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Master's Dissertation
DOI
10.11606/D.8.2014.tde-07112014-194213
Document
Author
Full name
Guilherme Sanches de Oliveira
E-mail
Institute/School/College
Knowledge Area
Date of Defense
Published
São Paulo, 2014
Supervisor
Committee
Pessoa Junior, Osvaldo Frota (President)
Bueno, Jose Lino Oliveira
Plastino, Caetano Ernesto
Title in Portuguese
Estados mentais e atitudes proposicionais: abordagens filosóficas da psicologia do senso comum
Keywords in Portuguese
Atitudes proposicionais
Atribuição de estados mentais
Cognição corporificada
Cognição estendida
Cognição situada
Cognição social
Eliminativismo
Leitura mental
Psicologia do senso comum
Abstract in Portuguese
A literatura filosófica sobre a Psicologia do Senso Comum se estende desde a década de 1970, e abrange diversas questões sobre nosso entendimento interpessoal cotidiano, nossa capacidade de interação e coordenação de atividades, o arcabouço conceitual intuitivo que relaciona estados mentais e atitudes proposicionais a comportamentos, e os mecanismos cognitivos de leitura mental que nos permitem atribuir estados mentais a outras pessoas. Nesta dissertação eu examino o desenvolvimento histórico desta literatura, identificando dois debates distintos, o primeiro (principalmente entre Paul Churchland e Jerry Fodor dos anos 70 aos anos 90) tendo como foco a relação entre a teoria da Psicologia do Senso Comum e teorias científicas (da neurociência e das ciências cognitivas), e o segundo (o debate contemporâneo) tendo como foco os mecanismos cognitivos de leitura mental e o papel das atribuições de estados mentais e atitudes proposicionais nas teorias da cognição corporificada, situada e estendida. Além do exame histórico do que argumento serem dois debates distintos e da transição conceitual entre ambos, também apresento aqui minha crítica à abordagem eliminativista contemporânea de Matthew Ratcliffe e, como alternativa, articulo os princípios de uma abordagem pluralista que combina leitura mental e interpretação contextual situada como fundamentais para a cognição social
Title in English
Mental states and propositional attitudes: philosophical approaches to folk psychology
Keywords in English
Eliminativism
Embodied cognition
Extended cognition
Folk psychology
Mental state attributions
Mindreading
Propositional attitudes
Situated cognition
Social cognition
Abstract in English
The philosophical literature on Folk Psychology began in the 1970s, and encompasses various questions about our everyday interpersonal understanding, our ability to interact and coordinate activities, the intuitive conceptual framework that relates mental states and propositional attitudes to behaviors, and the cognitive mechanisms of mindreading that allow us to attribute mental states to other people. In this thesis I examine the historical development of this literature, identifying two distinct debates, the first (mainly between Paul Churchland and Jerry Fodor from the 70s to the 90s) focusing on the relationship between the theory of Folk Psychology and scientific theories (in neuroscience and cognitive science), and the second (the contemporary debate) focusing on the cognitive mechanisms of mindreading and the role played by attributions of mental states and propositional attitudes in theories of embodied, situated and extended cognition. In addition to the historical examination of what I argue are two distinct debates as well as of the conceptual transition between them, here I present my criticism of Matthew Ratcliffe's contemporary eliminativist approach and, as an alternative to it, I articulate the principles of a pluralistic approach that combines both mindreading and situated contextual interpretation as fundamental for social cognition
 
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Publishing Date
2014-11-07
 
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