sector reform efforts. This includes enhancing cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, as well as sharing knowledge and experience with women and members of civil society. The Council, through Nigeria, also requested the Secretary-General to submit, by early 2013, an assessment of the United Nations support for security sector reform, including those efforts in Africa. It noted that had been five years since the publication of the first Secretary-General report on the matter, and there would be a need to review the status of assistance and strengthened the organization approach.

Concerned with the effectiveness of its assistance, in 2012, the Security Sector Reform Unit developed and launched an Integrated Technical Guidance Note on security sector reform providing advice to the Secretariat staff in field and headquarters on how to advance the reforms in several areas and conflict settings and interact with host-States (United Nations Inter-Agency SSR Task-Force, 2012). In 2013, the Unit also led preparation of the

Second Report of the Secretary-General presented to the Council, which reviewed the United Nations support and included recommendations on how best to strengthen the Organization's comprehensive approach in this area, according to the statement by the President of the Security Council in 2011. The report concluded that the organization had made progress in addressing the priorities identified in its first Secretary-General Report in 2008, including the development of technical guidance, establishment of capacities, and facilitation of coordination and partnerships with regional and subregional organizations, Member States forums, and civil society (United Nations Secretary General, 2013).

To implement the operational roles outlined in the report of 2008, dedicated security sector reform teams in peacekeeping operations and special political missions were established, with an increase from 3 in 2007 to 11 in 2012. This number however does not consider the tailored missions mandated directly from the Member States, including from in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, South Sudan and Timor-Leste (United Nations Secretary General, 2013).

The report recognized numerous challenges in implementing reforms including the limited national ownership by the host states and recommended that mandates more visibly incorporate the perspectives of the countries subjected to reforms under consideration:

> A key challenge for operationalizing national ownership is ensuring that security sector reform processes reflect the host Government's primary role, including with regard to the allocation of national resources to the reform process, while promoting inclusiveness. From the perspective of the United Nations, it may mean taking additional steps to ensure that Security Council mandates more visibly incorporate the perspectives of the countries under consideration (United Nations Secretary General, 2013:18).

The report also recognized the relevance of non-state actors for the security sector; but acknowledged that the organization does not, yet, see how best to engage them: "there is a need to better understand and address their role in the provision of security and in security sector reform more broadly" (United Nations Secretary General, 2013:21). It stressed the ambivalent relationship that traditional and informal groups continue to have with modern statutory institutions – which in practice meant the State formed by the colonial powers. In many contexts, they play a role that traditional and informal groups have in delivering security, but in others the Report noted that "can undermine security, contribute to human rights violations, and challenge the role and responsibility of the State" (ibid:5). For such recommendations to be operationalized, the United Nations would have to move beyond supporting mainly formal authorities to engage with civil society and informal justice and security providers.

Between 2008-2013, the Security Council endorsed around 64 country-specific mandates that referenced security sector reform, with particular focus on police and military reform, and from 2010, mandates better lined the security sector reform with peacekeeping and peacebuilding (United Nations Security Council, 2019). At the same time, the Council increasingly starts calling upon countries to reform their security sector while stressing "the importance of increasing, in a comprehensive framework, the functionality, professionalism and accountability of the security sector", as in Afghanistan (United Nations Security Council, 2009).

Beginning in 2011, security sector reform starts to be affiliated with the needs of women, the "protection of civilians" and to the "protection of humanitarian and United Nations personnel". In 2012 security sector reform is referred for the mandate in Democratic Republic of Congo to as "the primary focus within the stabilization and peace consolidation mandate" of the Mission (United Nations Security Council, 2012). These resolutions largely focused on African countries, including but not limited to, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Guinea-Bissau, Burundi, Cote d' Ivoire, Liberia and Mali. It also included Yemen, Timor Leste and Afghanistan.

Similar discourses patterns were identified in the presidential statements. In 2008, security sector reform was is presented as being "an essential element of any stabilization and reconstruction process in post-conflict environments [and that] the establishment of an effective, professional and accountable security sector is one of the necessary elements for laying the foundations for peace and sustainable development" (United Nations Security Council, 2008). At the same time, most of the references quote the police or the armed forces as main elements of security sector reform mandates. In 2009 and 2010 the references to security sector reform dealt mostly with peacebuilding issues. Moreover, national authorities were increasingly urged to take responsibility for the "restoring the rule of law, revitalizing the economy, reforming the security sector, providing basic services and other key peacebuilding need" (United Nations Security Council, 2007). In 2011, security sector reform is quoted as being one of the most important elements for "a comprehensive strategy to encourage the establishment of peace and stability" (United Nations Security Council, 2011).

The Security Council Resolution 2151 (2014) on security sector reform

Building on the past resolutions, in 2014, the Security Council found enough consensus to adopt the Resolution 2151, the first stand-alone resolution on security sector reform, explicitly affirming what was already widely accepted in the international community: that security sector reform was an central pillar of the global peace-building and state-building agendas. The concept note circulated by Nigeria ahead of the meeting highlights how the United Nations has faced challenges in securing national authorities' (including transitional entities) commitment to reforms; the resolution however recognized sovereign right and the primary responsibility of the states concerned to determine their respective national approaches and priorities for the security sector. The resolution was also voted by the General Assembly and provided the legal framework binding by the Council on the United Nations roles and methods of assisting countries in reforming security institutions (United Nations Security Council, 2014).

The resolution articulated some main imperatives of the security sector reform processes, concepts and meanings that will be increasingly repeated as part of the organization language:

- Security sector reform is political, as it helps countries to transform the basic relationship between the State and the individuals and communities.
- Security sector reform is context-specific: and there is a need to address the balance between a global approach, and country-specific needs. Regional actors may act as a bridge, including by bringing knowledge, cultural understanding and appropriate technical know-how to specific situations.
- Security sector reform is a long-term and dynamic process. United Nations has a role to play in helping to build norms and standards. In supporting long-term transformation of institutions, processes and ways of thinking, however, regional actors have a particularly significant contribution to make.
- Regional organizations help create the environment in which a country defines its security needs. A stable region, where security threats and challenges are collectively addressed, is a sine qua non for national security.

Since the launching of the resolution on security sector reform in 2014, the model of security sector reform based on principles of national ownership, coordination and governance became a standard state-building policy and practice form of assistance of international partners**.** Several departments, agencies and programmes carry out these activities and addressing capacity as well as governance dimensions of security sector reform. In addition to United Nations actors, other external actors engaged in security sector reform activities include bilateral donors, regional organizations, International Financial Institutions, humanitarian and private security companies.

A close review of the Security Council mandates one year after the Resolution 2151, demonstrate that the Council agreed on seventeen new mission mandates in global south countries authorizing the United Nations Secretariat to deploy and support the reform of the security sector (United Nations Security Council, 2019). These mandates requested its secretariat to undertake several initiatives, such as promotion of national dialogue, enhancing civilian oversight and public financial management (Libya, Somalia), security sector governance, police reform, prison reform, defence sector reform (Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya), capacity building, establishment of national security coordination mechanisms (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, Mali, Somalia) to more context-specific areas such as border management (Mali) or maritime security (Somalia) as well as cross-cutting issues, such as gender mainstreaming in the security sector.

In practice, security sector reform has been applied within peace operations or even in the form of global assistance, with a focus on the technical elements of security, building of central security institutions to the rule of law, such as the police, army, immigration, prisons and the judiciary. Its implementation has been in many contexts presented as a requirement for the withdrawn of the peacekeeping missions from the ground – including in Liberia, Haiti, Somalia to name a few – which means that only when countries have established security institutions capable of carrying out security for their population and State on their own.

In the present day, there are currently twelve field presences of the United Nations with the mandate to reform security sector both at the political, peacekeeping and peacebuilding type of interventions. As per the Council mandates, key peacekeeping missions are mandated to advanced security sector reforms, this includes United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, which supports the Government of Mali and the signatory armed movements to implement the defence and security provisions of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali; United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, which provides strategic advice to the Central Africa Republic authorities on the design and implementation of a comprehensive and gender-responsive security sector reform process that reinforces the peace process.

It also includes the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, which supports the signatory parties to broke consensus on the implementation of the defence and security provisions of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan; as well as United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, that coordinates international assistance provided to the security sector by bilateral and multilateral partners.

In political missions, the Council mandated Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to Yemen to supports the mediation efforts to advance the ceasefire agreement in Hudaydah and to build consensus among the parties on options for transitional security arrangements. United Nations Support Mission in Libya supports the mediation of ceasefire and security arrangements as well as the integration of armed groups into the state-controlled security forces. United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia supports the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States to implement the Somali Security Transition Plan and the National Security Architecture.

Also, United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel and United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq have the mandate to support implement reforms in the national security sectors. The resolutions usually are mandated for a period of the months to one year, upon the time that the Council will review the mandate again and decide whether to renew or terminate.

Chapter III

Securing Liberia, building its State: practices of reform, control and resistance

> *Liberians today face a critical choice: continue to accept history as filtered through the lenses of others or, as much as possible, employ a framework rooted in the perspective of their ancestors (Burrowes, 2016:20).*

3.1. From the Upper Guinea Coast to the creation of Liberia

Before Liberia there was the Upper Guinea Coast

When the indigenous groups that inhabited Liberia in the southwest corner of West Coast of Africa – traditionally known as *Upper Guinea Coast*[27] – were confronted with the unexpected arrival of the Europeans in 1461, their population was completing approximately six thousand years of history and constituted a vibrant society formed by a diverse number of ethnic groups. Their ancestors left the northern part of Africa due to climate changes around the Niger river and the rise and fall of African empires, including the Ghana Empire (800-1240), the Soso Kingdom (1200-1235), and the Mali Empire (1240 to 1464).

---

[27] The notion of "Upper Guinea Coast" refers to the littoral of the Western African region, covering partially or entirely the territories of Gambia, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cape Verde, as understood by the influential work of the Guaynese historian Walter Rodney (1942 – 1980) in "A History of Upper Guinea Coast 1945-1800" (1970). Rodney was a prominent Pan-Africanist and his most influential book is How Europe Undeveloped Africa (1972).

The Upper Guinea Coast societies were an integral part of the earliest known trade networks of West Africa, supplying kola nuts, malagueta, salt, and iron. The region was notorious for its ecological diversity, including the different rainfall patterns[28], along with the different topographies and vegetation (Brooks, 1985), which significantly influenced the formation of its social groups and political structures, trade patterns, migration practices, and security and defence strategies (Knoor and Trajano Filho, 2010).

Rather than being shaped by dominant ethnic line or cultural identity, the Upper Guinea Coast society was formed by encounters, disruptions, and alignments of different ethnic groups, each of them “woven like fabric, out of many threads” (Burrowes, 2016:385). Over the time, they formulated a diverse set of languages, including the Bandi, Bassa, Gio, Dei, Glebo (also called Grebo), Gola, Kpelle, Klao, Belle, Loma, Mano, Mandingo, Mende, Vai, and Wee (also called Krahan and Sapo), which today represent the sixteen ethnic groups of Liberia)[29].

> The Wee, Glebo and Klao resulted from the blending of various Kru-speaking groups. The Mende emerged from the mixing of southwest Mende and the northern Mende. The Loma acknowledge that there are a blend of southweast Manmdae and some Kissin ancestry. The Kpelle and Ma are a fusion of Mande and Kru speakers, with some komo as well (Burrowes, 2016:385)

Regardless of language differences, these groups were associated by many common cultural practices and were considered geographically and ethnically as single entity, including by the Europeans who traded there under this first phase of colonialism (Rodney, 1980). They were mainly brought together by the Poro, and Sande social traditions, which embodied a series of rituals practiced across all ethnic groups as means of defence of their local and cultural identifies (Burrowes, 2016:385). The Poro and the Sande were the first power associations responsible for providing hierarchy to the spiritual and physical dimensions among the ethnic groups in the Upper Guinea Coast (Harley, 1950). They encompassed rites of passage through which children's attachment to nuclear families were expanded to communities and elders from across lineages. These practices enabled intermarriages and higher education in the field of defence and trade, which protected those communities from the encroachment of empires that arose in the Sahel in the eighth century (Little, 1965).

---

[28] A long dry period from 1110 to 1500, a short-wet period from 1500 to 1630, and another dry period from 1630 to 1860 (Brooks, 1985).

[29] Linguistics have agreed that all African languages commonly spoken in Liberia belong to the Niger-Congo family and grouped them into four clusters: Atlantic (Gola and Kissi), Kru (Bassa, Dei, Glebo, Khao, Kuwaa, Wee), Northern Mande (Mandingo, Vai) and Southwest Mande (Bandi, Dan, Kpelle, Loma, Mando, Mende).

The Upper Guinea Coast had a long-standing relationship with Mediterranean and Arab societies. Its society was primarily influenced and dictated by the Niger traders and empires, including the Ghana, Mali, and Soso Empires, as previously mentioned, but also the Yoruba Empire (twelve to the eighteen century), Wolof Empire (1350-1549), Songhai Empire (1464-1591) and the Ashanti Kingdom (1670 to 1957)[30]

At the time of the arrival of the European explorers in the mid-1400s, the population of Upper Guinea Coast was undergoing through a process of assimilating, resisting and accommodating different waves of expansion of Mande-speaking groups, who had left the Niger River due to the dry climate and political instability of the Sudanese states during the thirteenth century (Knoor and Trajano Filho, 2010). As part of a process of reciprocal assimilation, Mande-speaking groups had merged the state structures prevalent in the Sudanese states with the political culture found among the people of the Upper Guinea Coast (ibid).

Just as these movements and encounters between the Mande and other Upper Guinea Coast groups were progressing, the Portuguese Pedro de Cintra arrived in the Upper

---

[30] Just as a notion of Egypt as a non-African civilization was articulated by the Europeans when they found in African land the most advanced ancient artefacts, the discovery of the remanences of these empires – including the Arabic manuscripts – at the heart of black Africa challenged the eurocentric conceptions of white supremacy. The credit for those magnificent splendours of the African civilization was then assigned to outsiders or to the presence of the “Hamitics”, a group of blacks regarded by the Europeans as superior to the rest.

Guinea Coast on 15 August 1461 (Huberich, 1947)[31]. Their arrival caused a substantial change in the social configuration of the region. It affected the coastal groups participation in the newly formed political structures of the Mande. Europeans interfered with interior trade networks, generating a number of conflicts between and within societies of the Upper Guinea Coast. It also weakened their ties with the Niger traders in the north and contributed to the collapse of the Malian empire by overturning regional trades and relations of power that were century old. As noted by Knoor and Trajano Filho, the arrival of the Europeans deteriorated the Upper Guinea Coast's traditional conflict resolution mechanisms based on Mande and West African values and institutions: "the European military technologies and commercial interests influenced regional warfare patterns, which were often associated with the new demand for slaves in the New World" (2010:5).

The monopoly of the Upper Guinea Coast trade remained Portuguese for a century. Between 1498 and 1514, about 77 tons of spice were exported from this region to Europe. Gold exports increased from 20,000 in 1449 to 170,000 in 1505, when gold shipments leaving the region reached $68 million per year (Burrowes, 2016: 190). By 1600, the Dutch also expanded their forts and trading posts in the Upper Guinea Coast region (Burrowes, 2016). In an analysis of the Dutch and Portuguese enterprise in Western Africa, Silva (2009) notes that their main characteristic constituted in the building of institutions, which were key to shaping these empires throughout the centuries. In her view, the institutions implemented in the Atlantic Empires were transferred from Europe and, therefore, followed models and goals aimed at the mercantilism and slavery.

Followed by the Portuguese and the Dutch, the English and the French sea-merchants also began to turn their attention to Upper Guinea Coast. But they tended to avoid the Liberian coast for two centuries thanks to the Kru. As explained by Davidson (1985), the Kru became valued as loaders and boat pilots for European captains. But they refused to deal with slaves, the commodity that the European sea-merchants wanted most of all. More than that, the Kru bought guns with the money they earned and used these to defend themselves against slave-raiders. They served as the first local army and were divided into the Bandama River and the Guerin regions, in the seaside of what afterward became Liberia. More fortunate than their western neighbours, the Vai, who tried the same tactics of defence but were eventually driven into the slave trade as a means of getting the guns they needed (Davidson, 1985).

---

[31] Other Portuguese colonizers that came after Pedro Cintra named locations which remain in today's Liberia: Grand Cape Mount, Cape Mesurado (Montserrado), and Cape Palmas.

The return of the freed slaves to Africa and the formation of Liberia

In the eighteen century, the United States support for abolishing slavery began to grow, and the idea of repatriating freed African-American slaves to the continent of their heritage also gathered place. The Haitian Revolution in 1804 raised concerns of the United States government of that time regarding the political situation and potential rebellion of the freed slaves in their territory (Trouillot, 1990). In response, the American Colonization Society was formed in 1817 in the United States to support churches, abolitionist groups, and state legislatures (Dwalu, 1995). In 1820, the Society settled in Liberia after crossing the Atlantic Ocean on the ship Elizabeth. After holding talks with the kings of those areas, who finally agreed to sell the land, they sold Montserrado area and later sold the Bassa (Ciment, 2013).

The indigenous people quickly understood the presence of the American Colonization Society as a practice of colonization. From 1822 to 1839, they named the land as Liberia and established a government composed of a colonial council; an executive branch; and the judiciary (Aido, 2016). Besides the settlement of Montserrado, there were other settlements around the area founded by some smaller organizations to return freed slaves from Africa. The arrival of more groups provoked tensions between the Americo-Liberians, and the Vai, Dei and Manda groups decided to resist the intervention but lost after days of conflict (Ciment, 2013).

In 1839, the American Colonization Society and other smaller organizations decided to form the Commonwealth of Liberia (Ciment, 2013). The Europeans' constant threat of control led the Commonwealth to declare independence in 1845, making Liberia the first independent republic of Africa. The regime that will start from there represented the rational that brought many of the Americo-Liberians to Africa. They sought to recreate a bipolar society based on ethnicity and class – not too different from the one they left. They referred to themselves as Americans and were recognized as such. They also recreated the symbols and institutions of the American state. (Liebenow, 1987)

The Native-Liberians had however a different form to solve its conflicts then through the institutions brought by the Americo-Liberians. The Poro and Sande Universities continued to play a central role in the organization of communities by providing education, training, ethics and initiation of youth into adulthood. Their primary functions involved instilling consciousness against committing an offence against the 'birth-land", with notions such as "property as communal and that fruits from the earth belong equally to all and cannot be sold" " (Malakpa et al, 2012). In their curriculum are social and political knowledge of oral history, communal work, but also all the most advantage knowledge of the chiefs in terms military combat, diplomacy, healing, sexual education, economy based on cardinal ideas of law, justice, harmony, balance, respect and human dignity to all. (Malakpa et al, 2012). The "witch-doctors", for instance, were responsible to detect and prevent crime and bring offenders to justice, through methods less barbarous, including the trance[32] which is a familiar phenomenon among Liberian people. "Doctor induce it in themselves, in others, by means known to those who are trained in this area, which gives the doctors invulnerability, superhuman strength, and the power to know and see things withheld from the ordinary mind" (Malakpa et al, 2012)

---

[32] Malakpa et al (2012:123) explains that "trance occurs when the person's spirit leaves his body and travels off into the realm of the spirits by possession, but also by the ghosts of the dead relatives, friends, or the relative or friend of someone seeking intervention". In this state, the possessing spirits enable the person to speak using different language and to prophesy.

The formation of the Americo-Liberians Government went through several economic challenges and constituted over the majority of the Native-Liberians' exploitation. Despite this relationship and being rich with culture, gold, diamonds, arable land, and iron, the country ruled by Americo-Liberians would become one of the most economically polarized nations on earth, ravaged by decades of authoritarian rulers and rampant corruption (Ciment, 2013).

Over the first century of the building of the Liberian State, Liberia evolved from "exile democracy," a democracy among the settlers, but with no participation from the other ethnic group, to an "exile oligarchy", when the settlers slowly assimilated some members of the indigenous groups (Gillfort, 2002). The main political party in the country, the True Whig Party, controlled the pollical alliances and decisions over natural resources. As one of the founders of the Organisation of African Unity, William Tubman, in 1944, emerged as president associated mainly with the conservative faction of the pan-Africanism movement that took timid steps to unify "the country people" of the interior and the Americo-Liberians (Gillfort, 2002).

The country also developed as a stronghold for American corporations, a strategic outpost for the American military, and a beneficiary of American aid. He also straightened the relationship with the United States through the signature of the Defense Pact, which gave the United States access to Liberian territory for the transports of soldiers and war supplies during the Second World War, in exchange for the construction of key infrastructures across the country (Piot, 2010). Liberia similarly declared war against Germany and Japan in 1944. After the war, Liberia also strongly resisted the Soviet expansion in exchange for foreign investment.

In 1971, the death of Tubman brought Willian Tolbert to the presidency. He strove for a more non-aligned politics to reduce the country depends on the United States and established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and Eastern bloc countries. After 27 years of Tubman rule and suppression, the arrival if Tubman brought hopes to the Liberian people amid a continent coping with the problems of underdevelopment, political paralysis, and military interventions (Fahnbulleh. 2003).

As the years passed, the Liberia population started becoming extremely frustrated with the low distribution of country resources, lack of employment, and the division among the Americo-Liberian and the African Liberians also influenced the formation of social movements, notably the Movement for Justice in Africa, which emerged as a grassroots movement for social and economic involvement.

To discourage rice importation and make Liberia “rice self-sufficient,” Tolbert significantly increased their prices back home, provoking massive demonstrations in Monrovia's “rice riots.” The government asked the military and the police to react by force, and while many refused to fire into the crowds, others shot and killed many of the protesters (Ellis, 1999). The protests deepened frictions and grievances within the Liberian society. For most Native-Liberians, it was clear that the rule of the colonial and racist political elite should be terminated.

3.2. The Liberians civil wars and the politization of the security forces

The raise of the Krahn and the ethnicization of the army

> *It was on 12 April 1980, at seven o'clock in the morning, that we heard over the radio that there had been a coup. The streets of Logan Town were crowded with people singing and dancing, happy people who stripped off their clothes out of sheer joy. There were Krahn living in our community people from Doe's own population group. They were happy that their son had come to power. Everyone was happy (Seroo, Didier; Woods, Samuel, 2014)*[33]

In 1980, a group of native-born Africans Liberians led by Samuel K. Doe entered the presidential residence and assassinated President Tolbert. While western news narrated the event as the rise of a "lower-rank and barely literate soldiers" who cut "the liver and heart out of President Tolbert and ritually mutilated them, leaving teeth marks on the flesh" (Timmerman, 2013:305), the majority of African Liberians who until then have been politically and economically marginalized took over the streets to celebrate what was the end of the 133 years of Americo-Liberian rule and the beginning of the second republic led by the "indigenous" Liberians.

Tumber's assassination was followed by the public execution of 13 high-ranking members of his administration in a beach near the Barclay Training Center of the Armed Forces of Liberia in Monrovia (Adebajo, 2002). Their bodies were tied to posts with their backs to the Atlantic shore on which their 19th-century Americo-Liberians ancestors first set foot. Only four members of his administration survived the coup, among them was the Minister of Finance and future president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf.

---

[33] Samuel Kofi Woods (b. 1964) is Liberia's leading human rights activist journalist, politician and academic. In 1994, he founded the Forefront Organization, which documented human rights abuses during the civil war. The section is a part of an interview given by him to Didier Seroo in 2000.

Once in power, the soldiers established the People's Redemption Council and asked all Americo-Liberians holding public office positions to leave government. Sawyer (1987) described Doe's government as a mix of unusual alliances formed by illiterate soldiers of the People's Redemption Council, who had the real power, and the civilians from the Movement for Justice in Africa, People's Progressive Party and technocrats from the old regime.

At a press conference before the executions, Doe said:

> The revolution which brought down the Tolbert government was motivated by the sufferings of the Liberia people throughout our country. Things were fixed in such a way that only a very few people enjoyed everything. […] The judiciary was a mockery in many instances because cases were determined by how much money one could offer. […] The armed forces have taken over the government to recover from their long years of suffering and when things begin to get on the right track, we, the men and women in arms, will return to the barracks where we belong (Leon, Washington Post, 1980).

The commitment to not repeat the oppression of the past and return to civilian rule soon brooked apart. Similarly, with other dictators across the continent (Mbembe 2001), Doe implemented the same technologies of control from the former government: oppressing different political views and dividing the society by the ethnic line. Pressures to the return of civilian rule led Doe to establish a commission of intellectuals[34] to write a new constitution. After modifying some of its provisions, Doe launched a more restrictive version in 1984. Ahead of the 1985 general election, he established the National Democratic Party of Liberia to run against the Liberian Action Party, headed by the former education Minister of Tolbert. Doe won the elections with 50.93% of the vote amid allegations of extensive irregularities and election fraud (Gillfort, 2002)

---

[34] Amos Sawyer (1945-), at the time Dean of the College of Social Sciences and Humanities at the University of Liberia, led the Commission. He later will serve as the President of the Interim Government of National Unity from 1990 to 1994. He was also the chairman of the Governance Commission established by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2003.

Doe's was brought to power by different ethnic groups, including Krahn, Gio and Kru. But grew suspicious and attempt of coups against him led to the removal of the Gios and Manos from the army. He increasingly appointed members of his ethnic group, the Krahns, and the Mandigo to the government positions (Gillfort, 2002). Adebajo (2002) describes the ethnicization of the Liberian army as an attempt of Doe to place the Krans at the top of the political system. Ellis (1999) will also add that at the time of Doe's rise to power, the Krahn composed only about 5 percent of all Liberians and had a reputation for being rather a marginal group, having had little opportunity for higher education,

Doe's systematic promotion of ethnic Krahn's drove deepening divisions within the Armed Forces of Liberia, particularly with his main allied, from the Gio ethnic group, Quiwonkpa. As a key member of the group that led the coup against Tumber, Quiwonkpa was the co-chair of the People's Redemption Council. The junta started to split in 1983, and the camps of the army were divided between the Krahn and Gio. Quiwonkpa fled into exile along with his assistant Prince Johnson - who was a Gio and would later become a vital leader of the civil war and today remains in Liberia's politics[35]. Quiwonkpa later returned in 1985 and, after a failed coup, the Nimba county, home of the Gio, would be excluded from the Liberian government (Ellis, 1999).

The Doe regime provides a concrete example of United States imperialism in Liberia at the time of the Cold War when the Regan administration intensified the control over the West Africa region to contain the Soviet and Libya expansion (Piot, 2010). During Doe's first five years in office, the total US assistance to Liberia exceeded complete US assistance to Liberia between the 1820s and 1979 (Copley 2006: 1168). It went from 11 million in 1979 to 72 million in 1982, when the country became the largest American aid recipient in Sub-Saharan Africa (United States CIA, 1982).

Out of 72 million, 15.8 percent was allocated to military assistance, including training and equipment to the soldiers that formed the cadres of Doe's security. Doe made used of those military resources to undertake arbitrary arrests of intellectuals, torture of students from the University of Liberia and dismantle the opposition, in particular the Gios and the Manos from the Nimba county (Copley 2006).

---

[35] Prince Johnson (born 6 July 1952) is a Liberian politician and the current Senator from the Nimba County.

Against that reality, Doe's popularity with the Liberians decreased massively. Economy collapsed, and State violence became the primary political tool for keeping Doe and the military in power. After about ten years of brutal authoritarianism under the mask of democratizing state, Liberia experienced another turning point in its political history. The National Patriotic Front of Liberia, under the leadership of the half-Gola and half-Americo-Liberian Charles G. Taylor, gained force and ignited one of the most devastating civil wars in African history.

Disputes for power and control in the Liberian civil wars

Taylor was a former government official of Doe's administration. In 1983, he was forced into exile after being accused by Doe of misappropriating government funds. Found and arrested in the United States in 1984, he mysterious escaped from prison in 1985 and returned to West Africa to gather support to topple the Doe government. Taylor visited Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Libya from whom he gained financial, political, and military assistance to attacked Liberia from its border with Cote d'Ivoire on 24 December 1989 (Adebajo, 2002), initiating the First Liberia Civil War that would last until 1997.

With around 100 National Patriotic Front of Liberia followers, in July 1990, seven months after entering Liberia, Taylor gained the support of several Liberians in Nimba county, most of the Gio and Mano groups been the primary targets and victims of Doe's violent rule. While Taylor and his fighters went after Doe's Krahn ethnic group members, Doe, his national army and security forces decimated everybody (Nwolise 1992: 56). Doe also recruited unemployed youths and released political prisoners to boost his 6000 Armed Forces of Liberia, while Taylor recruited over 10,000 (ibid). Thousands of civilians were massacred on both sides. On 29 July 1990, 30 soldiers gathered and killed 600 Gio and Mano in the St. Peter's Lutheran Church, located right at Monrovia's center, which was the worst single atrocity of the First Liberian Civil War (New York Times, 1990).

In response, the United Nations Secretary-General at that time stated emphasized the need for protection of civilians in Liberia. The leading regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS, dispatched a subregional military force to the country in August of 1990. However, the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), predominantly composed of Nigerian and Ghanaian peacekeepers, proved unable to de-escalate the conflict (Ellis, 1999). There were also suspicious that Nigeria was providing support to the factions against Taylor.

The arrival of ECOMOG hampered the National Patriotic Front of Liberia's efforts to capture the city of Monrovia. In turn, Taylor formed alternative national administration in Gbarnga in Bong county with the support of Prince Johnson. After a disagreement with Taylor over the new national administration's authority, Prince Johnson created his faction, the “Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia”, whose troops rapidly gained control of parts of central Monrovia (Adebajo, 2002).

Despite Nigeria's efforts and the mediation attempt of the United States, Doe was trapped by the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia faction in ECOMOG headquarters. He was taken away, tortured, and mutilated for two days before being killed by Prince Johnson in September 1990.

In response, ECOMOG replaced its commander and engaged around 4,000 troops from the region and initiated a series of measures to secure Monrovia's control. After a series of peace-making conferences, an interim government was established under Amos Sawyer. After disarming Johson’s Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia and getting Doe’s army back to the barracks, measures were also taken to establish security. The interim government established elite security of 1,000 men to combat crime in Monrovia, called by

"Black Berets". Sawyer would later disclose that the Black Beret, which was trained in Guinea, got the backing of heads of ECOWAS countries (David, 2008).

In the meantime, from one side, Taylor refused to engage in the peace negotiations and created a parallel government in the area of his control, called by Great Liberia, controlling 95 percent of the country. On the other side, formed by Doe's supporters composed of members of the Krahn and Mandigo and soldiers who have fought in the Armed Forces of Liberia, formed the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy in 1991 (Gerdes, 2014). Until mid-1992, Taylor's side of the country, which had all the natural resources and the main port, was booming, in particular with commerce with neighboring French-speaking countries (Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea) increased to the alarm of the United States that Liberia would switch its loyalty to France (Nwolise 1992:56).

Taylor also expanded his influence to other neighbouring countries, such as Sierra Leone, including by supporting the Revolutionary United Front, a rebel group thriving to overthrow the government. In retaliation, Sierra Leonean President Joseph Momoh sent funds to Taylor's opponents in the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy. The two-sided interaction with Sierra Leone made it easy for Taylor and his opponents to smuggle diamonds and trade them for arms, which ignited another war that will go on and off until mid-2003 (Hyman 2007:36).

After several mediations and peace talks by ECOWAS, parties signed the Cotonou Peace Agreement in July 1993. The Security Council mandated the establishment of a United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia to support the implementation of the peace agreement and to observe the elections. However, continued disagreement among the parties resumed fighting, made it impossible to hold the planned elections for 1994. In April 1996, the fighting led to the complete breakdown of law and order in Monrovia, most United Nations personnel's evacuation, and extensive looting resources (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1997).

Following other attempts to establish peace, the parties signed the Abuja Accord in Nigeria in August 1996, agreeing to disarming and demobilizing forces and holding elections by 1997. The end of the first Liberian civil war finally marked by the national elections in July 1997, which resulted in Taylor winning at over 75 percent of the votes in a campaign that included young supporters chanting “He killed my ma, he killed my pa, I’ll vote for him”**.** The war at that point had claimed over 150,000 Liberian lives, 750,000 refugees to the neighbouring countries and over 70 per cent of the country’s population being displaced (Ellis, 1999).

The presidency of Taylor kept the country under the same authoritarian rule of human rights abuses and intimidation of the opposition parties. He also continued to interfere in the affairs of his neighbours. These developments led to another wave of internal disputes that gave rise to the Second Liberia Civil War in 1999. The war was composed by two new armed groups: Liberia United for Reconciliation and Democracy in the northern part of the country, mainly supported by the neighbouring country of Guinea and later also Sierra Leone and formed by mostly Krahn and Mandigo from the former United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy; and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia in the south supported by Cote d’Ivoire. Over the course of the conflict, the two groups took over two-thirds of the country governed by Taylor.

The crisis in Liberia was a topic of discussion and subject to several sanctions from the Security Council, which believed that Taylor had supported the Sierra Leone Civil war. As such, the Security Council imposed an arms embargo and a ban on the trade of diamonds. At that time, the United Nations Security Council passed in 2000 a Resolution 1315, which began the process of setting up an international tribunal, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, to try “those persons who bear the greatest responsibility” for “crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, as well as crimes under relevant Sierra Leonean law committed within the territory of Sierra Leone” during the conflict (United Nations Security Council, 2000:1-3). In 2003, the Prosecutor of the Court secured an indictment against Taylor, forcing him to resign and exile in Nigeria in 2003, ahead of peace negotiations scheduled to take place in Accra, Ghana. However, from exile, he continued to influence the politics of Liberia, where his wife, Jewel Howard Taylor, was later elected a senator[36].

.

3.3. Post-conflict reconstruction and security sector reform

When the Second Liberia Civil War ended in 2003, Liberians began working alongside the United Nations and others to rebuild the country. The Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 18 August 18, 2003, in Ghana, Liberia provided for a political transition to democracy under an interim government led by a neutral businessman, President Gyude Bryant, and formed representatives of the three warring parties; political parties; civil society as well as representatives from all the country counties. The composition of the interim government as part of the Accra agreement, which was primarily facilitated by regional leaders, including the former Nigerian Head of State General Abdulsalami Abubakar, and women movements.

The United Nations Mission in Liberia was established in September 2003 to monitor the agreement and would remain in the country until March 2018. It was considered an emblematic post-Brahimi[37] multidimensional peace operation that emerged from Members-State's commitment to providing a more system-wide response to the security needs of post-conflict countries. With a mandate that covered both peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the Mission, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, had a directive to protect civilians throughout the Liberian territory and establish/restore state authority and the institutional rule of law and security sector capacity, in conjunction with the promotion of human rights. It was formed its pick by 15,000 military personnel and 1,115 police officers and civilian components (United Nations Mission in Liberia, 2018)

---

[36] She subsequently filed for divorce. In 2017, Jewel Howard Taylor would be elected as Vice-President of Liberia. His former son-in-law Edwin Melvin Snowe and his police chief Richard Saah Gbollie also secured places in the House of Representatives.

[37] The "Brahimi Report" is named after Lakhdar Brahimi, the Chair of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. The Panel was called by the Secretary-General to assess the shortcomings of the existing peace operations system and to make specific and realistic recommendations for change. The report came after the United Nations failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and to protect the inhabitants of Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina) in 1995. The report called for renewed political commitment on the part of Member States, significant institutional change, and increased financial support. The Panel noted that in order to be effective, UN peacekeeping operations must be properly resourced and equipped, and operate under clear, credible and achievable mandates.

The United Nations Mission in Liberia worked closely with the interim government to organize the general and free elections in 2005, which brought Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, a former economist in the World Bank that was indigenous descent and served as finance minister. She was the first woman to be elected as president in Africa. Reelected in 2011, Sirleaf remained in power until 2017. George Weah was elected and summed the presidency in 2018, marking the first democratic transition of power in 73 years and the end of the UN peacekeeping mission in Liberia.

The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants

Following 14 years of civil war, the proportion of ex-combatants in Liberia was considered the highest among the countries that had undergone intrastate conflict, approximately 4% (105,000) of the 3.5 million of the country's population (United Nations, 2008). Nearly 20,000 of these were child soldiers (Jaye, 2009), and 15,000 were female combatants[38]. The majority of the ex-combatants came from the main groups such as Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, which had 35,000 members, Movement for Democracy in Liberia, with 14,000 members, the pro-government militia fighters or paramilitaries, with 16,000 members, and the Armed Forces soldiers, which had 12,000 members.

---

[38] The data on female participation with rates between 10 and 24 percent (Vinck et al:2011; Moran 2012 and others).

With the signing of the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which called the signatory parties to establish “conditions for the initial stages of demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration program activities” (Government of Liberia, 2003), the Security Council tasked its new deployed peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Mission in Liberia, to implement comprehensive disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program targeting all former combatants from the warring factions including the government troops (United Nations Security Council, 2003).

The responsibility was shared by the United Nations and the United States. The United Nations conducted the disarmament of the entire country and demobilized and reintegrated law enforcement and non-state armed actors. The United States demobilized and reintegrated the Armed Forces of Liberia through the State Department contractors DynCorp International and Pacific Architects and Engineers. While DynCorp International was the implementation partner for the demobilization, demilitarization, and reintegration of the army, the Pacific Architects and Engineers were tasked with providing further training and mentoring of the renewed army.

A National Commission responsible for implementing the programme with the support of the United Nations and the United States, after years of engaging with the ex-combatants, was to reach the following figures (Daboh et al, 2010:9):

- Disarmament: to first qualify for demobilization and reintegration programme, ex-combatants were required to surrender an arm in good condition or 150 rounds of ammunition. 103,019 combatants were disarmed and 28,314 arms, 33,604 projectiles and explosives, and 6.5 million of rounds of ammunition were collected.

- Demobilization: 101,495 combatants, slightly less them the ones disarmed, were demobilised by 2005. The law enforcement and non-state armed actors received a United Nations package for the disarmament of 300 dollars and a retirement 1,400 dollars. In contrast, soldiers received by DynCorp a minimum one-time payment of 540 to 4,000 dollars and a pension per years of service.

- Reintegration: the rehabilitation phase focused on counselling and de-traumatizing ex-combatants, especially the former child soldiers. The United Nations offered 21,900 ex-combatants educational training and scholarships. It also offered 90,000 ex-combatants social reintegration programs, including courses to prepare former soldiers to return to their communities.

When the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program was concluded, various aspects were criticized: lack of planning and inefficient implementation; the eligibility and verification criteria were inappropriate, which allowed commanders to fraud lists of eligible individuals, substituting fighters for family members. It has been suggested that as many as 40,000 persons who did not comply with eligibility requirements participated in the process (United Nations, 2008), causing resentment among many ex-combatants, which still today publicly allege to have been disarmed but not demobilized or benefited from social and economic reintegration programmes.

The ratio of arms surrendered per combatant, one per four combatants, was also considered low, raising doubts about the admission criteria employed at that time. In public platforms, the population still would say that around 80% of the arms remained with the faction leaders. The rehabilitation and reintegration were done irregularly and stagnated due to a lack of funding, subsequent 40,000 ex-combatants were left unattended, and 70% abandoned the program. The lack of reintegration opportunities for the demobilized fighters also created a dangerous disconnect between the first two phases. Psychosocial assistance was not sufficiently taken into account. It was voluntary and some ex-combatants did not take counseling program and up to today roaming the streets of Monrovia (United Nations, 2008).

The frustration with the reintegration programs led to violent protests between 2003-2005, all contained by the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the newly formed Liberia National Police. During the subsequent vetting process of the new security forces, former soldiers were repeatedly made threats, demanding further recompense and employment and claiming that they were unfairly dismissed and forced to retire. In 2006, the ex-soldiers threatened the Government shortly after losing a lawsuit for more recompenses at the Civil Law Court in Monrovia.

A large part of the ex-combatants would remain economically dependent and loyal to their former military rank and command structures in the first years of the post-war. Some Liberian politicians and members of the country elite would still use and maintain these networks to exert control and profit from their labour, including in hotspot regions with unlicensed mining, rubber tapping, robbery and armed gangs. With the outbreak of war in Côte D'Ivoire in early 2011, some ex-commanders remobilized their networks and crossed the border to fight alongside forces loyal to President Laurent Gbagbo.

The former commander of Taylor's troops, Benjamin Yeaten managed to flee his home country and since then operates covertly as commander, recruiter, and military adviser. He recruited mercenaries from Liberian to Gambia post-election. During the 2005 and 2011 national elections, candidates also used former commanders to mobilize ex-combatants to register and vote for their parties and provide security services during the political gatherings.

Liberian ex-combatants' most commonly cited reasons for considering fighting again are economic disadvantage and lack of jobs or education opportunities (Hill et. al, 2008). After the war, a survey revealed that while the majority of ex-combatants did not want to return to conflict because this would destroy their communities, 13% said that they might consider fighting again in the future to seek relief from poverty (Hill et. al, 2008). Many ex-combatants had continued unemployed and living under the poverty line (Forsther, 2011), and some are seen up to today roaming the streets of Monrovia as "zogos" – how Liberians call youth individuals leaving in the streets and involved in begging or robberies.

The Liberia conflict was largely driven by nonmaterial rewards, such as revenge and power (Matts, 2005). Envisioning a return to conflict for these nonmaterial reasons is less common but not absent among ex-combatants. The same after-war-survey revealed that 7% would consider fighting again to take revenge and to win respect(Richard et. Al, 2008). Many young men and women who fought in the conflict were not willing to return to a pre-war situation characterized by patrimonial rule by elders and youth powerless (Peter et al, 2003).

As soldiers, they developed a fierce mindset, and while some presented fear of death and were forced to join the factions; others were proud of their advancement to commander status. At a young age, the wartime experience, combined with lack of access to family care and formal education, made such violent actions seem normal, thereby feeding a continued cycle of conflict (Human rights Watch, 2004). Most of them controlled guns and shotguns (82% and 87% respectively), and significantly more than half (67%) went into the battlefield to fight (Vink et al, 2011).

The violence perpetrated by the combatants during the Liberian civil resulted in lasting stigmatization but also deep social trauma. It is estimated that the armed factions directly or indirectly caused the deaths of 150,000 to 250,000 people. Approximately 850,000 became refugees, and approximately 500,000 became internally displaced within the country (United Nations Security Council, 2003). 70% of the population suffered some form of sexual assault by combatants (Government of Liberia, 2009), 47% witnessed a killing (Patrick at all, 2011:12) and 85.9% experienced the loss of a family member (Bratton, 2006:12).

Vink et all (2011) study also revels risks of conflict relapse if the ex-combatants were not being accepted by their communities. The quantitative survey revealed that a significant proportion of the adult Liberians indicated that the presence of ex-combatants makes the area less safe (43%). This perception was especially negative in Bomi, Grand Cape Mount and Rivercess, counties that concentrate the highest level of internal displacement (ibid). A possible reason for this pattern lies in the course of the civil wars, in particular, the final years, when these counties saw the most extreme back-and-forth between Taylor's forces in the west and other groups in the east.

Although the questions of ethnicity cannot wholly explain the composition of the warring factions, they were used for mobilizing fighters and certainly played an essential rhetorical role during the war (Morten; Hatloy, 2008). Perceptions by ethnic groups that the government discriminated an ex-combatant led to tensions during the elections in 2005 and 2011. This was particularly true for the Mandingos, who in many cases were not allowed to register and vote, or were accused of coming in from the neighbour's countries to vote.

Over the time, most ex-combatents distanced themselves from the main political scenes, diluting their conflicts among them, while remaining frustrated with the elite groups that did to meet their prospects for better job opportunities. After voting *in masse* in the elections, they felt dissatisfied and politically disenfranchised (Söderström, 2015) as the elections were not seen as trustworthy or as a solution to their daily problems, such as the price of food or the unemployment. After the war, over 86% of former fighters claimed no party affiliation (Pugel, 2007) and in 2006 and 2011 the few affiliations were concentrated in the Unity Party, Coalition for Democratic Change and Liberty Party.

Despite many efforts to abolish the armed groups' military command structures in the aftermath of the war to prevent renewed hostilities, networks remained stronger. Many former generals not only maintained command but also helped ensure stability. Mobilized in the Network for Empowerment and Progressive Initiatives in the late 1990s[39], they engaged in the rehabilitation and reintegration of former fighters into society. Their programs reached more than 15,000 ex-combatants and supported the healing of war trauma, reconciliation between victims and perpetrators and conflict mitigation along ethnic, traditional, religious, and socioeconomic lines

---

[39] Formerly known as the National Ex-combatant Peace Building Initiatives.

Some ex-combatants that during the war fought against each other had united and integrated themselves into their new business. The ex-combatants who were not integrated into the restructured State security services decided to seek employment in the informal sector as motorcyclists, street vendors or farmers in the rural areas. One of the most influential networks of the ex-combatants is the Motorcyclists Union, which recently emerged as a membership association for the 4,000 motorbikes present in the capital area.

Although each county branch has its regulations, the Union is about to be institutionalized as a membership association of drivers at a national level. The motorcyclist services prevented many ex-combatants from returning to conflict while providing transportation for thousands of people and supporting the country's economic recovery. Financial support, education and employment possibilities funneled through former ex-combatants by the Union have led them feel that they too much to lose by engaging in conflict

The Motorcyclists Union offer the ex-combatants a strong sense of belonging and identity, which respond to any form of intimidation against its members. In 2009, a vehicle carrying a Deputy Minister was attacked in Nimba by members of the Union following a traffic accident in which a union member had been killed. On another occasion, the Union staged a five-day protest, involving the burning of a police station and a clash with United Nations forces after one of their members had been murdered.

In 2016, the Union in Maryland organized a protest to express their grievance concerning violent arrests and extortion of their members by Liberian Police Officers. In 2016, 150 motorcyclists protested against the decision that refrains them from operating in the main street of the capital Monrovia, Sinkor, and threatened to burn down the police station if their demand was not heard. These incidents, which have been reported to vary degrees in other parts of the country, show their mobilization degree against presumed offenders of their members.

With the building of new police and army from scratch, former members of the army and police, as well as a fighter from the other groups, were all prohibited from joining the state security forces. They then turned to private security companies, where they could exercise a professional that they know but also carried the strong sense of identity built on the use of uniform, the factions, the loyalty to their commanders and the carry of guns. These security entities, in many ways, came to resemble a military unit that remembered the period of war.

The government's ability to provide security after the war also was severely curtailed, so commercial businesses turned to the private business for security protection. Some of the commanders formed their own security companies. The ex-combatants of the Black Berets were in one way or another absorbed into the most significant private security company in Liberia, the Execom, which maintains the same rank and command structures from the wartime. The Minister of Defence (2006-2017), during Sirleaf administration, Brownie Samukai, Black Berets prominent leader, created the security firm, which currently has around 2,000 personnel.

Other smaller private security firms concentrate 101-300 personnel, are also owned by security and government officials from the armed groups during the civil war. Due to the Ministry of Justice's lack of capacity to provide oversight to the private security services, it is difficult to determine how many private security companies and personnel operate in Liberia. The examination of the archives of the Ministry of Justice showed that 127 companies were registered with its Department of Public Safety in 2016.

The rebuilding of the Liberian state-forces

At the end of the war, the Armed Forces of Liberia, along with other private militias organized by Taylor, notably the Anti-Terrorist Unit and Special Security Services, were called as "Government Forces", and one of the armed groups that signed the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

The Peace Agreement requested that in the short-term members of the Armed Forces of Liberia to be urgently "confined to the barracks" and their "arms placed in armories". In the long-run, the Peace Agreement determined that the army should be fully reformed into a new command structure and an ethnically balanced force, formed by soldiers who were both screened for their fitness for services but also prior human rights violations[40]. The Agreement further stipulated that the United States should lead the process of reform (Government of Liberia, 2003). The Security Council similarly asked in the Resolution on September 19, 2003, tasking UNMIL to support the demobilization efforts and asking the international community to provide the needed resources (United Nations Security Council, 2003).

A private contractor, the DynCorp, led the United States' support to the demobilisation of the Armed Forces of Liberia. The company was hired to process the retirement payments for all 13,770 soldiers and more than 400 employees from the ministry of defence. The benefits were defined based on a points system that looked at rank and the duration of service. The minimal amount awarded to a soldier was a one-time payment of 540 dollars. Soldiers from the Doe-era at the retirement age were largely contemplated with a full package of 4,000 dollars. The other soldiers who entered the army during Taylor's period end up receiving around the minimum amount of 540 dollars.

The demobilization sites were built across the country and served as points of reference to process the requests of the 13,770 soldiers; grievance committees were also established to analyse hypothetical cases. The main difficulties of the demobilization process were logistical: ensuring that vouchers were at the sites; addressing the lack of documentation and information of the soldiers, considering that archives were severely damaged during the war. A massive redocumentation exercise had to be launched, and personnel rosters were reconstituted to identify the real size of the army.

---

[40] Article VII, 2, a, of the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement states that no incoming service personnel should have "*prior history with regard to human rights abuses*".

One of the most challenging aspects the defence sector reform process was that the new recruitment for the army did not integrate the ex-combatants. Despite the Peace Agreement in its article VII, 1.b, providing for "forces may be drawn from the ranks of the present Government forces, the LURD and the MODEL, as well as from civilians with appropriate background and experience" (Government of Liberia, 2003), the decision was to form a completely new military.

Social movements were calling for a new start for the Armed Forces of Liberia. Besides being misrepresentative of most of the ethnic's groups of the Liberian population, the soldiers were known and stigmatized for its human rights abuses during Doe and Taylor regime. At that time, the army was composed mainly of soldiers recruited by Doe, mostly Krahn senior officers at the retirement age, and soldiers recruited by Taylor after the 1997 elections.

The transitional government and the United States remained fully committed to a wholly new army and emphasized that nobody was de facto excluded from applying to the new recruitments (Ansorge; Antwi-Ansorge, 2011). Nevertheless, except for some senior authorities, no one of the former soldiers passed through the new army's vetting process, even though many of them were not involved in human rights violations.

Demobilization was therefore designed to be final and led to the complete release and retirement of all soldiers that until then formed the army. Many soldiers and their families that were living at Camp Schiefflin (currently Camp Ware) had to clear the area in preparation for the arrival of the new trained military.

Frustration over this decision combined with large scale of unemployment among ex-combatants, as well as the little amount of the demobilization allowances and pensions led violent incidents in December 2003, October 2004 and December 2005, contained mainly by police and the United Nations Mission in Liberia. The demobilization and retirement process were completed by the end of 2005, but former soldiers continued to demand further recompense and claim that they were unfairly dismissed and forced to retired (Ansorge;

Antwi-Ansorge, 2011). In 2006, ex-soldiers threatened to make “sour” of Christmas celebration in the country if the government refused to address their concerns, after losing a lawsuit against the government at the Civil Law Court.

Many soldiers up to today openly criticize the decision and the overall method of the army reform and note that the new Armed Forces does not rely on the country's history and the lessons learned from its former soldiers. While for the Americans, a new fresh army meant full authority over the transmission of knowledge to the new soldiers; for the new Liberian soldiers, it meant to turn their back to their experienced ancestors and being led to learn to defend their country through the lenses of white foreign teachers.

For the United States, the creation of a civilian-controlled armed force required a *de novo* reconstruction: new recruitment and training to the entire force. Under the same contract which determined the terms for the army demobilization, DynCorp was also requested by the United States to serve as its implementing partner in processing the recruiting, vetting, and training a new military and Ministry of Defense officers.

After extended discussions, the formation of a 2,000-strong army was agreed to by both the transitional government and the United States, based on an initial estimate of the size that the Liberian government could finance and sustain. Despite its ethnical diversity, the army was constituted as a male-dominant institution, such as the ones in the United States, and only later the Sirleaf administration would request a gender balance quota – which is yet to be achieved as women represent little less than 4% of the army today[41].

On January 2006, the Barclay Training Centre opened the first recruiting site for the new army and received a large turnout of applicants. One of the most sensitive aspects of the new recruitment process was the screening of applicants for human rights abuses. Each applicant would have to pass through different vetting stages, which included a background examination and neighbourhood interviews in determining the character of individuals. If the ethnic diversity was achieved, it was without any deliberate affirmative action.

---

[41] Data provided by the Ministry of Defence in January 2018

The 2008 Population and Housing Census conducted by the Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services (LISGIS) revealed the following composition of the army: 20.3% Kpelle, 13.4% Bassa, 10% Grebo, 8% Gio, 7.9% Mano, 6% Kru, 5.1% Lorma, 4.8% Kissi, 4.4% Gola, 20.1% other groups.

The United States formed the leadership of the army. DynCorp International took over the responsibility to train the recruits. As the training progressed and the classes began to graduate, some leadership positions were filled by Liberians as well as transitional staff from the regional Member States of ECOWAS. It would be only ten years later, in 2014, that Liberian officers would serve for the first time as Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff and Brigade Commander, replacing the senior regional officers that until were assigned to command positions.

The process of rebuilding the Armed Forces of Liberia led to the construction of what today comprised eight installations throughout the country. It is comprised of approximately 2,236 personnel[42], including 91 women. It also includes a Liberian Coast Guard, which has 86 personnel and the capacity to patrol up to 150 nautical miles from Monrovia. The Air Wing was dissolved in 2005 as part of the demobilization programme and was not re-established.

With the departure of DynCorp International, the United States continued to assist the military through its “Operation Onward Liberty”. The programme included the presence of a team of American soldiers within the Liberian army, who were responsible for mentoring and assist the capacity building of the force. The programme ended in July 2016, when the United States shifted its assistance to the provision of training and scholarships for soldiers abroad. Regionally, Ghana, Nigeria and ECOWAS have provided technical and policy advice; and, since 2006, the United Nations Mission in Liberia has also dedicated efforts to build the capacity and provide logistical assistance, in particular in the areas of military justice, human rights as well as destruction of explosives that remained from the war.

---

[42] The number is an estimate as for reasons of national security is not fully informed by any government.

One of the critical steps taken in support of the restructuring of the new Armed Forces of Liberia under civilian control and oversight was the drafting of the National Security Strategy launched in 2008 with the help of United Nations Mission in Liberia also provided for the formation of a new Armed Forces of Liberia, subject to civilian control, and trained to support civil duties under legal principles of democratic governance. It called for a Defence Strategy to clearly articulate the Armed Forces of Liberia's mission, appropriate size, doctrine and duties. It also emphasized the need to revitalize the Coastguard to ensure the security of Liberia's maritime borders and natural resources.

Initiated by the transitional government with the support of the United States, the new Defense Act was approved by the Liberian Legislature in 2008. The act refers to structure/organization (chapter 3), recruitment/eligibility (chapter 7) and also issues of compensation (chapter 10) for the new army. It asked the Ministry of Defence, during the recruitment process to "establish a committee to investigate a recruit to ensure they have not committed human rights abuses and/or other violations" (section 7.2).

Notwithstanding efforts to rebuild the army, international and national actors were apprehensive of the Armed Forces of Liberia's capacity to deliver and respond within its mandate. The army started being gradually deployed in different operations. Initially, the new army carried out operations in support of the United Nations Mission in Liberia troops and the national law enforcement. In 2012 and 2013, the army deployed to assist the Liberia National Police and Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization with their efforts to prevent the movement of armed groups into Côte d'Ivoire and enhance border security. In June 2014, the army was mobilized to counter a potential demonstration by demobilized former soldiers.

The deployment of the army was increased during the Ebola outbreak, playing a central role in monitoring checkpoints and assisting in quarantine operations. Following a fatal shooting incident of a civilian during one of its operation, Armed Forces of Liberia was withdrawn from public order operations and instead was led to focus on the construction of the Ebola Treatment Units. The shooting however exposed one of the leading institutional gaps of the army: the lack of military accountability mechanisms in place to respond to abuses of powers by the soldiers.

Although the Liberian Constitution references courts-martial, the military did not have an operational military justice system to hold the soldiers accountable for the incident. The army established its Legal Section in 2010 with support from the United States, but lack of resources could not make it operational. There were not trained judged, prosecutors and lawyers to constitute a court-martial tribunal. The assistance of the United States had largely focused on the "training and equipping" aspects of the security sector reform, and much support is still required to strengthen the governance and accountability of the army.

The United Nations Mission in Liberia played a central role in responding to the gap and assisted the Ministry of Defence to establish an agreement with the Ministry of Justice, extending the civilian courts jurisdiction over military soldiers accused or suspected for certain crimes. In 2016, the United States initiated its support to the drafting of a Uniform Code of Military Justice passed in 2017 detailing the future Liberia military justice system, which will take the country many years to operationalize.

In addition to the army, over the period of 2003 and 2018, the Government of Liberia took significant efforts to rebuild its entire security architecture. As part of a nation-wide security sector assessment in 2008, the United Nations Mission in Liberia supported the Government of Liberia engaged dialogue with security providers, oversight bodies, civil society of diverse age, sex, ethnicity to identify the people's security concerns and articulate a common national security vision for the country. The findings of those consultations informed the first-ever National Security Strategy launched by the President on 2008. The Strategy provides a common national vision for the security sector and outlines that the aspiration of the Liberians is to "have professional and apolitical security system able to protect the country and the people in line with fundamental human rights and the rule of law" (paragraph 26).

As provided in Security Council resolution 2239 (2015), the United Nations Mission in Liberia was mandated to "assist the Government of Liberia in implementing, in close coordination with bilateral and multilateral partners, as appropriate, its national strategy on Security Sector Reform" and to "advise the Government of Liberia on security sector reform and the organization of the Liberian National Police and Bureau for Immigration and Naturalisation, as well as on the justice and corrections sector, with a particular focus on developing their leadership, internal management and accountability mechanisms" (United Nations Security Council, 2015).

With the support of the United Nations Mission in Liberia and other bilateral partners, the country rebuilt its core security institutions and defined clear roles and responsibilities among them: Liberian National Police, which is the primary law enforcement agency in the country; the Liberian Immigration Service, which responsible for border security and immigration; the Drug Enforcement Agency, responsible for the importation, sale and use of illegal narcotics; the Bureau of Corrections and Rehabilitation, responsible for the security and maintenance of Liberia's 15 prisons; the Liberian National Fire Service responsible for firefighting and prevention; the National Security Agency responsible for the collection and analysis of information that could impact the security of the State; and the Executive Protection Service responsible for the security of the President and Vice-President and visiting dignitaries.

At the governance level, key bodies were also established, including the National Security Council, responsible for coordinating the government's national defence and security policy. County and District Security Councils and function as early warning mechanisms; the Liberian National Commission on Small Arms, responsible for government arms management and control, as well as the sale and registration of privately own weapons, the Ministry of Health, responsible for health related emergencies, including response to epidemics, the

Ministry of Gender, Women and Child Protection, responsible for coordinating the government's response to sexual and gender-based violence and for child protection; and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, responsible for local governance and is the lead agency for civilian disaster response. The Legislature also had dedicated security and defence committees responsible for exercising oversight over the Executive branch.

On 15 December 2014, the Security Council adopted the Resolution 2190 affirming its expectation that the Government of Liberia would assume security responsibilities from the United Nations Mission in Liberia by 30 June 2016. The Security Council stressed the importance of the Government formulating a concrete plan detailing final steps required to conclude the reform of the country security sector. The "Government of Liberia Plan for United Nations Mission in Liberia Transition", was developed and endorsed by the National Security Council on 6 March 2015. Among other things, the plan underlined the steps to be taken by the Government to meet the minimum capacity criteria to take over the security responsibilities from the United Nations Mission in Liberia police and military troops[43].

The completion of the plan led to the handed over to the Government of Liberia the responsibility for the country security on 30 June 2016, at time that the United Nations peacekeeping mission was completing 13 years of presence. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Mission in Liberia, recognized "this achievement is a culmination of the step-by-step rebuilding of Liberia's security institutions almost from scratch, following the long years of civil conflict." (United Nations, 2016).

Indeed, the security sector was completely rebuilt by Liberians with international support after the end of the civil war in 2003. At the time of the transition, international actors were increasingly concerned that the Government had become inquiringly dependent of the international security forces. It had relied on the support of the United Nations troops for over 13 years, including on its daily police and military services (guard to the airports and other facilities, patrolling and protecting the President) but also in responding to emergencies. In this case, the transition should represent an important breakthrough in the government's dependency by giving back to Liberians the control and monopoly of the use of force by the State.

---

[43] . A total of 205 activities were identified out of which 10 were considered essential in the following areas: legislative and policy framework; training; professionalism; justice and security service delivery; administrative and institutional reform; oversight, accountability and discipline; coordination, collaboration and partnerships, both within the sector and with regional and international partners; observance of human rights; financial management; conditions of service; and operational efficiency and effectiveness.

At the time of the transition, all critical security tasks[44] undertaken by the United Nations Mission in Liberia were successfully handed over to the Government. But, overall, the implementation of the Plan remained slow, with only 37 percent being achieved by 30 June 2016. Only 12.5 percent of the initial estimated budget was allocated to the Plan by the Government. The security transition took place within a context of a precarious economic situation exacerbated by the effects of the Ebola outbreak, limited infrastructure and economic opportunities. The security sector still had systemic weaknesses, including insufficient numbers of personnel, as well as inadequate expertise, professionalism, management capacity, oversight and accountability.

The Government of Liberia remained the 4th poorest country in the world and lacked the resources to deliver on the National Security Strategy 2008 vision, including by providing professional security services to the population through its core institutions, such as the police, the judiciary, corrections, immigration, and the army. Serious capacity gaps remained in the coordination structures of the National Security Policy, including the Office of National Security and in the oversight bodies, such as the National Assembly, civil society groups and educational institutions, which should be able play a leading role in producing local knowledge, research, and advanced education to national experts and security personnel that are leading the implementation of the security reforms.

---

[44] These were the ten security responsibilities that remained with UNMIL: responsibility to remove and destroy explosive remnants of war, which by then were still found by the population and posed risks to civilians; undertake cash escorts; provide security at corrections facilities; provide protection to the Presidential escort and static guard duties at the Executive Mansion and Ministry of Foreign Affairs; provide maritime patrols; undertake inspection and oversight of Government owned weapons; provide airfield security and maintenance; provide static guard duties at Spring Air Field airport; provide static guard duties at Roberts International Airport; and provide static guard at Liberian Petroleum Refining Cooperation Freeport.

While the Government faced resource constraints and was at that time unable to solely finance the reforms, international actors considered unrealistic to expect national ownership to prevail if the security sector process is largely dependent on external funding. In partnership with the World Bank, a new Public Expenditure Review of the security sector in Liberia was initiated to assess the affordability of the security sector in the long-term and propose a response. In parallel, the United Nations secretariat emphasised the importance of long-term investments and commitment from all partners to the building of national capacities in different areas, few resources were made available at the decision of the United Nations member states.

The anxiety among national and international actors over the security transition brought the issue of national ownership and sustainability to the forefront of the support to security sector reforms[45]. The confidence was brought by the Liberia themselves, who recognized early on the importance of security sector reform or its overall stabilization and peacebuilding process and worked closely with the United Nations and other partners to design and implement nationally led reforms. More than 13 years later, the rebuilding of the country security sector was largely seen as one of the essential steps taken by the country for the consolidation of its peace and democracy and, albeit on-going, helped to establish the first steps for a balance between demands for security with development needs, the depoliticization of the armed forces and enhanced the civilian control and accountability.

---

[45] The principles of ownership, inclusivity, and sustainability have been at the centre of the United Nations engagement on security sector reform. The Organization first articulated these principles in the Secretary-General's Report on security sector reform in 2008, in response to Member State interest and discussions in the Security Council. This was followed by the publication of the Integrated Technical Guidance Note on security sector reform in 2012, the Secretary-General's Report on security sector reform in 2013, and the unanimous adoption by the Security Council of the Resolution 2151 on security sector reform in 2014, which provides the normative framework for our current approach.

CONCLUSION

This study aimed to contribute to the analysis of the power dynamics that shape the local-international relations in the context of security sector reforms. It analyzed how international policies and practices of establishing security institutions in the post(colonial) nations proved to be a sophisticated mechanism to continue exerting control over the space and conduct of populations at the end of colonialism, including through discourses of protection and democracy. The analysis led to the following conclusions points:

1. The historical examination of rationalities that constituted the League of Nations and the United Nations demonstrated that the two organizations put into place legal mechanisms to secure and legitimise, in different degrees, the continuality of security interventions in (post)colonial nations throughout the imperial crisis that followed the First and Second World Wars. These interventions were the product of rationalisation of existing forms of colonisation – not a breakthrough with the imperial project and evidenced the transition from the violent practices to the protective practices of intervention, only conceivable due to the economic and moral unfeasibility of sustaining the old imperialist totalitarian models at that time.

As noted in the first chapter, at the time of establishing the League of Nations in 1919, the colonial order was facing a profound crisis as a result of the First World War. By threatening the profitable imperial structure of colonialism, the War forced the colonial powers to rethink their control practices and articulate new methods to dominate its possessions overseas. The consensus was reached through the Mandate System, a new legal solution created by the League of Nations whereby colonies were distributed among the Allied or its supporters. The League of Nations came to be a useful platform through which many colonial powers reframed their discourses and formulated new intervention tools. Its founding document, the Covenant of the League of Nations, contains fragments of the eurocentric discourse that shaped the perspective of its Member States and how they came to justify interventions in (post)colonial territories. Differently from the traditional colonial order, when colonies were formally acquired with the explicit purpose of exploitation, the dominance of the territories under the Mandate System was now justified through the discourse of protection. The colonial powers considered a moral duty to govern territories on the assumption that they were unable to govern themselves. The position of "protector" was given to countries based on their resources, geographical location, and experiences.

The League of Nations facilitated the continuation of colonial interference but little did to interfere in the wider colonization programme globally, particularly in Africa, which was primarily occupied by colonial rulers. Although the map of colonial Africa was not redrawn after the War, as it was the map of Europe and the Middle East, where the old empires collapsed, the League facilitated the passage of parts of the continent. The global colonial structure will remain intact until the Great Depression in the 1930s and the Second World War when colonial institutions will be subjected to countless African resistance. Those independence struggles destabilised the imperial international order. At the time of the emergence of the United Nations, it was clear to the surviving empires that traditional colonialism had to be terminated.

This changing colonial geography inevitably influenced the early years of the United Nations. Organization's Charter in 1945 did call for the sovereignty of countries under the colonial rule and called those countries by the "Non-Self-Governing Territories" in reference to the people that "have not yet attained a full measure of self-government." The colonial powers responded to that moment of weakening of their domains by creating institutional mechanisms to maintain their supremacy vis-à-vis the newly independent States. Among their strategies were establishing new forms of intervention and technologies of control, including the "Trusteeship System" through which a specific Member State could administer a territory under the supervision of a newly established United Nations Trusteeship Council.

With the end of the old colonial order, the Mandates System, the Trusteeship Systems and the Non-Self-Governing Territories served as a legitimate political space through which many colonial powers could maintain control over the (post)colonial) countries. These mechanisms of legitimization of interference positioned the United Nations not just as a sphere of regulation, but also a locus from which techniques of inclusion and exclusion emerged to build trust and identity among a particular group of nations and reaffirm their power against others.

2. At the end of the Cold War, many postcolonial nations gained their independence and joined the organization. In parallel, the United Nations embarked on a new "a new chapter" characterized by the development of a set of pro-democracy policies and practices aimed at establishing the rule of law and security institutions in post-colonial countries and addressing conflict factors in these contexts that, in the organization views, threatened international peace and security. While conflicts emerging in the global south were largely a result of the colonial interventions, Western discourses tended to present them as compelling proof that many postcolonial nations did not have the political capacity to govern and deliver on security and, therefore, requited international assistance.

A new rule of law consensus emerges based on the belief that the State and its security apparatus are essential to foreign liberal policy. Therefore, international interventions, especially peace operations, should include the rule of law component. The democratization agenda emerged in a period of decolonization and was aimed at the newly independent States - this led us to perceive such discourse as a form of regulation and normalization of the nascent political life of the postcolonial countries.

Terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, also helped to convince conservatives that "peripheral" countries, lacking population control and surveillance institutions, pose a threat to Western security. The international intervention programmes of the post-Cold War were reorganized around the ideal of democratization. Discourses of security are gradually converted into democracy, and the promotion of peace by the United Nations is reimagined as connected with the institutionalization of democratic governments.

3. The security sector reform agenda emerges from a new understanding of the concept of security, which traditionally centered on the State, now was recognized as centered in the people and their well-being. In this context, the United Nations will expand the scope of its interventions on security sector reforms. The number of peace operations will also increase, benefiting from the Security Council's new policies and guidance.

4. The colonial powers often had accumulated a lot of experiences with the recruitment, training and deployment of the "native security officer" as part of their colonial security programmes. Many had engaged in forming indigenous security armies and police as means to enhance and maintain control of the colonized territories and their populations during the first and second phases of colonisation. These practices consequently influenced and informed the creation of new technologies in the League of Nations Mandate System, which authorized the mandatory to establish local security forces and later on in the United Nations.

The new Trusteeship System's, for example, sought to ensure that the trust territories contribute to, and are not be held apart from the global security arrangements. The administering authority had the duty to engage with the security forces "for local defense and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory" (United Nations Charter, 1945, article 85). The hierarchy and disparities of power, knowledge, and resources that characterised formal colonialism remained between some administering authorities and those territories, which illustrates the continuing effect of the colonial encounter within the United Nations.

5. Throughout its history, Liberia had significant colonial encounters: the arrival of the Portuguese at the Upper Guinea Coast in 1461, at a time, that its population was completing approximately six thousand years of history, followed by other European colonizers; the occupation of Liberia in 1820 by the American freed slaves who at their arrival

sought to recreate a bipolar society based on ethnicity and class – not too different from the one they left in the United States; and the United States bilateral military and economic assistance. In many ways, these colonial interventions that took place in Liberia instrumentalized the country's security forces, including thought politicization, ethnization, and militarization programmes. These interventions also conflicted with the traditional models of security and mechanisms of resolution of Liberia's conflicts, such as the one managed by the Poro and Sande.

During the Americo-Liberians rule, security forces played a central role in maintaining the political elite's power and exploiting the majority of the Native-Liberians. They were also enough politicized to launch a military coup under Doe's leadership in 1980 to end the 133 years of Americo-Liberian rule. Doe implemented the same control technologies from the former colonial government: oppressing different political views and dividing the society by the ethnic line. The United States provided a large amount of financial support under the condition that Doe did not ally with the Soviets.

After about ten years of brutal authoritarianism, armed groups led by Taylor incited a civil war in 1989 that would end in 2003 with the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement. United Nations and the United States shared the responsibility to support the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants as well as the security sector reform detailed in the Agreement.

The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants were one of the main technologies applied by the international actors to control bodies and the armed groups after the aftermath of the war. Although many risks of conflict relapse in the early day of the peace process remained - in particular, due to the ex-combatants resentments, stigma, and lack of job opportunities - the assistance provided by the United Nations and other international partners, albeit challenges, was considered effective and central to maintain the country stability.

Another challenging aspect of the post-conflict Liberia was the security architecture reform, including its 2,000-strong new army. Social movements were calling for a new start for the Armed Forces, which was misrepresentative of most ethnic groups of the Liberian population. The soldiers were known and stigmatized for their human rights abuses. The United States similarly pushed for a new army and exercised its economic power to build a military from scratch that reflected the American structures and values.

The Government made significant efforts to rebuild its governance bodies and the police, prisons, immigration services, etc. with support from the United Nations Mission in Liberia and bilateral donors. Albeit these security institutions were model after the West, they were more considered a “hybrid” structure appropriated by Liberians and built under a vision articulated in their National Security Strategy 2018, then an imposed system. The Strategy articulated a common national security vision for the country in dialogue with security providers, oversight bodies, civil society. It helped ensure that the partners' assistance was grounded on national ownership.

ANNEXE I - List of the Trust Territories that have achieved self-determination

Trust Territory of Togoland under British administration

- United with the Gold Coast, a Non-Self-Governing Territory administered by the United Kingdom, to form Ghana in 1957

Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian administration

- United with British Somaliland, to form Somalia in 1960

Trust Territory of Togoland under French administration

- Became independent as Togo in 1960

Trust Territory of Cameroons under French administration

- Became independent as Cameroon in 1960

Trust Territory of Cameroons under British administration

- Following a plebiscite, the northern part of the Trust Territory joined Nigeria and the southern part joined Cameroon in 1961

Trust Territory of Tanganyika (under British administration)

- Became independent in 1961 (In 1964, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, which had become independent in 1963, united as a single State under the name of the United Republic of Tanzania)

Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi (under Belgian administration)

- Became two independent and sovereign States of Rwanda and Burundi in 1962

Trust Territory of Western Samoa (under New Zealand administration)

- Became independent as Western Samoa in 1962 (In 1997, it changed its name to Samoa)

Trust Territory of Nauru (administered by Australia on behalf of the Administering Authorities of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom)

- Became independent in 1968

Trust Territory of New Guinea/Papua New Guinea* (administered by Australia)

- United with the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Papua, also administered by Australia, to become the independent State of Papua New Guinea in 1975

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (administered by the United States

ANNEXE II – United Nations System Chart


The United Nations System
UN PRINCIPAL ORGANS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
SECURITY COUNCIL
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL[6]
Subsidiary Organs
Main Committees
Disarmament Commission
Human Rights Council
International Law Commission
Joint Inspection Unit (JIU)
Standing committees and ad hoc bodies
Funds and Programmes[1]
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNCDF United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNV United Nations Volunteers
UNEP[8] United Nations Environment Programme
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UN-HABITAT[8] United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
WFP World Food Programme (UN/FAO)
Research and Training
UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNITAR United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNSSC United Nations System Staff College
UNU United Nations University
Other Entities
ITC International Trade Centre (UN/WTO)
UNCTAD[1,8] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNHCR[1] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOPS[1] United Nations Office for Project Services
UNRWA[1] United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UN-WOMEN[1] United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
Related Organizations
CTBTO PREPARATORY COMMISSION Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
IAEA[1,3] International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC International Criminal Court
IOM[1] International Organization for Migration
ISA International Seabed Authority
ITLOS International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
OPCW[3] Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
WTO[1,4] World Trade Organization
Subsidiary Organs
Counter-Terrorism Committee
International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals
Military Staff Committee
Peacekeeping operations and political missions
Sanctions committees (ad hoc)
Standing committees and ad hoc bodies
Peacebuilding Commission
HLPF High-level political forum on sustainable development
Functional Commissions
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
Narcotic Drugs
Population and Development
Science and Technology for Development
Social Development
Statistics
Status of Women
United Nations Forum on Forests
Regional Commissions[8]
ECA Economic Commission for Africa
ECE Economic Commission for Europe
ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ESCAP Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
ESCWA Economic and Social Commission or Western Asia
Other Bodies
Committee for Development Policy
Committee of Experts on Public Administration
Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues
UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNGEGN United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names
Research and Training
UNICRI United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
UNRISD United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
Specialized Agencies[1,5]
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMO International Maritime Organization
ITU International Telecommunication Union
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNWTO World Tourism Organization
UPU Universal Postal Union
WHO World Health Organization
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization
WMO World Meteorological Organization
WORLD BANK GROUP[7]
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA International Development Association
IFC International Finance Corporation
Departments and Offices[9]
EOSG Executive Office of the Secretary-General
DESA Department of Economic and Social Affairs
DGACM Department for General Assembly and Conference Management
DGC Department of Global Communications
DMSPC Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance
DOS Department of Operational Support
DPO Department of Peace Operations
DPPA Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
DSS Department of Safety and Security
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA Office for Disarmament Affairs
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIOS Office of Internal Oversight Services
OLA Office of Legal Affairs
OSAA Office of the Special Adviser on Africa
SRSG/CAAC Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict
SRSG/SVC Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict
SRSG/VAC Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Violence Against Children
UNISDR United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UNODC[1] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOG United Nations Office at Geneva
UN-OHRLLS Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States
UNON United Nations Office at Nairobi
UNOP[2] United Nations Office for Partnerships
UNOV United Nations Office at Vienna

Notes:

1 Members of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB).
2 UN Office for Partnerships (UNOP) is the UN's focal point vis-a-vis the United Nations Foundation, Inc.
3 IAEA and OPCW report to the Security Council and the General Assembly (GA).
4 WTO has no reporting obligation to the GA, but contributes on an ad hoc basis to GA and Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) work on, inter alia, finance and development issues.
5 Specialized agencies are autonomous organizations whose work is coordinated through ECOSOC (intergovernmental level) and CEB (inter-secretariat level).
6 The Trusteeship Council suspended operation on 1 November 1994, as on 1 October 1994 Palau, the last United Nations Trust Territory, became independent.
7 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) are not specialized agencies in accordance with Articles 57 and 63 of the Charter, but are part of the World Bank Group.
8 The secretariats of these organs are part of the UN Secretariat.
9 The Secretariat also includes the following offices: The Ethics Office, United Nations Ombudsman and Mediation Services, and the Office of Administration of Justice.

This Chart is a reflection of the functional organization of the United Nations System and for informational purposes only. It does not include all offices or entities of the United Nations System.

© 2019 United Nations. All rights reserved worldwide

Published by the United Nations Department of Global Communications 18-00159—1 January 2019

Annexe III – List of peacekeeping operations (1948-2019)



ACRONYM	MISSION NAME	START DATE	END DATE
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization	May 1948	Present
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	January 1949	Present
UNEF I	First United Nations Emergency Force	November 1956	June 1967
UNOGIL	United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon	June 1958	December 1958
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo	July 1960	June 1964
UNSF	United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea	October 1962	April 1963
UNYOM	United Nations Yemen Observation Mission	July 1963	September 1964
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	March 1964	Present
DOMREP	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic	May 1965	October 1966
UNIPOM	United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission	September 1965	March 1966
UNEF II	Second United Nations Emergency Force	October 1973	July 1979
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force	June 1974	Present
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	March 1978	Present
UNGOMAP	United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	May 1988	March 1990
UNIIMOG	United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group	August 1988	February 1991
UNAVEM I	United Nations Angola Verification Mission I	January 1989	June 1991
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group	April 1989	March 1990
ONUCA	United Nations Observer Group in Central America	November 1989	January 1992
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	April 1991	October 2003
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	April 1991	Present
UNAVEM II	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II	June 1991	February 1995
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador	July 1991	April 1995
UNAMIC	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia	October 1991	March 1992
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force	February 1992	March 1995
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia	March 1992	September 1993
UNOSOM I	United Nations Operation in Somalia I	April 1992	March 1993
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique	December 1992	December 1994
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia II	March 1993	March 1995
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda	June 1993	September 1994
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia	August 1993	June 2009
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia	September 1993	September 1997
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti	September 1993	June 1996
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda	October 1993	March 1996
UNASOG	United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group	May 1994	June 1994
UNMOT	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan	December 1994	May 2000
UNAVEM III	United Nations Angola Verification Mission III	February 1995	June 1997
UNCRO	United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia	March 1995	January 1996



ACRONYM	MISSION NAME	START DATE	END DATE
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force	March 1995	February 1999
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	December 1995	December 2002
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium	January 1996	January 1998
UNMOP	United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka	February 1996	December 2002
UNSMIH	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti	July 1996	July 1997
MINUGUA	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala	January 1997	May 1997
MONUA	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola	June 1997	February 1999
UNTMIH	United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti	August 1997	December 1997
MIPONUH	United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti	December 1997	March 2000
UNCPSG	UN Civilian Police Support Group	January 1998	October 1998
MINURCA	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic	April 1998	February 2000
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone	July 1998	October 1999
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	June 1999	Present
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone	October 1999	December 2005
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor	October 1999	May 2002
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	November 1999	June 2010
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	July 2000	July 2008
UNMISET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor	May 2002	May 2005
MINUCI	United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire	May 2003	April 2004
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia	September 2003	March 2018
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	April 2004	May 2017
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti	June 2004	October 2017
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi	June 2004	December 2006
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in the Sudan	March 2005	July 2011
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	August 2006	December 2012
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur	July 2007	Present
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	September 2007	December 2010
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	July 2010	Present
UNISFA	United Nations Organization Interim Security Force for Abyei	June 2011	Present
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan	July 2011	Present
UNSMIS	United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria	April 2012	August 2012
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali	April 2013	Present
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic	April 2014	Present
MINUJUSTH	United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti	October 2017	October 2019

Annexe IV – List of past political missions

Africa

- UN Office in Angola (UNOA) (1999 - 2002)
- UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) (1997 - 2003)
- UN Mission in Angola (UNMA) (2002 - 2003)
- UN Office in Burundi (UNOB) (1993 - 2004)
- UN Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (MINUCI) (2003 - 2004)
- UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) (2005 - 2008)
- UN Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) (2000 - 2009)
- UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) (1999 - 2009)
- UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) (2006 - 2010)
- UN International Commission of Inquiry mandated to establish the facts and circumstances of the events of 28 September 2009 in Guinea (2009 - 2010)
- UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) (1995 - 2013)
- UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) (2008 - 2014)
- UN Integrated Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) (2009 - 2014)
- UN Office in Burundi (BNUB) (2011 - 2014)
- UN Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi (MENUB) (2015)
- UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) (2001 - 2016)
- Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel (OSES) (2013 - 2016)
- Good Offices Sudan and South Sudan (2016 - 2018)

Americas

- UN Mission in El Salvador (MINUSAL) (1995)
- UN Office of Verification in El Salvador (UNOV) (1996)
- OAS/UN International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) (1993 - 1999)
- International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICAH) (200 - 2001)
- United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the Commitments of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala (MINUGUA) (1994 - 2004)
- Good Offices Guyana - Venezuela (1990 - 2017)
- UN Mission in Colombia (2016 - 2017)
- International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) (2007-2019)

Asia and Pacific

- UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) (1999)
- UN Political Office in Bougainville (UNPOB) (1998 - 2003)
- UN Observer Mission in Bougainville (UNOMB) (2004 - 2005)
- UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) (2005 - 2006)
- UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) (2007 - 2010)

Europe

- Good Offices Greece - the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1993 - 2019)

Middle East and West Asia

- UN Special Mission in Afghanistan (UNSMA) (1993 - 2001)
- UN Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding (UNTOP) (2000 - 2007)
- UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) (2005 - 2009)
- UN Commission of Inquiry into the facts and circumstances of the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto (2009 - 2010)
- OPCW-UN Joint Mission in Syria (2013 - 2014)

Annexe V – List of Non-Self-Governing Territories

TERRITORY	LISTING AS NSGT	ADMINISTERING POWER	LAND AREA (sq.km.)	POPULATION [i]
AFRICA				
Western Sahara	Since 1963		266,000	582,000
ATLANTIC AND CARIBBEAN				
Anguilla	Since 1946	United Kingdom	96	15,397
Bermuda	Since 1946	United Kingdom	53.35	63,921
British Virgin Islands	Since 1946	United Kingdom	153	31,197
Cayman Islands	Since 1946	United Kingdom	264	65,813
Falkland Islands (Malvinas)	Since 1946	United Kingdom	12,173	Approximately 3,200
Montserrat	Since 1946	United Kingdom	103	4,649

Saint Helena	Since 1946	United Kingdom	310	5,467
Turks and Caicos Islands	Since 1946	United Kingdom	948.2	42,953
United States Virgin Islands	Since 1946	United States	352	105,000
EUROPE				
Gibraltar	Since 1946	United Kingdom	5.8	34,003
PACIFIC				
American Samoa	Since 1946	United States	200	60,300
French Polynesia	1946-1947 and since 2013	France	3,600	276,300
Guam	Since 1946	United States	540	163,875
New Caledonia	1946-1947 and since 1986	France	18,575	268,767

Pitcairn	Since 1946	United Kingdom	35.5	43
Tokelau	Since 1946	New Zealand	12.2	1,499

Annexe V - Map of Liberia


© Nations Online Project
12°
11°
10°
9°
8°
7°
GUINEA
SIERRA LEONE
CÔTE D'IVOIRE (Ivory Coast)
LIBERIA
Guéckédou
Mendekoma
Voinjama
Foya
Kolahun
Kailahun
Buedu
Pendembu
Vahun
Mt. Wuteve 1,440 m
Wologizi Range
Lofa
Lawa
Zigida
Irié
Kenema
Gelahun
Yella
Zorzor
Nzérékoré
Wonegizi Range
Mano
Moa
Gbeya
Loffa
Via
Mt. Gletohn
Yekepa
Nimba Range
Belle Yella
Kongo
Wiesua
Gbange
Niandi
Sanniquellie
Danané
Kahnple
Bendaja
Belefuanai
Kpein
Gahnpa (Ganta)
Sulima
St. Paul
Bopolu
Gbarnga
Sagleipie
Bo
Suakoko
Palala
Zienzu
Tubmanburg
Yela
Butlo
Robertsport
Lake Piso
Bong Town
Zekera
Kpeaple
Nuon
Cavally
Toulépleu
Klay
Kakata
Tapeta
Guiglo
Bensonville
St. John
Gboyi
Monrovia
Harbel
Tobli
Cavally
Kola (Kola Town)
Marshall
Guata
Poabli
Towabli (Towai Town)
Debli
Tchien (Zwedru)
Hartford
Babu
Taï
Edina
Buchanan
Trade Town
Ghapo
Gonglee
Timbo
Gwen Creek
Drubo (Dubwe)
Galio
Cavally
Duabo
Pelokehn
Dube
Sassandra
Timbo
River Cess
Cess (Cestos)
Bokoa
Sehnkwehn
Shabli
Putu Range
Yibuke (Kaobli)
Juazohn
Yakakahn
Kopo
Sino
Tiehnpo
Fish Town
Sehnkwehn
Tatuke
Tawake
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Sinoe Bay
Greenville
Dugbe
Dube
Grand Cess
Kodeke
Nyaake
Nana Kru
Barclayville
Sasstown
Nemeke
Grand Cess
Plibo
Tabou
C. Palmas
Harper
5°
6°
International boundary
National capital
County capital
Town, village
Road
Railroad
Airport
N
0 20 40 60 80 km
0 10 20 30 40 50 mi

REFERENCES

Abasiattai, M. B. European Intervention in Liberia with Special Reference to the "Cadell Incident" on 1908-1909. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal XIV, 1989.

Adebajo, Adekeye. Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.

Adebajo, Adekeye. Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002;

Aido, J. Liberia Social Sciences. n. 5. Accra, Ghana: Winmat. 2006.

Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso. 1993;

Anghie, Antony. Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations. New York: New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 2001

Aning, E. K. Ghana, ECOWAS and the Liberian Crisis--An Analysis of Ghana's Role in Liberia. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal XXI, 1996.

Annan, Kofi. At 70, the UN Must Celebrate – and Reform. LinkedIn, 2005.

Ansorge, Josef Teboho and Antwi-Ansorge, Nana Akua. Monopoly, Legitimacy, Force: DDR–SSR Liberia. Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2011

Atherton, J. H. Liberian Prehistory. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal III, 1971.

Batty, Fodei. Do Ethnic Groups Retain Homogenous Preferences in African Politics? Evidence from Sierra Leone and Liberia. Camden: African Studies Review 54, 2011.

Bauman, Z. Medo líquido. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2008

Beh; Kekuleh; Roberts; Russell. Liberia Social Sciences. n. 5. Accra, Ghana: Winmat. 2014.

Berg, E. J. Politics, Privilege and Progress in Liberia. A Review Article. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal II, 1970.

Beyan, A. J. The American Colonization Society and the Socio-Religious Characterization of Liberia: A Historical Survey 1822-1900. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal X, 1985.

Bøås, Morten; Hatløy, Anne. Getting in, Getting out: Militia Membership and Prospects for Re-Integration in Post-War Liberia. London: Journal of Modern African Studies 46, 2008.

Boutros-Ghali, B. An Agenda for Democratization. NY: United Nations, 1996.

Boutros-Ghali, B. Empowering the United Nations. 1996. Congers: Foreign Affairs Magazine, Available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48466/boutros-boutros-ghali/empowering-the-united-nations>.

Bratton, Michael; Logan, Carolyn. Voters but not yet Citizens: The Weak Demand for Political Accountability in Africa's unclaimed Democracies." Accra: Afrobarometer Working Papers, 2006.

Brooks, Charles. Western Africa to c/1860 A.D.: A Provisional Historical Schema Based on Climate Periods. Bloomington: Indiana University African Studies Program Working Papers Series, 1985.

Brooks, George E. A Provisional Historical Schema for Western Africa Based on Seven Climate Periods (ca. 9000 B.C. to the 19th Century).. In: Milieux: Cahiers D'Etudes Africaines, 1986

Brown, R. T. and Shick, Tom W., Behold the Promised Land: A History of AfroAmerican. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal IX, 1980.

Browne, Herman. Theological Anthropology: A Dialectic Study of the African and Liberation Traditions. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal XXII, 1996.

Brumskine, M. D. Marital Rape Exemption in the United States and Possibility for Reform in Liberia. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal XXI, 1996.

Buell, Raymond Leslie. Liberia: A Century of Survival, 1847–1947. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, the University Museum, 1947

Buelow, G. Eve's Rib: Association Membership and Mental Health Among Kru Women. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal IX, 1982.

Buelow, G. Siklipo Dark: Social Developments on the Kru Coast. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal VIII, 1982.

Burrowes, C Patrick. Between the Kola Forest and the Salty Sea: a history of the Liberian people before 1800. Bomi County: Know Your Self Press, 2016

Central Intelligence Agency. United States, Liberia: A Difficult Passage Ahead. Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1982.

Chatterjee, P. The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories. Princeton: Princeton Studies, 1993.

Chomsky, Noam. A nova guerra contra o terror. In: Estudos Avançados. v.16 n.44. São Paulo, 2002. Avalable at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0103-40142002000100002>.

Ciment, James. Another America: The Story of Liberia and the Former Slaves Who Ruled. Hill and Wang, 2013

Cohen, Warren I., America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945–1991. Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Commission on Global Governance. Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Copley, Gregory R., ed. Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook. 16th Edition. Alexandria, Virginia: The International Strategic Association, 2006.

Cordor, S. M. Liberia in African Culture and Artistic Expressions -- 1847-1997. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal XXII, 1996.

Daboh, Fedeba. DDRR: A case study of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan. New York: New York Science Journal, 2010.

Dash, Leon. Liberian Soldiers Taunt, Shoot 13 Former Leaders. Washington DC: Washington Post Foreign, 1980.

David, Alloycious. Liberia: Sawyer Confirms Recruiting Black Beret, Changing of Banknote. Monrovia: All Africa, 2008.

Dillon, Michael and Reid, Julian (2001) Global liberal governance: biopolitics, security and war. Millennium : Journal of International Studies, 30 (1). pp. 41-66.

Dominguez, Jorge. I. International Security and Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the post-cold war era. Pittsburg: Pittsburgh Press: 1998

Douglas, Mary. Pureza e perigo. Lisboa: Ferrell, 1996.

Duffield, M. Getting Savages to Fight Barbarians: Development, Security and the Colonial Present. In: Conflict, Security and Development. London: Taylor & Francis, 2005.

Duffield, M. Global Civil War: The Non-Insured, International Containment and Post Interventionary society. In: Journal of Refugee Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Duffield, M. Social reconstruction and the radicalization of development: Aid as a relation of global liberal governance. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.

Dunn, D. E. Introduction. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal, 2005.

Dwalu. Liberia Social Sciences. Accra, Ghana: Winmat. 1995.

Ebo, Adedeji. Liberia case study: outsourcing SSR to foreign companies. In: Nathan, Laurie. No ownership, no commitment. A guide to local ownership of security sector reform. Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 2007.

Ebo, Adedeji. The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Occasional Papel, nº 9, 2005.

Ellis, Stephen. The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War. New York: New York University Press, 1999

Elman, Miriam. Paths to Peace: Is democracy the answer?. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997.

Fahnbulleh, Boima. Voices of Protest: Liberia on the Edge 1974–1980. Florida: Universal Publishers, 2005.

Fanon, Frantz. Os condenados da terra. Tradução de Enilce Albergaria Rocha e Lucy Magalhães. Juiz de Fora: Editora UFJF, 1968;

Fanon, Frantz. Pele Negra, Máscaras Brancas. Tradução de Renato da Silveira. Salvador: EDUFBA, 2008;

Fanon, Frantz. Toward the African Revolution. New York, Grove Press, 1964.

Farrell, T. "Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations" in John Baylis, James Wirtz, Colin S. Gray, and Eliot Cohen (Eds.), Strategy in the Contemporary World, Second Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Feste, K. Expanding the Frontiers: Superpower Intervention in the Cold War. New York: Praeger,1992.

Focault, Michel. O Nascimento da Biopolítica. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2008.

Forsther, Michael Pach. No work, No peace. Tromsø: University of Tromsø, 2011

Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975.

Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology of Knowledge. London: Routledge, 1969.

Gberie, Lansana. A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone. London: Hurst, 2005;

Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance. United Nations Approaches to Security Sector Reform. Background paper for the workshop on “Developing an SSR Concept for the United Nations” on 7 July 2006 in Bratislava, co-hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic with the assistance of DCAF. Available at: https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/ev_bratislava_060707_UN_paper.pdf

Gerdes, Felix. Civil War and State Formation: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Liberia. Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag. 2014

Gifford, Paul. Christianity and Politics in Doe's Liberia. Cambridge Studies in Ideology and Religion. Cambridge University Press, 2002

Ginio, Ruth. The French army and its African soldiers: the years of decolonization, University of Nebraska, 2017

Glennon, Michael J. Why the Security Council Failed. Congers: Foreign Affairs, 2003.

Gruffydd Jones, Branwen. Edited Collection, Decolonizing International Relations. Lanharm: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006

Hall, H. Duncan. Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship. Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1948

Harley, George W. Masks as Agents of Social Control in Northeast Liberia. New Haven: Peabody Papers XXXII, 1950

Harsanyi, Doina Pasca. Anti-Americanism. In: Benjamin, Thomas. Encyclopedia of Western Colonialism since 1450. Farmington: Thomson Gale, 2007.

Hartwig, C. W. Peacekeeping in Liberia: ECOMOG and the Struggle for Order. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal XXX, 2005.

Held, D. Model of Democracy. Stanford: Stanford University, 2006.

Hill R. Policing the Colonial Frontier. Wellington: The Historical Publication Branch, Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1986.

Hill R. The Colonial Frontier Tamed. Wellington: The Historical Publication Branch, Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1989.

Hill, Richard, Gwendolyn Taylor, and Temin, Jonathan. “Would you fight again? Understanding Liberian Ex-Combatant Reintegration.” Washington: United States Institute of Peace (USIP), 2008.

Hill; Taylor; Temin. Would You Fight Again? Understanding Liberian Ex-Combatant Reintegration.

Hobsbawm, Eric. A. Era das Revoluções. São Paulo: Cia das Lestras, 1962.

Hobsbawm, Eric. A. Globalização, Democracia e Terrorismo. Trad. J. Viegas. São Paulo: Cia. das Letras, 2010;

Hobsbawm, Eric. Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991. Abacus, London, 1995.

Hobson, John. The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics. London: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Hoffman, Danny. “The City as Barracks: Freetown, Monrovia, and the Organization of Violence in Postcolonial African Cities.” Cultural Anthropology 22 (3): 400–28, 2007.

Hoffman, Danny. The Civilian Target in Sierra Leone and Liberia: Political Power, Military Strategy, and Humanitarian Intervention. In: African Affairs 103:211–26,2004

Huband, Mark. The Liberian Civil War. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1998.

Huberich, Charles Henry. The Political and Legislative History of Liberia. Clark: The Lawbook Exchange, 2010.

Human Rights Watch. How to fight, how to kill: child soldiers in Liberia. Washington DC: Human Rights Watch, 2004.

Huntington. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma Press. 1991

Hyman, Osisioma B. C. The Internationalization of the Liberian Crisis and Its Effects on West Africa. Lagos: Gabumo Publishing Co. Ltd., 1992.

International Court of Justice. Statute of the International Court of Justice. San Francisco: International Court of Justice, 2018

International Monetary Fund. Liberia: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2007

Jaye, Thomas. Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Liberia. New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009.

Johnson, Robert. True to Their Salt: Indigenous Personnel in Western Armed Forces. New York: Hurst & Company, 2017.

Kaldor, Mary. Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and Intervention. Malden: Polity Press, 2007

Katzenstein, Peter J. The culture of National Security: Norms and identity in world politics. NY: Columbia University Press, 1996;

Klay, George and Kieh, J. The Crisis of Democracy in Liberia. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal XXII, 1996.

Knörr; Trajano Filho. The Powerful Presence of the Past: Integration and Conflict Along the Upper Guinea Coast. Volume 24 of African Social Studies Series. BRILL, 2010:

Koller, Christian. The Recruitment of Colonial Troops in Africa and Asia and their Deployment in Europe during the First World War - Immigrants & Minorities Vol. 26, Nos. 1/2, March/July 2008, pp. 111–133 https://web.viu.ca/davies/H482.WWI/ColonialTroopsWWl.pdf

Kory, W. "Liberia's Population Figures." Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal III, 1971.

Kramer, Reed. Liberia: A Casualty of the Cold War's End. Washington DC: CSIS Africa Notes, 1995.

LaFeber, Walter. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–2000, 9th edn. New York: Mcgraw-Hill College, 2002.

League of Nations. The Covenant of the League of Nations. (Including Amendments adopted to December 1924. 1939. Available at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp.

League of Nations. The treaty of peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany. Versailles: League of Nations, 1919.

Lefkow, Leslie, Tate, Tony and Whitman, Lois. How to Fight, How to Kill: Child Soldiers in Liberia. Human Rights Watch vol.16, 2004.

Liebenow, J. Gus. Liberia: The Quest for Democracy. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1987.

Little, Kenneth. The Political Function of the Poro. Part I. Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 1965.

Lyons, Terrence. Voting for Peace: Postconflict Elections in Liberia. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999.

MacDougall, Clair. Too small to succeed? Liberia's new army comes of age. Monrovia: Al Jazeera, 2014.

Macfarlane; Neil. Human security and the UN: a critical history. United Nations Intellectual History Project. Indiana: Indiana University Pres, 2006.

Man, Simeon. Soldiering Through Empire: Race and the Making of the Decolonizing Pacific. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2018

Martin, Jane. The Dual Legacy: Government Authority and Mission Influence among the Glebo of Eastern Liberia, 1834–1910. Boston: Boston University, 1968.

Masonen, Pelka. The Negroland Revisited: Discovery and Investigation of the Sudanese Middle Ages, Helsinki: Fennica, 2000.

Matz, Nele. Civilization and the Mandate System under the League of Nations as Origin of Trusteeship. London: Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 2005

Mbembe, Achille. Necropolitics. Durham: Duke Press, 2003.

Mbembe, Achille. On Politics as a Form of Expenditure. In Law and Disorder in the Postcolony, edited by Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.

Mbembe, Achille. On the Postcolony. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001.

Mbembe, Achille. Prosaics of Servitude and Authoritarian Civilities. Durham: Duke Press, 1992.

Mbembe, Achille. Provisional Notes on the Postcolony. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Mbembe, Achille. Sovereignty as a Form of Expenditure. In Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the Postcolonial World, edited by Thomas Hansen and Finn Stepputat. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

McFate, Sean. The Art and Aggravation of Vetting in Postconflict Environments. Fort Leavenworth: Military Review, 2007.

McMahon, Robert. The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003,

Michel, Marc: L 'Appel à l'Afrique. Contributions et réactions à l'effort de guerre en A.O.F. (1914-1919). Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1982.

Miles, Renanah. Security Sector Reform and Army Building: A Survey of the Armed Forces of Liberia Preliminary Project Report February 2018. New York: Columbia University, 2018.

Mobekk, E. UN Peace Operations Lessons from Haiti, 1994-2016. Oxon: Routledge, 2017.

Morello, C.U.N. Budget Cuts Highlight New U.S. Approach. Washington: The Washington Post, 2017.

Morris, J. and Wheeler, N. J. The Security Council’s Crisis of Legitimacy and the Use of Force. London: International Politics, 2007.

Moseley, Katherine. Caravel and Caravan: West Africa and the World Economies 900-1900. New York: Research Foundation of State University of New York, 1992.

New York Time. Liberia Troops Accused Of Massacre in Church. 31 July 1990. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/31/world/liberia-troops-accused-of-massacre-in-church.html>

Nigeria; South Africa. African Perspectives on Security Sector Reform, 2010. Avalable at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/AfricanPerspectivesSSR_UN2010.pdf

Normandy, E. L. African-Americans and U.S. Policy Toward Liberia 1929-1935. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal XVIII, 1993.

Omissi, David E. Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919–1939. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990.

Paris, Roland. Echoes of the “Mission Civilisatrice: Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era. In: NEWMAN; RICHMOND (eds). The United Nations and Human Security. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001;

Pedersen, Susan. The Guardians The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Peters, K. and Richards, P and Vlassenroot, K. What Happens to Youth During and After Wars? A Preliminary Review of Literature on Africa and an Assessment of the Debate. The Hague: RAWOO, 2003.

Pham, John-Peter. LIBERIA: Portrait of a Failed State. Gainesville: Reed Press, 2004.

Piot, Charles. Nostalgia for the Future: West Africa after the Cold War. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010.

Powaski, Ronald E. The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917–1991. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Prozorov, Sergei. Foucault, Freedom and Sovereignty. New York Ashgate Pub, 2007

Pugel, James. What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Liberia February–March 2006. Monrovia: UNDP, 2007.

Reno, W. Foreign Firms and the Financing of Charles Taylor's NPFL. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal XVIII, 1993.

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council. The maintenance of international peace and security: the role of the Security Council in humanitarian crises — challenges, lessons learned and the way ahead. New York: United Nations, 2005

Republic of Liberia. National Population and Housing Census 2008. Monrovia: Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Informationm Services (Lisgis), 2008.

Republic of Liberia. Population Census. Monrovia: Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services – LISGIS, 2009.

Republic of Liberia. Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Monrovia: Republic of Liberia, 2009.

Reveron; Mahoney-Norris. Human Security in a Borderless World. Philadelphia, Westview Press Inc, 2011

Richards, P. and Helander, B. No Peace No War: Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts. Oxford and Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004.

Richmond, Newman,. The United Nations and Human Security. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.

Robert. The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003

Rodney, W, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications, London, 1972,

Rodney, W. A history of the Upper Guinea coast, 1545–1800. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.

Roosevelt; Churchill. The African Charter, 1941. Available at: https://larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2015/eirv42n10-20150306/25_4210.pdf.

Rose, Nikolas. The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

Rosow, Stephen J. Globalisation as Democratic Theory. London: Millennium Journal of International Studies, 2000.

Ryan, A. Forward. In J. Farrall, H. Charlesworth (Eds.), Strengthening the Rule of Law through the UN Security Council. Oxon: Routledge, 2016.

Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Pantheon, 1978.

Sande, T Debey. Security Sector Governance in West Africa: Learning from Experience. A case study of Liberia: Developments In norms of legislative oversight, 2013.

Santos, Boaventura de Sousa. The End of the Cognitive Empire: The Coming of Age of Epistemologies of the South. Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2018.

Sassen, Saskia. Losing Control? Sovereignty in An Age of Globalization. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

Satia, Priya. Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain’s Covert Empire in the Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Sawyer, Amos, Effective Immediately, Dictatorship in Liberia. A Personal Perspective. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal XIV: 162-166, 1987.

Sawyer, Amos. The Emergence of Autocracy in Liberia: Tragedy and Challenge. Washington DC: Ics Pr, 1992

Schatzberg, Michael. Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, Food. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001.

Schatzberg, Michael. The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001.

Schwab, George. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.

Scott, David. Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004; 62 180

Scott, David. Refashioning Futures: Criticism after Postcoloniality. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1999;

Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Liberia. New York: United Nations, 2003.

SEN, A. "Why Human Security?". Apresentação no International Symposium on Human Security, Tokyo, Julho de 2000. Available at: <http://www.humansecuritychs.org/activities/outreach/Sen2000.pdf>.

Seroo, Didier; Woods, Samuel. Interview with Samuel Kofi Woods of Liberia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Sesay, Amadu. Historical Background to the Liberian Crisis. In The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peace Keeping, edited by Margaret A. Vogt, 29-52. Lagos: Gabumo Publishing, 1992.

Seyon, P. L. N. A Quick Fix for the Liberian "Humpty Dumpty": Will It Work? State Transformation and Democratization in Africa: A Lesson from Liberia. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal XXIII, 1998.

Shilliam, Robbie. Edited Collection, International Relations and Non-Western Thought. Oxon, Routledge, 2011.

Short, Clare. FOREWORD. In: The Future of Security Sector Reform, 2010. Available https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/the_future_of_security_sector_reform.pdf

Short, Clare. Security sector reform and the elimination of poverty. Speech delivered at Centre for Defence Studies | Kings College, London, UK | 09-March-1999 Available at: https://www.clareshort.org/speeches/security-sector-reform

Silva, Filipa Ribeiro da. Dutch and Portuguese in Western Africa: Empires, Merchants and the Atlantic System, 1580–1674. Leiden: Leiden Universiteit, 2011.

Sisk, Timothy. Statebuilding: Consolidating Peace after Civil War. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013.

Slovakia and Netherlands. Report from the Roundtable “The Role of the United Nations in Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform (SSR)” New York: DCAF, 2006. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SSR%203%20November%203.pdf

Slovakia. Developing a Security Sector Reform (SSR): Proceedings of the Expert Workshop held in Bratislava, Slovakia. Independent Publication, 2006.

Smith, Robert S. Warfare and Diplomacy in Pre-Colonial West Africa. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989.

Smyke, R. J. Fatima Massaquoi Fahnbulleh (1912-1978) Pioneer Woman Educator. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal, 1990

Smyke, R. J. Liberian Writing, Liberia as Seen by Her Own Writers as by German Authors. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal IV, 1998.

Söderström, Johanna. Peacebuilding and Ex-Combatants Political reintegration in Liberia. New York: Routledge, 2015.

Thakur, Ramesh. The United Nations, Peace and Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Thomas, Hugh. The Slave Trade: The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade. New York: Simon & Schuster 1997.

Thomas, Martin. Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder After 1914. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007.

Thomas-Queh, J. The Liberian Nation in Revolt: A Psychological Analysis of Recent Events. Liberian Studies Journal XII, 1987

Thompson, F. I. a. R. A Kuwaa (Belle) Wordlist. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal V, 1975.

Timmerman, Kenneth R. Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson. Washington DC: Regnery Publishing, 2013.

Tipoteh, T.-N. Crisis in the Liberian Economy 1980-85: The Role of Endogenous Variables. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal XI, 1986.

Todorov, Tzvetan. Os inimigos íntimos da democracia. Tradução Joana Angélica d'Avila Melo. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2012.

Toe, J. C. Macroeconomic Policies and Agricultural Performance in Liberia: 1980-90. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal XIX, 1994.

Tokpa, H. F. Cuttington University College During the Liberian Civil War: An Administrator's Experience. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal XVI, 1991.

Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1995;

Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. State against Nation. The origins and legacy of Duvalierism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990;

Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. The incovience of freedom: free people of color and the political aftermath of slavery in Dominica and Saint-Domingue/Haiti. In: MCGLYNN;

Twe, B. S. A Review of African Psychology in West Africa. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal XXIII, 1998.

United Nations (a) “1945: The San Francisco Conference”, 2020. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/sections/history-united-nations-charter/1945-san-francisco-conference/index.html. Accessed at: January 2020

United Nations (b). Decolonization. 2020 In: “Global issues”. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/decolonization/index.html

United Nations (c). Non-Self-Governing Territories. 22 September 2020. Available at: <https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/nsgt>

United Nations (d). International Decades for the Eradication of Colonialism. 2020 Available at <https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/history/international-decades>

United Nations (e). Democracy. 2020. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/democracy/index.html

United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report,1994. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf

United Nations General Assembly. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 1514 (XV). Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 14 December 1960. http://www.un-documents.net/a15r1514.htm

United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 66(I) of 14 December 1946. Available at: https://undocs.org/A/RES/66(I)

United Nations General Assembly. Declaration of Human Rights. New York: United Nations. 1948.

United Nations General Assembly. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 entry into force 23 March 1976. Available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx>

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Study on Common Challenges Facing States in Their Efforts to Secure Democracy and the Rule of Law from a Human Rights. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2012.

United Nations Inter-Agency SSR Task-Force. Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on Security Sector Reform. New York, United Nations, 2012.

United Nations Library, Registry, Records and Archives Unit. History of the League of Nations - 1919-1946. Available at <https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/36BC4F83BD9E4443C1257AF3004FC0AE/%24file/Historical_overview_of_the_League_of_Nations.pdf>. Accessed on 31 March 2018.

United Nations Secretary-General. United Nations Approach to Rule of Law Assistance, 2008. Available at: <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/RoL%20Guidance%20Note%20UN%20Approach%20FINAL.pdf>

United Nations Secretary-General (b). Report “Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform”. A/62/659–S/2008/39, 23 January 2008

United Nations Secretary-General. Report on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict and Societies (S/2004/616). New York: United Nations. 3 de Agosto de 2004

United Nations Secretary-General. Definitions of Human Security. United Nations Definitions. 2000. Available at: http://www.gdrc.org/sustdev/husec/Definitions.pdf

United Nations Secretary-General. Guidance Note of the Secretary-General on Democracy, 2007. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/pdfs/FINAL%20Guidance%20Note%20on%20Democracy.pdf

United Nations Secretary-General. Report of the Secretary-General Securing States and societies: strengthening the United Nations comprehensive support to security sector reform. New York, United Nations, 2013. Available: https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/480

United Nations Secretary-General. United Nations Assistance to Constitution-making Processes, 2009. Available at: <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/Guidance_Note_United_Nations_Assistance_to_Constitution-making_Processes_FINAL.pdf>

United Nations Security Council. Decision of 12 July 2005 (5225th meeting). In: Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2004-2007a. New York, United Nations, 2005. Available at https://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2004-2007/Chapter%208/Thematic/04-07_8_Maintenance%20of%20international%20peace%20and%20security-humanitarian%20crises.pdf

United Nations Security Council (b). Statement by the President of the Security Council. S/PRST/2005/30. 15 July 2005

United Nations Security Council. Decision of 20 February 2007 (5632nd meeting). In: Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2004-2007a. New York, United Nations, 2007. Available at https://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2004-2007/Chapter%208/Thematic/04-07_8_SC%20role%20in%20supporting%20security%20sector%20reform.pdf

United Nations Security Council (b). Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2007/3). New York: United Nations, 2007.

United Nations Security Council. Effective, Professional, Accountable Security Sector at Cornerstone of Peace, Sustainable Development, Security Council Stresses in Presidential Statement. SC/1040912 OCTOBER 2011. Available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10409.doc.htm

United Nations Security Council. Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2004-2007, 2007. Available at <https://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2004-

2007/Chapter%208/Thematic/04-07_8_Maintenance%20of%20international%20peace%20and%20security-humanitarian%20crises.pdf>

United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1315 (2000). S/RES/1315 (2000). disAvailable at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1315>

United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1890 (2009). S/RES/1890 (2009). Available: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES%201890.pdf

United Nations Security Council. Resolution 2053 (2012). New York, United Nations, 2012

United Nations Security Council. Resolution 2151 of 2014. Available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2151

United Nations Security Council. Resolutions from 2008-2013. Available at: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0

United Nations Security Council. Security Council Affairs Division Security Council Practices and Charter Research Branch, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 16th Supplement 2008-2009. New York: United Nations, 2014.

United Nations Security Council. Statement by the President of the Security Council. S/PRST/2011/6. Available at https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%20PRST%202011%206.pdf

United Nations Security Council. Working Methods Handbook. New York: United Nations, 2017

United Nations. General Assembly Resolution A/RES/62/7. New York: United Nations, 2007.

United Nations. Guidance note on human rights due diligence policy on UN support to non-United Nations security forces. New York: United Nations, 2011. Available at: https://unsdg.un.org/resources/guidance-note-human-rights-due-diligence-policy-un-support-non-united-nations-security

United Nations. International Trusteeship System. 2020. Available at: <https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/history/international-trusteeship-system-and-trust-territories>. Accessed at: January 2020

United Nations. Report on Liberia (Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration, 2003-08)". New York: United Nations, 2008. Available at: http://escolapau.uab.es/img/programas/desarme/mapa/liberia08i.pdf

United Nations. SSR Perspective. New York: United Nations, 2012.

United Nations. UN Charter. New York: United Nations. 1945.

United Nations. UN Secretary General Guidance Note on Democracy. New York: United Nations, 2008.

United Nations. United Nations Charter, 1945.

United Nations. United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia Report. New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1997.

United States Department of State. Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference. Washington D.C.: United States Department of State, 1919

Utas, Mats. Building a Future? The Reintegration and Re-Marginalization of Youth in Liberia. Oxford and Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005.

Vinck, Patrick, Pham, Phuong, and Kreutzer, Tino. "Talking Peace: A Population based survey on attitudes about Security, Dispute Resolution, and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Liberia." Berkeley: Human Rights Center, University of California, 2011.

Wallensteen, Peter, & Johansson, Patrik. 2004. The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Chap. Security Council Decisions in Perspective, pages 17–33.

Walters, Francis Paul. A History of the League of Nations Oxford University Press, 1952.

Weber, Max. Politics as a Vocation. In: Gerth, Hans H.; Mills, Charles W. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York City: Oxford University Press, 1948.

Westad, Odd Arne. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and The Making of Four Times. Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Wright, Quincy. Mandates Under the League of Nations. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1930

Yoder, J. C. Reconstructing Liberian Political Culture: Tentative Suggestions. Bloomington: Liberian Studies Journal XXX, 2005.

Yorke, Edmund James. Britain, Northern Rhodesia and the First World War Forgotten Colonial Crisis Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005

Zaffaroni, Eugenio Raúl. Criminología: aproximación desde un margen. Bogotá: Temis, 1988;

Zaffaroni, Eugenio Raúl. Em busca das penas perdidas. Buenos Aires: Revan, 1989.

Zaffaroni, Eugenio Raúl. Un replanteo epistemológico en criminologia. Buenos Aires: MIMEO,